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Abstract
This research examines complex clinical decision-making processes in trauma center units of
hospitals in terms of the impact of complexity on the medical team involved in the trauma event.
The science of complex adaptive systems together with human judgment theories provide
important concepts and tools for responding to health care challenges in this century and beyond.
Clinical decision-makers in trauma centers are placed in urgent and anxious situations that are
increasingly complex, making decision-making and problem-solving processes multifaceted.
Under stressful circumstances, physicians must derive their decision-making schemas (―internal
models‖ or ―mental models‖) without the benefits of judicious identification, evaluation, and/or
application of relevant medical information, and always using fragmentary data. This research
developed a model of decision-making processes in trauma events that uses a Bayesian Classifier
model jointly with Convolution and Deconvolution operators to study real-time observed trauma
data for decision-making processes under stress. The objective was to explore and explain
physicians‘ decision-making processes during actual trauma events while under the stress of time
constraints and lack of data. The research addresses important operations that describe the
behavior of a dynamic system resulting from stress placed on the physician‘s rational decisionmaking processes by the conditions of the environment. Deconvolution, that is, determining the
impulse response of the system, is used to understand how physicians clear out extraneous
environmental noise in order to have a clearer picture of their mental models and reach a
diagnosis or diagnostic course of action.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
This dissertation explores clinical decision-making processes under stress (DMPUS) at
trauma centers from the perspective of complex adaptive system (CAS) theory, including its
approach to managing complex, collaborative work. It is an attempt to provide an understanding
of the work of trauma physicians while in the act of saving a human life during a distressing
trauma situation. Trauma is defined as a major threat to the immediate and often long-term health
of individuals. Complex adaptive systems are dynamically evolving situations involving multiple
operations. Everyone—physicists, mathematicians, psychologists, engineers, business leaders,
trauma physicians, other medical personnel, artists, and even politicians—deals with this kind of
complexity (Suh, 2005). The theory of CAS as applied to clinical decision-making is a way to
manage the complex, dynamic, unpredictable work of trauma centers. This exploration into
complex clinical decision-making processes has revealed how health care workers in trauma
centers self-adjust and survive despite uncertainty, change, and constant interaction with the
environment. It includes both participant observation and interviews with medical doctors which
combine to provide a complex, rich portrait of trauma centers.
This research focuses on the complexity of decision-making processes that exists in
hospitals‘ trauma center systems, with their rapidly changing environments. The scenario at
trauma centers is completely unpredictable from hour to hour, and decisions are constantly made
in the face of complex situations with ill-defined, fuzzy, and uncertain goals. One issue of
particular interest is the role of the physician in reducing the complexity of the milieu and
anchoring a robust medical team. Trauma physicians need to ‗keep afloat in a turbulent sea of
unexpected demands, unfunded mandates, and diminishing recourses‖ (Kenagy, 2009). This
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implies that physicians as decision-makers should learn and adapt and have the ability to make
responsive adjustments to changes in the environment by finding clear and unambiguous way to
problem-solve—all within a real-world time. To facilitate the effort to study a suitable cross
section of different patients, as well as a suitable cross section of varied treatment instances, this
research was done in real-time at a Level 1 trauma resuscitation center. However, we have had
the opportunity to analyze our data and make judgments based upon it at considerably more
leisure than is usually afforded to doctors at trauma centers.
1.1 The Practice of Emergency Medicine: Dilemmas of an Emergency Department
In today‘s hospital Emergency Departments (ED), patients present via walk-in as well as
via emergency transport services. Upon arrival, patients are triaged and assigned acuity levels,
which are generally accomplished with the use of an Emergency Severity Index (ESI). ESIs are a
series of triage algorithms that yield rapid, reproducible, and clinically relevant stratification of
patients into five groups from Level 1 (most urgent) to Level 5 (least urgent). The ED stands
alone as the only area of the hospital in which patients can be expected to present with chief
complaints of such variance, which run the gamut from toothache to myocardial infarction; from
ambiguous unspecified ―pain‖ to severe burns or trauma; and even psychological issues, such as
substance dependency and suicidal thoughts. EDs are outfitted with differing levels of treatment
rooms to accommodate the differing acuity levels of the patients, an example of which can be
seen in Figure 1.1. One hospital in North Carolina, in particular, boasts an ED divided into both
major care and minor care areas, with 41 double-bed treatment rooms and with the major care
area further equipped with six ―Level 1‖ trauma resuscitation treatment rooms.
In such an environment, the attending physicians present will find themselves faced with
incidences which call for rational decision-making but which may also come with an enormous
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number of stressors. Sometimes those stressors are directly related to the urgency of the
situation; other times, they are not. At an ED in today‘s hospital, one can expect to be presented
with patients who have neither insurance nor the ability to pay for routine medical procedures.
For this reason, they utilize the ED (which by law must provide them with care) for their routine
needs, such as acquisition of prescription medications, treatment of aches and pains, even kidney
dialysis. In these situations, it is likely that the patient will present to the physician with a
routine chief complaint, as well as a series of familiar symptoms and other medical parameters.
It is almost a certainty that these patient cases will not contain an element of urgency due to time,
thereby allowing the physician to employ a rational decision-making process (RDMP) without
convolutions and reach an accurate diagnosis.

Figure 1.1. Level 1 trauma center bay (Walleigh, 2011).
Other patients may present regularly for amorphous conditions. These ―frequent flyers‖
might be homeless, drug-seekers, hypochondriacs, or merely those desiring attention. In these
situations, physicians are presented with a series of familiar symptoms (albeit less specific, e.g.,
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―abdominal pain‖), which in turn translate into batteries of tests which fit with the chief
complaint. A patient presenting routinely with unspecific abdominal pain might receive, as a
matter of course, a urine test, blood screen, and abdominal CT scan—computerized tomography
scan. The physician then interprets the results of these tests and provides diagnosis based on his
knowledge of the original symptom parameters and the new information provided by the test
results and again, the element of time does not play a significant role. This is because decision
analysis techniques have been developed to assist physicians in making rational decisions that
reflect the best available evidence for each patient‘s individual needs.
However, in a given shift at an ED, physicians will also be faced with a variety of bona
fide emergent situations, which introduce various stressors into the clinical decision-making
process. These stressors (noises) are the ―convolutions‖ which alter the physician‘s interpretation
of the scenario, as well as his/her response to it. The most pertinent of these stressors is the
element of time constraint, which is one of the characteristic of emergency medicine. A patient
who presents with acute myocardial infarction may need immediate transport to a cardiac
catheterization lab. In this particular scenario, there is a controllable variable of time as well as
an uncontrollable variable of time. The elapsed time from onset of symptoms to the moment
when the patient presents at the ED trauma center is an uncontrollable variable of time. The
medical staff has had no control over how long the individual has waited before seeking medical
attention. However, once the patient presents with these symptoms, the element of time then
becomes a variable completely under the control of the medical staff. Upon presenting to an ED,
the patient will be registered, triaged, evaluated, examined, and treated. Each of these stages
takes a measure of time, and the decision-making process of the members of the medical staff
determine how great or small that measure of time is. Because of the critical nature of emergent
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medical situations, the decision-making process will be different from routine or rational
decision making, due to the introduction of the convolution of time constraint as well as the
introduction of another convolution: resource management.
Emergency Departments operate with finite staff, finite materials, and finite resources of
all types. In most scenarios, the levels of staffing and material are non-factors, as they prove
more than sufficient to meet the level of need. Even when supply exceeds the demand, the level
of supply does not play a role in decision-making. In emergency medicine, it is not uncommon to
have several emergent situations arise and require attention within moments of one another. A
vehicle crash with multiple occupants, an assault with multiple victims, or even a spill of some
type of hazardous material might bring multiple patients in need of emergency care to the doors
of an ED without warning—or more often, a combination of singular events can do the same. In
one scenario during this study, there was a victim of severe burns in one room, an assault victim
and recipient of multiple stab wounds in another, a severe head trauma resulting from a 30 foot
fall in a third, and acute respiratory distress in a fourth. Each of these patients presented at
nearly the same time, and while these treatments were being attended to, a fifth patient presented
with symptoms of a myocardial infarction. In each of these cases, the element of time constraint
plays a strong role, exacerbated by the fact that now the physician is required to divide his time,
attention, and decision-making acumen between multiple cases (each case having its own casespecific convolutions). Furthermore, the physician must divide the time of others, as qualified
staff is a finite resource. Qualified respiratory specialists, EKG technicians, registered nurses
(RN), nursing assistants, radiology technicians and others all play a role as valuable resources
and must be managed accordingly. Beyond human resources, the material resources must be
divided and dispensed. Units of blood for transfusion must be acquired and dispensed, IV
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pumps, EKG monitors, portable x-ray machines—all of these items must be requested, acquired,
transported to rooms, and operated by qualified staff. The convolution of time comes into play at
all levels, from the moment a patient comes through the doors, and then the convolution of
resource management rears its head as well. Seamlessly, those convolutions come together and
are must be resolved as the physician makes treatment decisions. The risk/benefit ratio must be
weighed at every moment: Is the risk of taking the time to perform this task outweighed by the
benefit of the task to the patient?
1.2 Background
The Newtonian worldview has been the dominant approach to science for more than
three centuries in almost all areas of physics, social sciences, engineering design, and in the
biological sciences. It is based in an attempt to see things at their most fundamental level and has
been referred to as ―the machine metaphor‖ in which any entity could be studied and fully
understood by reducing it to its smallest parts, or in which one event is understood as the
consequence of another (Hoffman, 2000). Once each of its separate parts (or each discrete event)
was understood, the entity‘s current state outlined, and the rules that made it functional were
understood, its future behavior (or the outcome of the events) could be predicted without much
difficulty. This, in essence, defines a deterministic system. This reductionistic conceptual
framework worked well during the Industrial Revolution, promoting both the capacity for mass
production and a dependency upon predictable environments. Its science is simple and strongly
reflects a view of causality that assumes the ability to understand systems in the simple terms of
the processes from which these systems have been created or structured.
This Newtonian conceptual framework is not sufficient for many other things. It does not
allow understanding of the complexity of dynamic systems in which there are a myriad of small
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parts (agents), all interacting with each other. A trauma center is a dynamic, highly complex
adaptive system which is itself dealing with other dynamic systems in the form of living
organisms wherein the source of the problem is not self-evident and decisions at all times
involve a complex set of choices. As such, a trauma center does not well fit the machine
metaphor of science.
The word ―trauma‖ is of Greek origin, signifying wound. The American College of
Surgeons (ACS) uses the word ―trauma‖ interchangeably with ―injury‖ to mean damage to
human tissue and/or organs resulting from the transfer of some form of energy from the
environment to a human host. Injury occurs when the impact of this energy is beyond the body‘s
resilience in absorbing it (Jacobs, & Hoyt, 2000). In this research, it is important to differentiate
between a trauma system and a trauma center. Therefore, the next two subsequent subsections
describe these differences.
1.2.1 Trauma system. A trauma system, shown in Figure 1.2, is a coordinated set of
procedures and programs that address the continuum of care from prevention to acute care,
through rehabilitation and the integration of the sick or injured individual back into society.
Trauma systems, in this sense, may vary from country to country. In the United States, trauma
systems change from state to state to accommodate the needs of the communities and the regions
they serve. Despite their diversity, all trauma systems are designed and intended to reduce the
rate of deaths and permanent disability in trauma patients (Maier, 2003). As Figure 1.2 indicates,
a trauma system involves the integration of many services, including but not limited to
Emergency Medical Services (EMS), rehabilitation facilities, and many types of trauma
prevention organizations. In essence, a trauma system analyzes the causes and medical
consequences of serious trauma, while promoting the continuum of care that provides timely and
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appropriate delivery of medical care for the rehabilitation and reintegration into society of
patients with acute traumatic injuries and illnesses.

Figure 1.2. Depth of trauma care systems.
Because of the benefits a trauma system brings to a region, local governments create task
forces whose job are to license healthcare facilities with trauma systems, to evaluate and
recommend criteria concerning the development of trauma systems, and to operate trauma
centers within its region. The systems thus created must be grounded in legislation, with policies
and procedures to ensure that they continue to meet regional needs. Thus, there must be a means
to ensure adequate funds and personnel to support operations, as well as continuing quality
improvement. These trauma systems are built with flexibility to provide the best possible care
even in the most remote circumstances.
1.2.2 Trauma center. A trauma center is located in a hospital that is designated as such
by a state or local authority or is verified by the American College of Surgeons. Trauma centers
are spread throughout the United States, distinguishing them by a strong commitment to provide
24-hours-a-day, 7-days-a-week availability of dedicated medical resources for the care of the
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injured. Medical personnel, from trauma surgeons and nurses to technologists and clerical staff—
all with specialized knowledge in trauma care—must be immediately available at the trauma
center for achieving the purpose of caring for sick and injured patients.
Trauma centers are designated according to the level of care each is capable of providing.
Levels of care are construed to mean the type of trauma services provided by the healthcare
organization, as shown by the degree of commitment in personnel and facilities made to the
delivery of care to the sick and injured. In the United States, the number of levels of care
depends upon the region, local governments, and healthcare systems. Some trauma systems have
four types of trauma centers, varying in their specific capabilities. Trauma centers throughout the
country are identified by acuity ―level‖ designations that have the following requirements (refer
to Appendix A for detailed criteria for Levels 1 and 2 trauma code):
Level 1 trauma centers provide multidisciplinary treatment and specialized resources for
trauma patients and require trauma research, a surgical residency program and an annual
volume of 600 major trauma patients per year.
Level 2 trauma centers provide similarly experienced medical services and resources but
do not require the research and residency components. Volume requirements are 350
major trauma patients per year.
Level 3 trauma centers are smaller community hospitals that have services to care for
patients with moderate injuries and the ability to stabilize the severe trauma patient in
preparation for transport to a higher-level trauma center. Level 3 trauma centers also do
not require neurosurgical resources.
Level 4 trauma centers are able to provide initial care and stabilization of traumatic injury
while arranging transfer to a higher level of trauma care.
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Table 1.1
Trauma Center Resources Needed to Reflect Maximum Commitment
Trauma Center Medical Specialists
Trauma Surgery

Emergency Medicine

Anesthesiology

Neurosurgery

Orthopedic Surgery

Ophthalmology

Plastic Surgery

Micro Surgery

Hand Surgery

Cardiac Surgery

Thoracic Surgery

Critical Care Medicine

Oral Surgery

Radiology

Pediatric Surgery

OB/GYN Surgery

Levels 1 and 2 trauma centers can also be categorized as either ―Adult Trauma Centers‖
or ―Pediatric Trauma Centers.‖ In many healthcare systems, the adult and pediatric TCs are
physically separated by location in a totally different building or in a different ward in the same
building complex.
To be considered a ―Level 1‖ trauma center, a facility must have up to 16 physicians in
specialties ranging from neurosurgery to OB/GYN who are available in-house or on-call at all
times. These specialties are defined in Table 1.1 and all the medical specialties in the United
States are outlined in Appendix B.
1.2.3 Trauma care. Trauma centers, which are part of local and regional trauma
systems, must prioritize their treatment of the patients who come to them. They are usually
triaged into five ―levels of care,‖ reflecting the large variety of medical problems potentially
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resulting from illness or injury. These levels are labeled ―Level 1‖ for the most serious injuries
and illnesses, to ―Level 5‖ for the less severely involved patients. Patients are evaluated by
acuity by either the charge nurse or the attending physician or by either of these care providers in
conjunction with EMS providers who are in the field with the patient. Patients who present with
Level 1 and Level 2 conditions are also evaluated by resource needs. Patients who are triaged at
Levels 3, 4, and 5 are considered to have less pressing needs both in terms of acuity and in terms
of resources. For these less acute cases, experienced RNs and nurses who have attended
comprehensive triage educational program assess each patient to determine triage level based on
the number of resources needed.
1.3 Trauma Centers as Complex Adaptive Systems
This research is based on the premise that many social systems are too complex to
accurately predict their futures and that, nevertheless, such systems exhibit patterns that can help
humankind cope with an increasingly complex and unpredictable future (Gell-Mann, 1996, 1999;
Janssen, 1998; Levin, 1998; Yolles, 2006; Miller and Page, 2007). These systems may be
understood by Complex Adaptive System (CAS) theory. Complexity science has proved to be
the birthing ground of computational techniques which allow for exploration of models far
beyond that of Adam Smith's "invisible hand" economic model. Adam Smith in 1776 described
the benefits to society of this ―invisible hand‖ leading groups of people (agents) who are working
and behaving in their own self interests; yet, unknowingly and unintentionally creating wellformed structures that today‘s scientists label as complex adaptive systems (Smith, 1776). These
techniques include and provide for the emergent and self-organized behaviors of Complex
Adaptive Systems.
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The science of CAS provides important concepts and tools for responding to the
challenges of health care during this century and beyond. Today‘s trauma physicians face fuzzier
boundaries due to substantial changes in the social, economic, and cultural environmental
contexts within which they work. In addition, a changing range of lifestyle choices provide
people with the ability to make decisions that can affect their risk for developing disease or
having serious accidents. Clinical decision-makers are placed in situations that are increasingly
complex, in which they must cope effectively with the inter-relationships, inter-actions, and
inter-connectivity of these elements (Chan, 2001, Gell-Mann, 1996). Figure 1.3 provides a visual
conceptual framework for a trauma event‘s diagnostic course of action that takes into account its
complexity, represented by the intertwining helical strands some of the types of decisions the
medical team faces.
The complexity of trauma center care is most directly demonstrated by the large numbers
of individuals of all ages who are daily brought in to trauma centers with complex
pathophysiological conditions and difficult problems that need immediate solutions. Despite
constantly dealing with variables that seem to be too many to count, too uncertain to express,
and, at times, too difficult even to understand, physicians still make life-and-death decisions that
generate predictable outcomes by adjusting continuously in real time toward a diagnosis and
treatment. When confronted with a massive amount of information and cues originating from the
trauma event, retrospective experience and real-time speed are the major physician-linked
variables in making sound medical diagnosis and treatment decisions. Another key variable in
such dynamic and uncertain situations is communication skills. All communications are
centrally concerned with the accurate processing of information. In the TC setting,
communication is complicated by its need to be interdisciplinary, drawing on the knowledge and
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skills of health care specialists from a variety of fields. All these agents are interacting so as to
make sense of the situation that confronts them, and their interactions must be coordinated and
consistent with one another. This communication task may become even more convoluted at
times because of the patients‘ physiological conditions, which may include multiple interacting
injuries that complicate each other. In this setting, the amount of total information conveyed
about the patient and the situation during team interactions may be drastically reduced.
Depending on who is directing the interaction, however, higher information content may be
achieved. Thus, information acquisition dynamics also play a central role in attempts to manage
complexity.

Figure 1.3. Conceptual framework for diagnostic course of action.
Trauma centers exhibit the important characteristics of complex adaptive systems (CAS),
which are composed of several relatively independent agents (Paley, & Eva 2010), which in this
case are the many different medical disciplines. Some of the most important features of CAS
are: (1) sensitivity to small perturbations, (2) difficulty in performing as predicted, (3) difficulty
in developing any type of experience, (4) inability to expect what worked last time to work this
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time, and (5) a tendency to undergo rapid adaptations, changing behaviors to improve the
chances of success and creating novelty in the process. Probably the most salient of these
features for trauma centers is the inability to predict outcomes. Dr. Thomas Scalea, a trauma
physician, discusses the research findings of Dr. Claudia Goettler. Dr. Scalea raises the
following questions: ―Why are we so bad in predicting outcome? Is it inherently that difficult?
Are the scoring systems and predictive models just that bad, or are we simply incapable of being
objective? Are families unrealistic?‖ Replying to these questions, Dr. Goettler said: ―In regards
to our inability to correctly predict outcome, we are still hampered by too little data, the inherent
differences in physiology between individuals, which likely will require genetic profiles to assess
in the future, and our own individual biases regarding reasonable error and quality of life to be
successful in prediction‖ (Goettler, 2010, pp. 1279-1288).
Decision-making studies, which vary according to the dynamic complexity of the system,
often focus on the applications of agent-based modeling to investigate how decision-makers
understand non-linear relationships within complex systems. In the framework of agent-based
modeling, decision-makers (agents) scan their environments and develop schema (interpretive
and action rules) to help them distinguish what is essential before engaging in decisive action.
The unfolding of trauma centers‘ events requires an ability to create mental models that are
―holistic‖—that sufficiently account for high complexity and uncertainty (Coffey, 2010).
Understanding a trauma center‘s turbulent and rapidly changing context requires appreciating
each of its components and being able to visualize how each part is integrated into the whole
framework. Because trauma centers are highly variable medical domains, it is necessary to have
an excellent diagnosis and treatment protocol in place and a superior leader in charge who will
prioritize with a genuine and sustained interest in organizational performance and who is capable
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of integrating, over time, all events faced by the medical team. One attending trauma physician
described his working location as a ―strategically positioned command center, as in a naval war
ship,‖ from which every decision-making event is orchestrated both with electronic technology
and with his medical team. The fundamental characteristics of CAS, therefore, provide trauma
team members (i.e., physicians, nurses, and staff) with multiple and creative paths for learning
and collaboration.
For these physicians, the trauma center medical team‘s strategies and practices, together
with the tools from CAS theories, help them form the mental models that affect the success or
failure of the team as measured by the outcome of the life or death of the sick or injured patient.
However, the current state of a trauma patient (living system) is no predictor of what that patient
will be in any given time in the future, because small disturbances in complex systems can
produce exponentially different outcomes—in other words, the ―Butterfly Effect‖ (Lorenz, 1972)
is exactly the reason as to why it is difficult to define failure. The intricate interrelationships of
elements within a trauma center give rise to multiple chains of dependencies. Changes happen in
the context of this intricate intertwining chain of inter-relationships and inter-actions at all levels,
and medical judgment in the clinical decision-making process is necessary to recognize and work
with all of these interactions.
1.4 Problem Statement and Research Questions
―A major part of the problem is the inherent obscurity, complexity, and irreducible
uncertainty associated with human illness‖ (Croskerry, 2012, pp. 50-56). Trauma code is
obviously an uncontrolled environment for at least a few minutes when any patient with highly
varied medical conditions arrives in a Level 1 trauma center resuscitation unit. Under such
circumstances, the clinical decision-making process in an uncontrolled environment is

18
overwhelming (Gawande, 2002). Often trauma physicians have to make multiple decisions under
extreme uncertainty and in real time, while the situation is rapidly changing and evolving. The
timing of these clinical decisions helps to determine their value. Another factor in their value is
their suitability to the situation at hand, given that the relationships upon which they are based
may have more or less relevance to situation.
Medical schools, major academic centers, and medical practices provide physicians with
the needed training in diagnostic reasoning, which helps physicians gather and group assessment
data into meaningful sets in order to generate hypothesis about a patient. A major factor in this
training, however, is that physicians for the most part tend to assume the presence of linear
relationships between data and patients‘ disease. However, while these relationships are
generally reliable, they will not help in determining the degree to which these relationships are
able to explain the reported association when addressing the patient‘s unique problem. The
reason is not because of problems with the accuracy or completeness of the data, but ―because
they are derived from the study of large and diverse populations‖ (Marinker, 2004, pp. v-vi). In
particular, the inability to assimilate or incorporate subsequent or evolving data about that
particular patient may be troublesome. In essence, ―what can be claimed to be generally true for
such researched populations cannot simultaneously be true for each of the individual patients
included in these populations‖ (Marinker, 2004, pp. v-vi). Therefore, when physicians are
confronted by actual patients, evidence derived from the study of populations can be less
reliable, and the path between general medical facts garnered through large clinical studies and
the specific application of those facts in individual cases becomes blurred. The rapid expansion
of medical knowledge has lead to the daunting but crucial need for the physician to distill which
information is valid and applicable to their particular individual patients, and how it is to be best
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applied in order to avoid active failures and latent conditions. Medical decision-making
techniques help in deciding whether and how the results of a study apply to a physician‘s
patients. A better understanding of diagnostic reasoning should enhance patient care outcomes.
Medical knowledge is expanding rapidly. For many professionals, learning to access,
interpret, and apply this knowledge appropriately is a daunting but crucial task, and physicians
are not immune to this problem. Under the pressures and stresses of the moment, this task can
become very complex. For example, in one situation observed during this study the attending
physician supervisor at a trauma center was required to attend to four incoming matters almost
simultaneously: (1) an internal resident physician asking for instructions on how to proceed with
a patient, (2) another attending physician reporting on a serious situation with a second patient
that required the supervisor‘s immediate attention, (3) a telephone call from the EMS on an
incoming patient, and (4) a radio call from another unit of the EMS system on a seriously injured
patient on the way to the trauma center. This required four decisions about medical interventions
that had to be made in less than two minutes. The overarching physician‘s approach was a
decision model based on prioritization by concentrating on the radio and telephone calls first and
then handling the in-house physicians expeditiously.
The research design of this study took into consideration the need to set boundaries and
study only a few questions in depth. Based on the research methodology of real-time
observations of trauma cases, boundaries were further limited by available resources, time
constraints, and ―limits in the human ability to grasp the complex nature of social reality‖
(Patton, 1987, p. 45). This research explored the following questions:
1. How do physicians make decisions when confronted with complex, stressful, and
changing situations of trauma events?
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2. Is it the physician‘s level of expertise that determines whether an intuitive judgment or an
analytical approach should be taken to the various components of the clinical decisionmaking task while in the critical moments of the ―golden hour‖?
3. To develop an approach to understanding how physicians think while caring for a
stressful trauma situation.
1.5 Summary
This chapter summarized and brought to light the importance an emergency physician
play in trauma centers everyday situations. It covered in detail the important aspects of a trauma
system versus a trauma center and the roles each play in our society. The major objective of this
dissertation is to use complex adaptive systems ideas to provide an understanding of how
physicians think when stressed by fragmentary data, multiple injured or very sick patients, and
placed in very complex situations.
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CHAPTER 2
A Review of the Contributing Literature
2.1 Introduction
This chapter presents an introduction to the material to be given detailed treatment in
later chapters, that is, the application of the theories of complex adaptive systems and human
judgment in hospital trauma centers, which receive a large number of trauma injuries. Trauma
patients are those who have sustained a physical injury. Surgeons, in particular, use the term
―trauma‖ to refer to the physical injury, whereas other medical providers prefer the term
―injury.‖ These injuries may be broadly categorized as penetration trauma (e.g., gunshot, knife
wound) and multisystem trauma, such as car crashes, falls, and other events.
Trauma injury can be serious. Injury deaths worldwide place a significant burden on the
world‘s work force. As shown in Figure 2.1, almost 50% of the worlds‘ trauma-related mortality
occurs in young people aged 15 to 44 years old, the potentially most economically productive
members of the global population. The World Health Organization estimates that trauma injury
constitutes 12% of the world‘s burden of disease. Injuries have a substantial impact on American
residents, their families, communities, and society. According to the Centers for Disease Control
(CDC), during the year of 2005 a total of 173,753 injury-related deaths occurred (Besser, 2009).
It is the leading cause of death in trauma patients in Western countries (Spijkers, Meylaerts, &
Leenen, 2010). By 2020 it is estimated that more than 1 in 10 people will die from injuries
(Fildes, 2008).
However, trauma is not always fatal. In 2006 an estimated 29,821,159 persons with
nonfatal injuries were treated in United States hospital emergency departments (Besser, 2009).
Severely injured patients can be expected to be at high risk for developing complications. The
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―reasons for this include the physiologic and immunologic impact of trauma (e.g., coagulation
disorders, hyperthermia) and the frequent necessity of mechanical ventilation, immobilization,
etc.‖ (Saltzherr, Visser, Ponsen, Luitse, & Goslings, 2010). The consequences of traumatic
injuries can be extensive and wide-ranging. They can be physically, emotionally, and financially
crippling, and in the case of disabling injuries, the consequences are enduring. For instance, as
reported by the CDC in 2012 in the United States alone, more than 1.7 million individuals
sustain intentional and unintentional traumatic brain injury annually, which typically entails
long-term changes in functioning. Such complications are at the very least inconvenient for the
patient, and they can lead to more severe negative consequences such as prolonged hospital
stays, increased costs of medical care, and mortality. Almost 90% of pre-hospital trauma-related
deaths involve brain injury. Global trauma-related costs are estimated to exceed $500 billion
annually, not including costs related to lost wages, medical expenses, property damage, fire loss,
and employer costs, among others (Fildes, 2008). The importance of research in efficiently
generating medical evidence and diminishing the problem of injuries has been well described. In
1985 the Institute of Medicine report, ―Injury in America: A Continuing Public Health Problem,‖
concluded that supporting injury research is necessary to substantially reduce injury rates. The
World Health Organization (WHO) feels that organizations and groups involved in the care of
trauma need to become more united and develop common messages with which they could
collectively advocate. The WHO‘s report emphasized a preliminary set of key resources that
every injured person should have: (i) basic lifesaving care in the field and rapid transport to a site
of definitive care; (ii) access to adequate, timely, essential care that is life- or limb-saving at
hospitals and clinics; and (iii) access to adequate, essential rehabilitation services for those with
disabilities resulting from their injuries (Shiffman, 2009). In essence, the report seeks ways to
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increase the political profile of trauma care by developing ways to utilize the determinants of
political priority in order to position trauma on the global health agenda.

Figure 2.1. Age distribution of global injury. Source: (Peden, McGee, & Sharma, 2002).
Because of the diverse health effects associated with injuries, positive outcomes are often
dependent on the availability of a continuum of providers from a multitude of health disciplines
to provide patients with quality care, better life expectancy, functional status, and greater
satisfaction. Patients arriving at trauma centers are placed in the hands of highly specialized
teams comprised of 15 to 20 medical personnel, including surgeons, residents, registered nurses,
medical students, and technicians. Most hospital providers of trauma centers have three separate
teams to ensure 24-hour coverage. Studies have shown that the risk of death for patients cared
for at a trauma center becomes significantly lower than when care is provided in a non-trauma
center facility (MacKenzie, Rivara, Jurkovich, Nathens, Frey, Egleston, Salkever, & Scharfstein,
2006). This has been the fundamental belief and impetus that led the American College of
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Surgeons Committee on Trauma (ACS-COT) to move forward its ―Advanced Trauma Life
Support for Doctors‖ (ATLS) program throughout the world to establish trauma center criteria
for the care of the injured (Fildes, 2008). To be maximally effective, trauma center teams need
not only to articulate their needs clearly, but also need to discover their members‘ unarticulated
needs, innovate, and develop frequent, timely, and accurate problem-solving communication
skills to effectively translate and disseminate information.
2.2 Interest in Complex Systems
The study of complex adaptive systems (CAS) these last few years has fascinated
scientists from every corner of the world and across many disciplines in the physical and natural
sciences, such as evolutionary biology, genetics, artificial intelligence, psychology, and
mathematics. The New York Times on May 6, 1997, brought complexity theory to center stage
when it carried an article by George Johnson entitled, ―Researchers on Complexity Ponder What
It‘s All About‖ (Johnson, 1997). In this article, the writer stated, ―Some of the grandest
phenomena, like the coursing of comets around the Sun, are marvelously predictable. But some
of the most mundane, like weather, are so convoluted that they continue to elude the most
diligent forecasters. They are what scientists call complex adaptive systems. Though made up of
relatively simple units—like the molecules in the atmosphere—the pieces interact to yield
behavior that is full of surprise[s].‖
There are number of contemporary trends that are contributing to the growth of interest in
complex systems theories and have been attracting a great deal of attention. One researcher of
the complexity theory, Michael Cohen, (Cohen, 1999), provided at least three instances of this
recent interest in complexity science. The first is that there are dramatic changes occurring in the
structure and operational scope of business and government, and the list of challenges is long:
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globalization, intensive local and global competition, process re-engineering, workforce
diversity, quality improvement, and continual innovation are but a few. Second, it is common
knowledge that we are in the midst of an information revolution, with the internet compressing
space and time. There is awareness of the fact that prices for sensing, processing, transmitting,
storing, and retrieving information are constantly declining at incredible rates. These changes
allow for the exploitation of technology to couple activities that were previously disconnected in
space and time, creating unlimited opportunities for the use of these new technologies to increase
the sensitivity and inter-connectivity of one process to another. Finally, organizational entities
are being created and dissolved at increased rates. It is noticeable from macro-level events such
as the fall of the Soviet Union, the integration of the European countries, and the mergers of
mega-size corporations, to micro-level events such as the rise of increasing numbers of
temporary employees, outsourcing manufacturing and services, and virtual organizations that are
here today and gone tomorrow. All these complex changes experienced daily ―direct our
attention to the formation and dissolution of an organization‘s boundaries and to the forces that
allow an organization to have value greater than the sum of its parts‖ (Cohen, 1999), that is
complex adaptive system.
It is easy to confuse complexity with chaos; actually, it is even tempting to use the
expression interchangeably in informal conversation to refer to a ―chaotic situation‖ as being a
―complex situation.‖ The management of traumatic injuries is such a complex, chaotic situation,
involving interactions among hosts, agents, and environments, which together have lasting
physical and psychological impacts. It is a science and an art that, like forecasting the weather, is
always full of surprises. It is also full of potential. Murray Gell-Mann, the 1969 Nobel laureate
in physics, is among those scientists who have become fascinated with CAS. He sees the
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potential for a much broader impact of complexity theory to all aspects of human endeavors:
―Even more exciting is the possibility of useful contributions to the life sciences, the social and
behavioral sciences, and even matters of policy for human society‖ (Gell-Mann, 1995a, pp. 316312).
2.3 Basic Concepts of Complex Adaptive Systems
The changes occurring in many processes can be explained in terms of how complex
adaptive systems organize, develop, and evolve. Levin (1998) has observed that it is easy to find
books that discuss with varying degrees the specifics of certain systems as CAS. For instance,
one author attempted a fairly general definition by stating that a complex adaptive system is an
ordered state of the elements that make up an environment, exemplifying it with the state of
liquid water, which is created by combining two molecules of hydrogen and with one molecule
of oxygen (Miller, 1999). But it is another matter, said Levin, to find a formal definition, ―as if
investigators fear that by defining CAS they will somehow limit a concept that is meant to apply
to everything‖ (Levin, 1998, pp. 431-436). Several researchers have nevertheless tackled the
complex task of attempting to describe complex systems. Gell-Mann explains that ―Complexity,
however defined, is not entirely an intrinsic property of the entity described,‖ as it depends to
some extent on who and what is doing the describing (Gell-Mann, 1996, pp. 2-12). Thus, each
proposed definition is somewhat unique, yet all contain overlapping features.
Broadly speaking, complexity results from the inter-relationship, inter-action, and interconnectivity of elements within a system and between a system and its environment. Complex
systems are systems that are comprised of many interacting parts that together have the ability to
generate a new quality of macroscopic collective behavior, the manifestations of which are the
spontaneous formation of distinctive temporal, spatial, or functioning structures (Qudrat-Ullah,
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& Spector, 2008). Levin has offered a fairly general and flexible definition of complexity using
three properties: ―(1) diversity and individuality of components, (2) localized interactions among
those components, and (3) an autonomous process that uses the outcomes of those interactions to
select a subset of those components for replication or enhancement‖ (Levin, 2002). A more
comprehensive definition of CAS can be stated as a collection of individual agents with freedom
to act in ways that are not always predictable, and whose actions are interconnected so that one
agent‘s actions changes the context for other agents (Plsek, & Greenhalgh, 2001).
In each of these definitions, the form of a complex adaptive system is understood to
reflect the ways in which its elements interact with one another. Some researchers of CAS
(Chan, 2001; Gell-Mann, 1994; Holland, 1992; Mitchell, 2009; Nugus, Carroll, Hewett, Short,
Forero, & Braithwaite, 2010) have begun to extract a common kernel from all of these
definitions, that is, each one recognizes there is a similar ―evolving structure‖ in complex
systems, that these evolving organizations have certain design requirements and, furthermore, in
seeking to adapt to changing circumstances, these evolving systems have demonstrated that their
parts can be thought of as developing rules that anticipate the consequences of certain responses.
To say that such systems adapt is to suggest that they have the capacity to alter or
change—the ability to learn from their experience. Gell-Mann points out that complex adaptive
system actively search for regularities. They acquire information about their environment and
their interaction with that environment, identify regularities in that information, then compress
the acquired information into an organized collection of schemata or models and take actions
based on those models (Gell-Mann, 1995b). Examples of CAS include trade balances, acquired
immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS), genetic defects, ant colonies, human bodies, hospitals,
trauma centers, and so on.
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J. H. Holland, a professor of psychology and computer science at the Santa Fe Institute
for Complexity Science and also the creator of the Genetic Algorithm, stated that the ability of
the elements in CAS to adapt or learn is the pivotal characteristic of complex adaptive systems.
More than this, they are adaptive not only because they respond to changes in their surroundings
(learn) but also because they influence their environments to conform to their current
organizational state (Holland, 1992). This is the evolutionary aspect of complex systems. Besides
evolution, complex systems seem to share two other characteristics: aggregate behavior and
anticipation. It is the aggregate behavior that researchers seek to understand and modify. Though
to fully understand all of its ramifications, there is a need to understand how the aggregate
behavior emerges from the interactions of the parts of the system (Holland, 1992).
A complex environment arises when situations or events occur that offer little or no
predictable information, at which point learning and communication are required to fill the
information gap in order to sustain the system. The assertion is made here that a trauma center
should be dealt with as complex adaptive system because it is one in which low-information
situations that require rapid learning and communication regularly arise. A trauma center is
comprised of a set of elements that are interconnected and inter-related such that changes in
some of its elements or their relations produce changes in other parts of the system. Moreover,
the trauma center system, as a whole, exhibits behaviors that are different from those of the parts.
The fundamental unit of the trauma center system is the patient. Each trauma case arrives with
information limited to that which was communicated through radio or telephone by the EMS to
the medical team at the trauma center. Considering each of these trauma cases as a sub-system of
the trauma center, this information for the most part consists of the functional requirements that
capture the intended behavioral parameters of the sub-system. These behaviors have been spelled
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out by the American College of Surgeons Committee on Trauma as the ABCDEs of trauma
care—the services and functions (behaviors) to be performed, in the form of an algorithm that
provides for a rapid survey and resuscitation of vital functions before the initiation of definitive
care by the activated trauma team.
The job of the trauma team is one of securing these functional requirements of the patient
sub-system in such a way that the information derived in doing so can drive architectural
decision-making processes that create relevant mental schemas, which, in turn, translate into the
formation of goals and their analysis and development during stressful moments. The structural
design of the trauma case sub-system is created by the actions and interrelations of the team in
using the information acquired from both the EMS and its own set of observations. These
minimum functional requirements (the ABCDEs) serve to delineate the intended behavior of the
sub-system (the patient) and allow for responding to changes that emerge from it, providing a
basic frame of reference on which the entire team reacts. However, it is not unusual for lack of
clarity surrounding these functional requirements to preclude the team from developing explicit
goals. At these times, the trauma team must also draw upon intuition and judgment.
2.4 Medical Judgment in Clinical Decision Making
The literature of intuition and judgment in decision-making has grown immensely these
last few years, covering both theoretical issues and interdisciplinary applications. A review of the
literature shows that the clinical decision-making process for most specific medical procedures
has been extensively and frequently described. However, it is hard to find studies covering
decision-making processes for a trauma center medical team operating under the stressful
conditions of caring for multi-trauma-injury patients. The medical team‘s pre-established
protocols and algorithms may not factor in the element of human judgment in the clinical
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decision-making processes. This is because these algorithms are developed based on the
procedural domain of medical expertise. Complex situations, however, bring massive amounts of
challenging, problematic, and testing information that decision-makers come across, or even
stumble upon, that helps them make their decisions. These decisions are ―decisions typically
made through gut feeling or intuition‖ (Yolles, 2006, pp. 237). Intuition and judgment have
being around since the dawn of ages, as far back as Socrates (470-399 BC), Plato (427-347 BC),
and Aristotle (384-322 BC). However, it has been only recently that researchers on decisionmaking methodologies have decided to study these most enduring disciplines in a formal manner
and incorporate them in their processes as critical developments occur in this important
competency area of decision making (Connolly, Arkes, & Hammond, 2000).
Classic models of decision-making generally assume static problem domains, rational
analysis, and suboptimal human decision-making. The land of intuition is not one many scholars
write about. ―They prefer to describe a land where the sun of enlightenment shines down in
beams of logic and probability, whereas the land [of intuition] we are visiting is shrouded in a
mist of dim uncertainty‖ (Gigerenzer, 2007). However, intuitive judgment is bounded by ―gut
feelings‖ that arise during attempts to avoid misses and false alarms. This, undisputedly, is ―the
intelligence of the unconscious‖ turned loose on practical, real-time issues of interdisciplinary
decision making. This intelligence comes strongly into play in trauma centers.
When an injured patient arrives in a trauma center, protocols to obey and algorithms to be
followed generally take precedence in the process of caring for and even resuscitating the injured
patient. These rules and procedures are starting points that are in effect long before the injured
patient even arrives at the trauma center. Through radio communications, EMS and trauma
center medical personnel are making two key decisions on how to bring a trauma event to a safe
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conclusion. First, there are decision-making events to get the patient alive into the trauma center.
Second, there are decision-making events (based on certain pre-determined criteria) for deciding
whether to code the case as either a Level 1 or a Level 2 trauma. Either of these two decision
points will activate an appropriate medical team to be on standby for the incoming patient.
While in the midst of the trauma situation, the logic of mathematical models, a myriad of
engineering technologies, and even the knowledge of evolutionary biology help trauma teams
find a plausible solution for saving the patient‘s life. However, what is rarely observed are the
repeated judgments, intuitions, and gut feelings of the leading medical team that bring about the
successful outcome of the event. Logical scientific reasoning helps to bring success to fruition;
but, not always is it solely because of the logic of scientific knowledge and the technology that is
applied. Often it is the medical team‘s unconscious choices and decisions, not just their
deliberate reasoning that makes it all possible. Everyone has such unconscious processes.
Sometimes we are not even aware of making these kinds of choices or decisions. ―The
unconscious parts of our mind can decide without us—the conscious self—knowing its reasons,
without being aware that a decision has been made in the first place‖ (Gigerenzer, 2007). The
fundamental characteristics of medical decision-making while providing the best patient care
seem to go beyond the technical, as if expert clinical judgment is generally of an intuitive nature.
It is irrefutable that science makes up a great part of medical decision-making processes; but as
the famous physician Atul Gawande pointed out, it is ―also habit, intuition, and sometimes plain
old guessing‖ (Gawande, 2002).
2.4.1 A case of intuition.

The following case exemplifies intuition in trauma episodes

and a surgeon‘s abilities to recognize patterns within a complex event. This case helps illustrate
how intuitive decision-making works in the clinical setting, as well as showing methods to
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reduce complexity in the decision-making process by taking an incremental approach to the
problem at hand. It is ―The Case of the Red Leg‖ (Gawande, 2002). The case is one of those
situations in which the absence of algorithms and protocols about what do drive physicians to
make gut feeling, intuitive- medical-judgment decision-making. This is the story of one very
complex decision-making event under extraordinarily uncertainty.
A 23-year old woman presented in the emergency department of the hospital with a red
and swollen leg. The resident physician at the scene in the emergency department thought that it
was probably only a bad case of cellulitis, a simple skin infection, and started the patient on
intravenous antibiotic. However, because of the severity of the rash, he called on another
physician, a surgeon, for a second opinion (perhaps due to intuition kicking in). The surgeon
looked at the young woman. She looked fit, athletic, and almost young enough to be a teenager.
There did not seem anything seriously ill about her, as she watched television. The young
woman again told the surgeon the same story that she had already told the resident trauma
physician, which was the same story she had a few days before also told to her private attending
physician. It was a grand wedding she attended where she kicked off her shoes and went dancing
barefooted all night. A tiny blister developed, which afterwards became an infection, and now
she was in the trauma center in a lot of pain. Initially, the surgeon was about to concur with the
resident trauma physician‘s diagnosis. But for unknown reasons, something popped up in the
surgeon‘s mind (intuition, again): the possibility of one of the most horrendous diseases ever to
befall a human being, a horrendously lethal type of infection known as necrotizing fasciitis. The
tabloid media has called it a disease of ―flesh-eating bacteria‖ and the term is not an
exaggeration. Very little is known about the disease, except that it is highly aggressive and
rapidly invasive. This disease has been associated with significant morbidity and mortality,
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rapidly killing up to 70% of the people who get it, with significant morbidity if an operation to
remove the decaying and infected area is delayed even as little as 12 to 24 hours (Sudarsky,
1987; Wong, Chang, Shanker, Khin, Tan, & Low, 2003).There is no less invasive antibiotic or
other treatment that can stop it.
Only about 500 to 1000 cases of necrotizing fasciitis occur in the entire United States
each year, mainly in the elderly and the chronically ill (Gawande, 2002; Wong et al., 2003). How
do you tell a young woman, full of life, just beginning her adult existence, that she possibly has
this horrendous disease? It would be a hard sell, since, her fever had all but gone and the only
signs of the infection were the red rash and the pain in her leg. The surgeon, however, had a gut
feeling that told him to search deeper and, as he recognized the pattern, he ―gained a sense of the
situation‖ (Klein, 2004). He excused himself from the room, spoke with other physicians. Most
physicians do not see this disease often, because it is not common; actually, some physicians fail
to see it at all throughout their entire careers. And there is no test whatsoever short of a biopsy
that will tell the two diagnoses, cellulitis or necrotizing fasciitis, apart. The scenario is thus
completely unpredictable from patient to patient. The only way to know with any certainty is to
go into the operating room, cut the patient open, and look inside (Gawande, 2002; Sudarsky,
1987; Wong et al., 2003). If it is necrotizing fasciitis, the medical team sees the destruction
caused by the bacteria. If it is not too late, they must remove the affected area—including
amputating limbs, if necessary—and hope to stop the bacteria from spreading to the rest of the
body.
Within an hour, the surgeon had obtained the young woman‘s consent for a biopsy of the
affected tissue followed possibly by amputation of the affected leg. In the operating room, the
biopsy revealed that indeed her condition was flesh-eating bacteria. To address this potential
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diagnosis, the surgeon had pre-assembled an impressive multidisciplinary team composed of
surgeons, pathologists, radiologists, dermatologists, and the technological facilities only
available in another hospital, all working in synchrony to save her life. The surgeon opted to try
to save the leg via debridement of the infected tissue coupled with thoroughly washing out the
entire area. For recovery, her doctors recommended hyperbaric oxygen treatments, which
required transport to a nearby hospital for a two hour therapy, two times daily. After four similar
operations to remove infected tissue, the leg seemed to be growing new tissue and healing.
Researchers of intuition and human judgment, such as Gary Klein, might say that the
surgeon ―had stumbled onto the phenomena of intuition‖ (Klein, 2004). To illustrate the
importance of intuition, Klein uses a story he calls ―A Baby in Crisis.‖ The nurse in an intensive
care unit was caring for an infant but ―had missed the classic symptoms of sepsis, which seemed
so obvious‖ (Klein, 2004). The supervising nurse, however, despite not having hands-on care of
the infant, noticed the signs of the problem at a routine inspection, and her ―intuition‖ told her
that a more serious danger was facing the infant. Immediately, the supervisor sought help and
information, which was met with the approval of the attending physician who agreed with the
supervisor‘s diagnosis, decision, and treatment, therefore saving the infant‘s life.
Similarly, the surgeon in the necrotizing fasciitis case did not have any of the ―classic
symptoms‖ that could guide his decision-making process, because there are no such symptoms
that will enable physicians to decide positively on the diagnosis of the disease. The pieces of the
diagnostic puzzle were put together in the mind of the surgeon, who developed those pieces into
a story that revealed the larger pattern. The ability to recognize visual patterns (i.e., the red leg)
and auditory patterns (i.e., the young woman‘s account), and form them into a larger,
recognizable, meaningful pattern are evidence of the great adaptive abilities of the human brain
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(Gluskov, 1966). Because of his ability to recognize an obscure pattern by combining disparate
sets of observations and information, the surgeon was able to create an image (a schema) of the
disease that allowed him to assemble the multidisciplinary surgical team and to translate his
―experience into action‖ (Klein, 2004). In addition to the limited information acquired from the
trauma event environment, the surgeon had previously had an experience with another patient
with the same disease.
The disease in this other patient had started with a scratch on the patient‘s chest and
escalated to the rest of the body, despite all the efforts of the medical team to eradicate the
bacteria in an attempt to save the patient. The recognition of patterns helped the surgeon to
capitalize on his stored representations of disease, by way of constructing mental algorithms for
learning the pattern of various diseases. This, in turn, offered him direct access to the judgment
and decision-making process. His judgment could not benefit from the system‘s accurate
description of the properties characterizing the trauma in order to arrive at a decision. Only his
intuitive thoughts and gut feelings about the whole thing allowed him to make a judgment about
what was going on under the skin of the young woman‘s leg.
This series of events seriously contrasts with statistical approaches to events, where
probabilities and likelihood ratios may provide some guidance in the diagnosis. But, as John Fox
puts it, statistical numbers represent ―a relationship between symptoms and diseases, but in
abstract form.‖ They say nothing about the symptoms or the disease—whether it is just a
symptom or a distinct disease, or whether the symptom is caused by a disease or just statistically
associated with it. ―Each number records the scale of a relationship but not its sense‖ (Fox,
1984). Intuition, however, can provide the sense of experiences. ―Intuition is holistic and can
reveal a remarkable degree of accuracy if the learning context has provided representative and
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valid feedback‖ (Plessner, Betsch, & Betsch, 2008). ―The output of intuition,‖ observes Betsch,
―is a feeling, for instance, the feeling of liking the entity or a feeling of risk‖ (Betsch, 2009).
These amazingly accurate gut feelings or intuitions are often based on surprisingly little
information. Researchers have shown that decision making can actually be improved despite
severe time constraints and little available information (Gigerenzer, 2007).
Gut feelings are powerful means of communication of important pre-rational information
and Gigerenzer (2007) uses this term to refer to judgment that promptly pops up in our minds,
sometimes for no apparent reason, but with so much impetus that the decision maker feels
compelled to act upon. Trauma systems, which are amalgams of medical personnel from
different specialties who have learned unique formal algorithms (procedural domain of expertise)
for diagnosis and treatment, rely on a combination of gut feelings buttressed by solid information
from the medical team to produce positive outcomes for patients. Expert medical personnel are
capable of attending to and extracting the most relevant cues in the trauma environment and can
avoid attending to distracting or irrelevant cues that the learning context may also provide as
feedback. If the initial gut feeling is proven correct, the physician‘s expectancies should match
the events with the solid knowledge-base of the assembled multidisciplinary team. Conversely, if
intuition fails the surgeon, the surgeon can quickly use the team‘s vast stored knowledge to
notice the problem, take corrective action, and provide representative and valid feedback on the
event.
In ―The Case of the Red Leg,‖ a year after the young woman‘s necrotizing fasciitis has
been treated; the surgeon visited her family to check on her progress. He noted with satisfaction
that the patient had recovered full use of her leg. His intuition, in short, had paid off not only in
saving the young woman‘s life, but also in saving her leg. The perceptual skills he had used to
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accomplish this feat included many of the intuitive decision-making processes: visual search
strategies, signal detection, extraction of cues, and pattern recognition. This significant way of
viewing a patient, who presented with what seemed at first to be a fairly straightforward and
uncomplicated problem, made it possible to recognize the lethal disease.
For many complex clinical decisions such as the one just discussed, all the hard data in
the world cannot surpass a lifetime‘s worth of experience that informs one‘s gut feeling, instinct,
or intuition (Matzler, Bailom, & Mooradian, 2007). Researchers have struggled to understand
human judgment and intuition by building mathematical models of how each item of information
contributed to influence clinical decision-makers overall judgments. The consistent and amazing
finding of these researchers has been that ridiculously simple mathematical models of disease did
as well in study after study as sophisticated, experienced clinicians. The explanation for and
implications of these results are still hotly debated (Connolly et al., 2000). In the trauma center
as it is in life, ―intuition is an essential, powerful, and practical tool,‖ that we all use to ―translate
our experience into action‖ (Klein, 2004 pp. HIV).
2.5 Summary of Literature Review and Implication to this Research
The interest of this research lies in examining the complexity of decision-making
processes in emergency medicine, and physicians‘ decision-making process under stress at all
levels of trauma center units in hospitals. One way of exploring this is through theories of
complex adaptive systems together with human judgment theories, which provide important
concepts and tools for elucidating decisions that often seem ill-defined, fuzzy, and uncertain. In
complex situations such as those of trauma events, the information that decision-makers have to
help them make their decisions is often massive and difficult to handle. In the face of such
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complexity, it is often the case that decisions ―are typically made through gut feeling or
intuition‖ (Yolles, 2006).
The problem of decision making under stress has not been solved yet and more research
is needed in the area of accurate description of physicians decision-making processes; however,
researchers have developed theories that have greatly benefited those whose jobs are to operate
in complex and challenging environments (Cannon-Bowers, 1998; Schraagen, & Schaafstal,
1999; Hamm, Scheid, Smith, & Tape, 2000). This study used Bayesian Classifier with
Convolution and Deconvolution operators to study real-time, observed trauma events data to
explain decision-making processes under tremendous stress. These topics are being introduced
here but they will be fully discussed in chapter four. ―Convolution is by far the most important
operation that describes the behavior of a dynamical system‖ (Mendel, 1990). It ―may be viewed
as a self-organized learning process‖ (Haykin, 1994). Because physicians have blurred
information and cues that are tainted by random environmental noise during injury-related
events, making their information convoluted, they must de-blur (de-convolute) the observed data
to find a best approximation of the real situation. Convolution is what causes the stress on the
physicians‘ rational decision-making processes. Deconvolution is the process of clearing out the
extraneous noises of the physicians‘ immediate environment to allow them to gain a clearer
picture of real state of affairs and come to the correct diagnosis and course of action.
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CHAPTER 3
Conceptual Framework
The American College of Surgeons Committee on Trauma (ACS-COT) has for over three
decades published guidelines for trauma care. Books from the ACS-COT such as the Advanced
Trauma Life Support for Doctors (ATLS) have outlined the general context and background for
most particular actions and trauma events. In the following paragraphs, a general framework will
be developed that distinguishes causes, sources, contents, and consequences of complexity in
trauma centers, as well as different actors involved in the clinical decision-making processes.
Decision makers in a trauma center (TC) know what they are trying to achieve but there are
many unknown variables that make it unclear how to do so, in which case comes the need to
judgmental or intuitive modes for making a decision. Patients in TCs present themselves with
undifferentiated problems and symptoms hard to diagnose that require reasoning by analogy,
intuition, judgment, and trial-and-error decision-making processes that poses real challenges.
3.1 Modes of Decision-Making
In this study, an attempt is made to operationalize complex clinical decision-making in
trauma center units of hospitals in terms of the immediate impact of complexity on both the tasks
and the actors involved in the trauma event. Figure 3.1 illustrates the nature of complex systems
along three axes. The first, the x-axis, represents the continuum between facts and actions that
are clearly defined or lend themselves to linear conceptualization and those that are more nonlinear and conceptually fuzzy. The y-axis represents the continuum between situations and facts
in which all are in agreement, to those in which various stakeholders may be in frank
disagreement. Finally, the z-axis represents the continuum between extreme certainty and
extreme uncertainty as complexity increases. These three dimensions of complex situations are
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at work in four identified domains: Rational (R), Political (P), Judgment or Discernment (J),
Intuition (I). Each of these four domains of Figure 3.1 shall be discussed next.

Figure 3.1. Concepts and fields of complexity.
3.1.1 Rational. Rational is decision making based upon facts regarding the object of
focus (i.e., the patient), which specify what people ideally should do during a decision process.
―Rational approaches are conscious, logical and planned, testable, and traditionally related to
clear and quantifiable situations‖ (Yoles, 2006, p. 37). The rational domain of Figure 3.1 has the
embedded notion of order that induces creation and systemization of information. This is the
domain where decision makers do not raise questions of uncertainty or difficulty and there is no
confusion whether they are dealing with the symptoms of a hidden problem or the problem itself.
However, decision makers have to keep in mind that these decisions are taking place in dynamic
and changing environments, requiring full information and knowledge. Rational approaches are
sometimes inadequate for uncertain or ambiguous situations that cannot be rationalized as
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common pattern knowledge. The medical team‘s interactions provide common grounds for
linking feedback and observations that is enhanced through rationalization.
The rational decision making process (RDMP) considers three characteristics: (i)
descriptive, how people actually make decisions; (ii) normative, the process that would constitute
rational decision making; (ii) prescriptive, tools that will encourage rational action in real life; in
other words, moving the descriptive towards the normative (Robinson, 2004). There is strong
desire to base decisions on rational grounds, which is corroborated by Paul Robinson that the
desire for objectivity and rationality pervades the study of medical decision making (Robinson,
2004). Physicians go through the rational process to match the parameters acquired through
experience, research, body of literature, schools, and so on. It means, in RDMP the decision
maker has a value for the decision making process. If the parameters are known, everyone should
reach the same conclusions.
3.1.2 Political. Political is decision making based upon intangible outside influences
such as the perception of others and instructions of those in superior station or standing. Decision
makers in most pivotal crossroad situations are burdened with conflicting objectives and must be
cognizant of the constraints presented by the finite nature of human and material resources. The
political process in trauma centers is ethical but normally exerts a determining or guiding
influence on the behavior of the medical team. This is the domain of Figure 3.1 in which
physicians believe that information matters in order to advance models to explain how their
preferences are turned toward immediate evaluation of one procedure versus another. It is the
domain for the evaluation and the structuring of cognition that result in a heuristic mechanism
for evaluating new information. When new information is encountered, it interacts with relevant
existing knowledge to form a virtually instantaneous assessment of the new information. And,
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this is a continuous and immediate process which occurs upon acquisition of the new information
for which the decision maker will argue in favor and make an effort to fit it into the existing
trauma case. It is the decision maker‘s prerogative to argue and make it fit to the situation; thus,
the political decision-making process. The onus then falls upon the physician to determine how
newly discovered data fits in to the developing scenario.
3.1.3 Judgment. Judgment (Discernment) is decision making based upon similarities
observed between the current object of focus and previous scenarios with comparable
circumstances while being aware of the subjective nature of judgment. It assumes that
commonalities in decisions-making are perceived by all members of the team. The trauma
situation can become difficult because it is not repetitive, outcomes are generally unknown for a
few hours at least, and results are complex to measure. However, the objectives are clear,
requiring subjective judgment. In this domain of judgment of Figure 3.1, the decision maker
develops a view of the problem and proceeds to the modeling of it because how one sees the
problem is individual and personal. The modeling of the problem allows others to visualize what
happen in the decision-making process of someone making a judgment. This knowledge of
judgment as modeling of decision-making process can be used to further understand how a
decision maker under stress arrives at solutions to problems which prove themselves difficult to
solve. In this domain, physicians rely on their library of pattern recognition in order to guide his
or her actions to somewhat reduce the complexity of the task to arrive at a reasonable predictive
probability. Judgment has associated with it the notion that situations can be intentionally
molded to maintain an environment conducive to unconscious gathering of information and
potentially revealing cues to a particular recognizable pattern. This approach of deliberate effort
to manage the developing situation allows for adaptability to a changing environment.
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Judgmental decision-making can then be conscious, unconscious, or subconscious through the
projection of cultural attributes that are connected to emotions, experience, and knowledge. The
physician‘s task is to be able to mentally read all cues and clues and make reasonable
assumptions. The articulated judgments about some environmental state derived from
physicians‘ perceptions, instincts, and interactions with emotions that eventually create
transformation in that state. It is these organizations of perceptions, instincts, and interactions
that convey to someone else what the physician has seen. And, it is the articulation of his/her
judgments that makes problem‘s solutions available for discussion and reflection because
perceptions, instincts, and interactions are organized in the context of immediate purposes and
relationships. As seen in Figure 3.1, Judgment domain moves away from certainty and
agreement (rational) to conditions of uncertainty and conflict, represented by the fuzzy or blurred
area encroaching chaos.
3.1.4 Intuition. Trauma physicians are making intuitive decisions in every trauma case.
In this intuition domain of Figure 3.1, physicians are using ad hoc mental models developed
through years of experience and it occurs through physicians‘ pattern recognition and inductive
reasoning. This is also the domain that shows that physicians do not know all the alternatives and
all possible outcomes of the trauma case. However, through a quick and limited search to
discover a few alternatives and the use of their own subjective intuition, a decision is made that
satisfies the problem presented by the system. Physicians‘ knowledge and experience is clearly
seen as playing a role of central importance in avoiding a chaotic situation. Isenberg (1985,
1986) suggested that decision makers‘ time and resources are limited and that even when
computerized theories are available, they rely on subjective mode to make decisions. The use of
this type of decision making by physicians happens because each trauma case is different, human
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beings react unpredictably and there is little direct access to knowledge about and control of the
attributes endangering the patient. The principles that drive this domain are ―why?‖ ―what?‖
and‖ how? respectively, followed by pattern recognition and mental model simulation, which
garner the internal power to exploit the opportunity. Intuitive processes help decision makers in
their decision-making performance and their abilities to reflect on actions while performing them
(Isenberg, 1985, 1986).
3.2 The Framework
In Figure 3.1, the relation between the states and the transformation is assumed to be
continuous where the set of states may lie in a connected region. Thus, the region within the
boundaries of Discernment (D), Intuition (I), Political (P), and Rational (R) are stable, though
with each region showing a different landscape. However, the place where these three regions
intersect gives rise to a complex region. Trauma centers operate at all times within this matrix of
complexity, with each trauma case having a value that lies somewhere on each of the three axes
and impacting each of the four domains. Given such complexity, clinical decision-making can
be anything but a straightforward process. In Figure 3.2, ―Framework for Clinical Decision
Making,‖ the Diagnostic Course of Action appears at the end of the mapping, but diagnosis and
treatment actually occurs iteratively throughout the process, relying on representations of
potential solutions. The framework in its simplicity suggests flexibility and transparency; but it is
the evolution of the trauma event that fills in the details within that framework and creates
complexity. That is, at each step of the trauma case, which is from the onset of the EMS critical
report to the first assessment on to the second assessment, the team is intervening through
interactions and interrelations among medical team members and the patient. These interventions
are in the form of experts in airways, breathing, circulation, cardiopulmonary resuscitation
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(CPR), and many other medical experts‘ actions. Therefore, this complexity occurs throughout
these interventions or these constants in the framework in a fashion that may be imagined as a
sort of helix. This helix has been drawn as a quadruple helix consisting of medical judgment,
political and rational considerations, and treatment decisions, all leading to a final diagnostic
course of action. One could imagine that the helix represents an ongoing mental process, and as
one moves from the initial and secondary assessments to the diagnostic course of action, the
combined factors create a complex, curved-yet-linear, three-dimensional structure of the helix.

Figure 3.2. Framework for clinical decision making.
Ultimately, this is all about perception. This is about perception, data collection, and how
people perceive the ongoing event. Simultaneously, it is about how they process this information.
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At this level, data is a critical component. There is an initial contact with data that involves
political, rational, and judgment decision-making. This contact includes the people handling the
data as well as those perceiving it. There are three ways in which the data are treated and
handled, which introduces an interesting form of uncertainty. At this point, complex decisionmaking is to be operationalized as a combination of all four aspects of decisions, such that it can
be measured or expressed quantitatively. It can be stated that complex decision-making includes
rational, intuitional, and political decision-making as the event unfolds. The medical team
navigates the environment and how the team interacts with that trauma environment causes the
team to decide its next move, which is supported by the feedback the team gets from the
anticipatory tactile and auditory cues that in turn help the team move next, and so on.
In one sense, the trauma forces one to embrace a form of randomness due to the intricate
folding of the state-space of the trauma system over the time of the event. The physician‘s task is
to be able to mentally read all cues and clues and make reasonable assumptions. When
physicians make judgments about some environmental state, transformations in that state must
occur. A very basic example of how judgments change states occurs when one tries to navigate
from one side of a dark room to the other. That individual is going to adjust in order to get their
bearings. Throughout the process, the individual gets tactile and auditory cues, which are being
fed into their sensory system. Intrinsically, there are different points in the diagnostic process:
There is the initial assessment, and there is the secondary assessment, both of which work like
gates in the information processing and decision-making system that eventuates in a diagnosis
and a treatment plan. As gateways or transition points in the decision process, they get initial
input followed by an initial vigorous push, and then a rapid increase in stimulus as the situation
evolves.
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Following this reasoning, at the intersections of the three steps in Table 1.1 (initial and
secondary assessments and the diagnostic course of action) is an actual treatment, in which the
arrows might be spaces where there is an activity that may lead to some type of decision making.
Because a patent feedback loop creates the system that is out in the environment, and the
environment gives it some sort of feedback, the system, when it is functioning properly, selfcorrects. The trauma center operating as a system that is constantly getting information, reaches
these points, these markers, these gates—and it changes. It can correct, but it can also overcorrect. The medical team is always treating, never stopping, such that the conceptualized gates
or markers get the system in motion. This treatment motion is symbolized by the arrows. The
treatment motion is important in this model, and all decision cues along the way are qualified at
every step. At the end of the decision making-process a cure or solution is found, or the patient
dies.
There are at least three things that are simultaneously going on in the framework, which,
along with some randomness or chaotic inputs, characterize the unknown. Because there are
always chance factors, variation will occur regardless of the approaches taken by the medical
team. If one thinks of the four domains shown in Figure 3.2 (political, rational, medical
discernment, and intuition) dynamic factors in decision-making that are intricately tied, the
complexity really shows. In that complexity a truth is revealed: There is no such thing as purely
rational decision-making. One can always aspire to it, but there is no such thing as purely
rational because no decision can be free of subjectivity or bias. Even if one attends to one‘s own
subjectivity and potential biases the questions asked as a researcher are inherently biased because
they are formed by interest. For example, the things someone else sees walking down the street
versus what I see or what a third person sees might have something to do with what catches our

48
eyes, which in turn is dependent on a range of factors from differing visual fields to differing
stimulus thresholds. The concept of ―bounded rationality‖ is used to designate rational choice
that takes into account the cognitive limitations of the decision-maker (Simon, 1972). Decision
makers in any specialty or profession try to do it, but it is often the case that it does not happen.
The next step may be to operationalize complex decision-making by either designing a
construct that says ―This is what complex decision-making means‖ or by searching the literature
for an existing definition. An operationalized definition of complex decision-making is needed
because chaos encroaches on decision-making and causes complexity. A search of the literature
on this aspect of clinical decision-making has not yet turned out any work from other
researchers. It is thus an interesting study because it can reveal how social, political, and even
economic pressure can become centers of power from interested stakeholders. These factors
combined in to the mix make rational decision-making straightforward, but then judgment and
political decision-making variables also need to be factored in. It may be assumed that by this
conceptualization of the model, rather than complex decision-making being somewhere in
between, that complex decision-making is inherently a combination of the political, the rational,
judgment, and intuition. Chaos is included because trauma centers are, or it can be at times,
unpredictable and chaotic, in which the very uncertainty, unpredictability, uncontrollability, and
dynamism of the environment reify the idea of adaptive capability of complex systems. Because
of their adaptability in and evolvement with a changing environment, these dynamic networks
that are of interest are often described as complex adaptive systems (Goldstein, Hazy, &
Lichtenstein, 2010).
At this point in the research, it is not a matter of being right or wrong; instead, it is a
search for a way to develop a theory such that the framework can be thoroughly analyzed. In
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order to achieve this, the goal is to define a construct of interest that will allow the development
of ways to measure and observe the decision-making process. Therefore, the strands that go like
a double helix, a triple helix, or even a quadruple helix as in a deoxyribonucleic acid
macromolecule (DNA) strand such that political, rational, medical judgment and treatment
decisions are each represented by one strand. We now add the unpredictable. Referring to Figure
3.2, it is when the three or four of these ongoing actions (the helix) hit the edges of chaos that
they become complex. There is then this threshold of uncertainty where these edges come in and
become complex, which generates disagreement.
3.3 Process Map of Trauma Center Decision-Making
Many of the issues confronting physicians during a trauma case require the ability to
articulate thoughts and ideas concisely during stress. Figure 3.3 illustrates how a trauma center
(TC) and its medical team engages in decision-making under stress that originates with the
Emergency Medical Service (EMS) arriving at the trauma scene and transporting patients to the
hospital, through the time that the trauma center medical team takes over the patient, and to the
point where a proper diagnosis is reached.
Figure 3.3 shows the mapping of a complete trauma case event, which starts with the
EMS personnel arriving at the scene of the event. During this period of time, communications
between EMS and the TC is a constant. These are two-way communications as represented by
the arrow until the injured or sick patient is delivered to the TC with an EMS critical report. At
the time the patient is taken over by the L1TRU team, it is assumed to be a moment all
convoluted or blurred by the physical condition of the patient, lack of historical information, the
physicians‘ mindset, and the constraints imposed by the environment. It is the physicians‘ job
according to experience and knowledge to de-blur his/her mental models. It is a monumental and
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an almost impossible task to understand and capture the process of what physicians are doing,
saying, or thinking in the context of a healthcare trauma case.

Figure 3.3. Process map of trauma center decision making.
This is a process in which physicians with a lot of experience go through the process
more expediently compared to a novice physician. Once the mentally collected data are
organized (de-blurred) and made sense of, physicians are able to return an approximation of the
rational decision making process (RDMP) under stress, and have an initial diagnosis for the
patient. Treatment then is outlined and the team works towards this common objective.
Throughout the process, physicians work relentlessly and persistently with time-critical nature of
certain injuries while continuously drawing upon their experience to provide optimal care to the
severely injured patient. The successful outcome of the trauma event then becomes directly
correlated to the physician‘s experience and skills.
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CHAPTER 4
Methodology
4.1 Research Design and Procedure
This chapter presents the methodology, including the research design and the procedures
by which data is collected and analyzed for this study. The study is a combination of shadowing
emergency medicine attending physicians (EMAP) during their daily shifts, observing
emergency physicians in real-time trauma cases (referred to as ―trauma code‖ by physicians)
while situations are developing, reviewing transport emergency medical services (EMS)
audiotapes of actual trauma cases in progress, and interviewing EMAPs during the shadowing
observation period in the trauma center. The study site is a designated Level 1 trauma center
based at an academic medical facility that treats approximately 3,600 trauma patients yearly.
This healthcare institution has a multistate referral base and an air medical unit facility. The
hospital‘s emergency department (ED) has an annual census exceeding 100,000 patients. The
research and its data collection procedures were reviewed and approved by the Institutional
Review Boards (IRB).
The model was designed on an X, Y, and Z-axis to allow for mapping decision-making
processes and to look at the processes as medical team members reach certain benchmarks, or
simply markers of decision-making. Every marker is somewhat alike in that the decision maker
goes through a stage, which is a decision-making marker that records passing through a threshold
such as the initial assessment, secondary assessment, blood pressure (BP), heart rate (HR),
respiratory rate (RR), and so on. Lack of understanding of the challenges of these thresholds in
the environment of acute care by non-medical researchers of decision making may lead to poor
guessing of care givers‘ mental processes. Trauma centers medical teams are dealing with living
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systems that are complex with emergent characteristics that analytical models, attending only to
local interactions and relationships of the system, fail to capture. As it was designed, the model
may enable researchers to gain an insight into the well orchestrated cognitive processes of these
practicing physicians while working with and treating living systems. The study attempts to
explain the physicians thinking process while attempting to answer the questions of ―How do
physicians make decisions when confronted with complex, stressful, and changing situations of
trauma events? Is it the physician‘s level of expertise that determines whether an intuitive
judgment or an analytical approach should be taken to various components of the clinical
decision-making task while in the critical moments of the golden hour? Thus, the nature and
development of the model is an attempt to answer these questions. Further details about the
model are outlined in the following section.
4.2 The Decision Making Model
The model designed for this study uses Bayesian classifier, convolution, and
deconvolution operators. This model is designed to explain physicians‘ thinking processes while
making decisions under stress during a trauma situation. This is shown in Figure 4.1, which is a
model explicating physicians thinking process. Instead of just seeking statistical inferences,
solutions are continuously sought until a familiar pattern emerges. Physicians want to achieve an
approximation to a rational decision making while under the stress of a trauma code. In this
model (1) data mentally collected is assumed convoluted; (2) Bayesian classifier generates a
confusion matrix; (3) when accuracy is less than threshold, data is to be de-convoluted; and (4)
physicians achieve decision-making under stress (DMUS). These decision makers in healthcare
not only are faced with the stress of human beings body functions that need to be restored to their
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proper functional requirements, but they are also faced with many possible latent dilemmas (i.e.,
patients with AIDS, tuberculosis, hepatitis) that exerts tremendous pressure in the process.

Figure 4.1. Data deconvolution model.
The environment of a trauma center is one in which physicians are constantly dealing
with individual team members‘ cognitive processes and personal task work skills as well as
information exchange and team leadership. The quantity and type of knowledge acquired by
team members may influence decision processes. The structure of the physicians‘ cognitive
processes during a trauma case, as shown diagrammatically in Figure 4.1, requires a strong
knowledge base and experience for selecting the appropriate set of knowledge patterns to be
activated in any given trauma situation. These decision-making processes are also influenced by
variables beyond physicians‘ control, such as equipment failures, the surrounding environment,
and material resources that may move physicians unsteadily to the edge of chaos (see Figure 3.1)
or it may stimulate enough diversity to adapt to environmental demands in innovative ways. The
EMAPs in trauma centers are constantly compelled to adapt in and evolve with a fast changing
environment. It is in this state, the edge of chaos, where these physicians are most productive, in
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which their works result in maximum creativity that leads to innovations and new possibilities.
In this model, the trauma team mental processes proceed through the actions of and interactions
among its members‘ experiences, knowledge based medicine and the team‘s goals at hand as it
reaches the edge of chaos.
Physicians are bombarded with a multiplicity of scoring systems that supposedly produce
thresholds (see Figure 4.1) of decision making that might be used as predictors of potential
mortality. As example, the Glasgow Coma Scale (simply known as GCS) purports to facilitate
detection of early changes and trends in the neurologic status of patients. GCS is a simple
method for determining the level of consciousness that is predictive of patient outcome (ATLS,
2008). Another example is the blood pressure (BP) scale for determining blood volume and
cardiac output. As BP reaches low levels in addition to a patient having abdominal pain,
physician‘s decision is to initiate surgery procedures. All these human and non-human variables
create convolution in the mind of the physician‘s decision-making process. Therefore, on the
onset of the trauma, the data mentally collected by these individuals are blurred or convoluted by
many known and unknown variables while decisions are made at every fraction of a second of
the process. The Bayesian classifier then is used to classify these decisions made during stress
into the types of decisions occurring during the trauma. It allows for recognition of the number
of decisions correctly made. Subsequently, BC originates a confusion matrix which determines
the percentage of accuracy of the physicians‘ analysis. This percentage of accuracy is compared
to the thresholds for that particular procedure or decision-making action. Accuracy percentage
that is greater than the physician‘s threshold takes the process to the DMUS final result (see
Figure 4.1). At this conjecture, novice versus expert physicians are different in their abilities to
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make decisions because the experts generally generate less mental iterations for each decision
made during a trauma case.
Deconvolution operators are applied to these convoluted data to de-blur or de-convolute
the data and to act as simulator of physicians‘ mental processes of arriving to a decision, and it
can be viewed as an optimization of the process. It attempts to remove the distortion of the
mentally collected data in the presence of noise by recovering a sharp version of the blurry input
data, leading to the true diagnosis. Deconvolution doesn‘t act as crystal ball; and in decision
making, it depends on the estimating abilities of the decision maker. Physicians still have to
decide whether the de-blurred data is right or wrong and either perform other mental iterations
for more solutions or act on the initial de-blurred data based on observations that suggest it is a
correct decision. In essence, the de-blurred data become an approximation of the physician‘s
rational decision making process, in which the output is a confusion matrix that offers the
percentage of accuracy of the decision. Therefore, these results may explain the processes by
which physicians make decisions under stress. Deconvolution then becomes the sorting out, the
unscrambling of convolution that exists in the minds of physicians during those initial moments
of trauma events.
4.2.1 Bayesian classifier. Classification is the problem of identifying or mapping to
which group of categories an observation belongs, generally accomplished through the use of a
training set of data containing observations whose features are known to the researcher. There
are many classification algorithms in use by individual and organizational researchers, of which
Naïve Bayesian classifier is one of them. For years researchers have been aware of the
importance of statistical validation of published results, which have influenced the conception of
an ever increasing number of classifiers. Today‘s computing power has facilitated the
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development of both new and hybrid algorithms. Here for example are some of the most
commonly used classification algorithms:
Naïve Bayesian classifier
C4.5 statistical classifier
CN2 induction algorithm
Neural Networks
Logistic regression
Decision trees
Bayesian networks
Markov models
The details on these classifiers can easily be found throughout the literature of published journal
articles and many books and textbooks.
Naïve Bayesian Classifier (BC) is a probabilistic classifier model based on Bayes‘
Theorem. The Naïve Bayes classifier greatly simplifies classification by assuming that
characteristics are independent from each other given the value of a class variable. Therefore, it
yields good performance in classifications, making it one of the most efficient and effective
learning algorithm. One important function of BC is that of probability revision of the initial
physician‘s guess (prior probability) based on new information from either research or
experimentation to achieve a new revised probability (posterior probability) of the diagnosis. In
essence, Bayesian classifier provides an effective way to approach many problems which
decision makers need to identify solutions to problems that are not initially clear or logic but are
solvable probabilistically. More important is that it allows researchers to come up with results
without having to go through massive amounts of data that grows with the model.
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The Naïve Bayesian Classifier (BC) model classifies the decisions made during the
trauma case and provides the general framework to describe decisions that are made in the
uncertain environment of trauma centers. BC operates by simply considering all of the
characteristics of the variables being classified independent of each other, using information that
is insufficient to completely determine the correct answer. In spite of its simple design and
apparently over-simplified assumptions, BC has worked well in a multitude of complex real
world situations (Charniak, 1991).
For the most part in statistical works, investigators use the classical methods of
estimation that are based solely on information provided by random variables, focusing on how
to extract information from available data. These methods essentially interpret probabilities as
relative frequencies. Bayesian statistics represents statistical estimation as the conditional
distribution of parameters and unobserved data, given observed data. An important difference is
that in Bayesian theory, the parameters are viewed as random variables. The foundation of the
Bayesian theory rests on subjective probability. From basic statistics, one learns two approaches
of probability: relative frequency and indifference approaches. But, in many studies of
probability, these two approaches are not applicable. In medicine where Bayes‘ theory is
extensively used, physicians need to consider questions such as ―What is the probability of this
patient having cancer?‖ How likely is it that a patient has the flu?‖ ―What is the likelihood of
survival for this patient?‖ ―What is the possible outcome for after surgery?‖ These are questions
that can only be answered subjectively, always reflecting one‘s subjective opinion. Experienced
physicians mentally review large amounts of clinical information about a patient to arrive at
these clinical judgment points where these probabilistic questions arise to form predictive
models. Questions of when, why, what, and how then permeate the analysis and are dependent
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upon four factors: (1) changes in the condition of the patient, (2) changes in the collected data,
(3) scoring systems producing thresholds of decision making, and (4) organizational
requirements. These factors influence the formation of subjective probabilities, which
distribution then can be specified as prior probability distribution and reflects the researchers‘
prior assumptions about the parameter.
Once the prior probability distribution is specified (through experimentation and/or
research), the posterior probability can be mathematically computed, and the investigator then
can easily use it to make inferences about the population of the parameters. Posterior
probabilities are nothing more than prior probabilities estimates of specific events of interest
which were revised with the help of additional information obtained from sources such as
samples, tests, laboratory reports, patient‘s conditions, communication among medical personnel,
and clues from the environment. Given this new indicative sample information, posterior
probability values are then mathematically calculated with equations provided by the Bayes‘
theorem to denote the outcomes of the trauma. In summary, the subjective prior probability is to
be the inextricable partner of posterior probability in the Bayes‘ classifier approach to building
models that combines prior knowledge with new information extracted from the experiment.
4.2.2 Convolution.

In applied mathematics, convolution is a mathematical operation

on two functions, say f and g, producing a third function that is deemed as a modified version of
one of the two original functions. The convolution problem refers to the computation of the
output signal y(n) given the knowledge of both the input x(n) and impulse response h(n).
Convolution is one of the most widely used operations in mathematics with applications in many
fields, including medicine, bioengineering, electrical engineering, imaging, seismology, digital
signal processing, probability, statistics, and many other fields. It complements well the Bayesian
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classifier model in that it satisfies each of the characteristics of the input of a system
independently of each other. The fundamental assumption about the convolution input is that it is
random and the values of the input are completely independent from one value of time to the
next value (Mendel, 1990). Because of these features, convolution became a popular tool with
scientists and it is used here in this research in combination with deconvolution operator for
explaining decision making processes under stress. To this end, Matlab® software with its
convolution and deconvolution functions is used in the model. Figure 3.3 shows a map for
prototypical task situations in trauma centers and illustrates the complexity of the physicians‘
repertoire of mental models relevant to situation analysis that may easily become convoluted in
their minds. Thus, the figure illustrates the potential for knowing how the physician mindset, the
patient‘s physical conditions, and the environmental constraints affect the outcome of decisions.
And, by understanding the way in which input factors are comprised of large numbers of
tangible, intangible, known, and unknown variables‖ (EMAP-1), it seems reasonable to think
that it should be possible to emulate physicians‘ decision making processes regardless of
convolution in the first few minutes of the trauma code.
Under the stress of a trauma event, physicians have the challenge of time constraint,
environmental noise, and other disturbances, causing their mental models to be blurred
(convoluted). In the model, convolution is the actual data for the physicians‘ decision-making
process under stress (DMUS), in which the function f is stressed. Stressing the function f is the
convolution operation. For example, it is like adding lines to an image. It really blurs the image
through the convolution function. However, physicians don‘t make decisions on blurred models.
It has to be mentally de-blurred because physicians under stress have to make swift judgments
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because of time constraint to create a quick model which identifies what has been observed while
the cognitive processes are blurred.
Experts in convolution (Sheth, & Rossi, 2010) argue that convolution based approach
may permit a more efficient selection of the objects for which unbiased reconstruction and
calibration are required. Convolution then becomes a formidable tool in determining a system‘s
output from knowledge of a subjective and uninformed input and the system‘s impulse response.
Because physicians know how patient (a system) injuries affect organ systems and understand
that human physiology is comprised of balanced functions, it is possible for them to analyze
treatment responses of the system. Thus, it is possible to determine what output results from a
particular treatment action. In this case, convolution determines a system output from knowledge
of its input. In convolution, investigators find it to be a tool to obtain a statistical picture of an
overall situation.
4.2.3 Deconvolution. Deconvolution is a filtering process used to remove the
extraneous noises to allow for understanding and visualization of physicians‘ decision processes,
which should be an approximation of the rational decision making process under stress (RDMP).
Deconvolution then becomes the unraveling of convolution (Mendel, 1990). The importance of
deconvolution in this study can be thought of as similar as a telephone communication system.
Peoples‘ voices can be easily distorted by the telephone system that exists between the mouth
pieces at both ends. The telephone system smears out the voice sounds, resulting in interferences.
Unless smearing is undone, these interferences make it difficult to understand the spoken words.
Deconvolution (and convolution) is used in real-time to invert the effect of the telephone
system, allowing for clear, undistorted messages to flow from transmitting to receiving ends. It
has to be accomplished in real-time to avoid unpleasant delays in the conversation. The
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deconvolution process in communication systems uses the same convolution and deconvolution
equations called equalization. Physicians in trauma centers are continuously deconvoluting the
real-time acquired data to make decisions about the system (patient).
In mathematics, deconvolution is an algorithm-based process used to reverse the effects
of convolution on recorded data. The literature of deconvolution is extensive, which gives
evidence of its importance in many disciplines such as in medicine, image de-blurring, seismic
data deconvolution, communications, and so on.
4.2.4 The Matlab® program. A Matlab® program was created to run the data that
explains the thinking process by which physicians make decisions. Deconvolution (referred to in
Matlab® as de-noise function), convolution, and Naïve Bayesian classifier functions were
utilized in order to achieve the results for this work. The program was created with objective of
helping in the explanation of physicians‘ mental processes while under the stress of a trauma
event. Naïve Bayes classifier classifies data in two steps, which are training step and prediction
step. In the training step, using the training samples, the method estimates the parameters of a
probability distribution, assuming features are conditionally independent. In the prediction step,
the method computes the posterior probability of that sample belonging to each class. The
method then classifies the test sample according to the largest posterior probability. Naïve Bayes
function operates based on estimating P(X∣Y), which is, probability of features X given that
class Y is known. This Matlab® function provides for the use of many distributions, including
the normal and multivariate distributions. It uses less data than the other classifiers for accurate
classifications, making it particularly effective. Deconvolution, or de-blurring, which Matlab®
refers to as de-noise, is a mathematical operator greatly used by researchers of imaging,
seismology, petroleum excavation, and many other disciplines. The objective is to take an event
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that is blurred or degraded by environment noises, such as physicians under the stress of a
trauma patient, to capture and describe the distortions. Throughout the process, the decision
maker really doesn‘t have a vision of what is in reality happening. What the decision maker has
is vision as an image that represents what he/she would have if they had a perfect understanding
of the event before them. In Matlab®, the functions include:
deconvwnr: Implements deblurring using the Wiener filter
deconvreg: Implement deblurring using regularized filter
deconvlucy: Implement deblurring using the Lucy-Richardson algorithm
deconvblind: Implement deblurring using the maximum likelihood algorithm
These functions can all be used to provide information about the noise to reduce the existing
noise that blurs the decision maker‘s action.
4.3 Data
For the most part, data collection was based on site visits, individual interviews, and
medical charts concerning trauma cases. The data were obtained from a Level 1 trauma center of
a medical school in a major healthcare system. This data was a collection of 14 trauma cases,
which are outlined in Appendix C. Of these data, two of the cases were not included in the study
due to insufficient information; thus, twelve cases were identified that met the study criteria.
The researchers followed the plan to go into the trauma center as the events were occurring and
got the data first hand, real-time data collection of actual trauma events. It was all accomplished
using the methods described in Section 4.1 (Research Design and Procedure). It included many
days of shadowing attending physicians during a period span of two months (2012) in order for
the researcher to familiarize with procedures and processes of caring for the seriously ill or
injured patient in a trauma center. During this period of time, it was observed how physicians
organized and made medical decisions in fourteen trauma cases and the identification of the
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variables needed for the decision making model. The second step of this data collection was to
review EMS transport audiotapes. It was reviewed 51 days of audiotapes of communications
with the trauma center from ground EMS and Helicopters EMS for Level 1 and Level 2 trauma
codes for the mentioned period.
Table 4.1
Trauma Cases Observed in the Trauma Center

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14

Patients Observed During Shadowing of Physicians
Mechanism of Injury
Duration in Trauma Center
Motorcycle Crash
06 minutes
Gunshot Wound to Lower Extremity
58 minutes
Multiple Gunshot Wounds
1 hour 11 minutes
Vehicle Crash
3 hours 47 minutes
Severe Knife Stab
29 minutes
Blunt Knife Stabs to Chest
18 minutes
Vehicle Crash
1 hour 08 minutes
Vehicle Crash
1 hour 31 minutes
Gunshot Wound
1 hour 23 minutes
Severely Burned
28 minutes
Blunt Chest Wounds
41 minutes
Vehicle Crash
28 minutes
Vehicle Crash
1 hour 14 minutes
Vehicle Crash
10 minutes

The final step on this data collection procedure was to review the medical records of 14
Level 1 and Level 2 trauma cases in order to gather the final data for the variables used in the
model. Table 4.1 summarizes 14 of the trauma cases that occurred during shadowing and
observation in the trauma center. This procedure, reviewing the medical cases, was also covered
by the IRB, which authorized and approved the retrieval of 12-15 de-identified trauma encounter
records. The request was approved, along with a data collection form onto which the information
was recorded. However, the medical records contained all of the patients‘ identifiers. To bypass
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the problem, the IRB committee authorized EMAP-1, a physician, to extract these data and then
destroy the medical records with any linking information, thereby, permanently de-identifying
the data.
4.3.1 Method for data collection. The process of getting the observations was
accomplished by observing and taking notes of the trauma event cases brought in to the trauma
center. Each trauma (patient) event was considered an observation, one cycle, and each cycle
representing one person as being input (arrival) and output (discharge from the trauma center).
For this decision-making model experiment, it was recorded 14 (fourteen) of these trauma events
in order to have a workable sample of how decisions are made in real time within the trauma
center environment. Each trauma code was observed from the moment the trauma patient
arrived at the trauma center (EMS hands off) until the time the patient left the care of the trauma
medical team or to a maximum of 60 (sixty) minutes, whichever came first. The 60-minute mark
was where a decision was made to stop observing and the trauma event was considered over for
study purposes. Data were gathered on all these different events. The investigator looked at
those different gates of the framework or those points of decision-making, whether it was the
triage, the initial assessment, the secondary assessment, diagnostic course of action, and so on.
Those gates or markers constituted the decision-making thresholds. In cases of potentially fatal
trauma, exacting numeric values sometimes were discussed by the trauma team as the threshold
and target for the posterior probability, once a test was recommended. These thresholds were
determined based on benefit-risk analysis associated with each patient or treatment, and each
threshold is individualized to each patient and according to the experience and knowledge of the
physician. The data recorded for each cycle (patient) helped find out where the input was, with
its starting and finishing points.
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4.3.2 Procedure. There were many patients who arrived at the hospital and were either
triaged as Level 1 or Level 2 trauma cases during shadowing of those physicians in the period of
this study, from which events were observed as they unfolded and the data were collected. Table
4.2 is a sample of the data collection instrument.
Table 4.2
Sample of Data Collection Form

Mechanism
of Injury

19
16
14
13
19
20
16
18
15
13
20
22
18
22

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

94
96
96
98
97
98
98
95
95
96
95
94
95
97

3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3

Physician
Decision

Respiratory
Rate

102
103
102
92
98
95
106
98
94
89
93
93
93
80

Glasgow
Coma Scale

Heart Rate

134/102
140/83
140/90
138/87
140/83
132/84
142/92
130/100
124/79
133/76
135/89
111/89
122/81
130/77

Pupils L/R

Blood
Pressure

22:32
22:37
22:43
22:48
22:53
22:56
22:59
23:01
23:10
23:20
23:25
23:30
23:40
23:46

Oxygen
Level Sa
O2 %

Time

Trauma Case 13

8
8
9
9
10
12
12
12
12
12
13
15
15
15

4
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
1
1
1
1

Observations
Patient arrived by
EMS.
Vehicle Crash.
Trauma team in
place at beside.
Primary and
secondary
assessments
conducted. Patient
was stabilized.

Additionally, while observing the events unfolding, the entire scenario was mapped out
from the verbal standpoint. Hence, the data was transcribed, encoded, and analyzed to observe
how it fit in different scenarios, in real time as those scenarios were played out. It was real data
that got transcribed. Table 4.1 shows an example of the data collection form in which the
physicians‘ decisions were recorded with the patient‘s vital sign, as the trauma case progressed.
For trauma cases of greater complexity, it was expected to see more of each of the four
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parameters of decision making going on because people are using their medical judgments or
their intuition in the decision-making process as to whether to deal with the problem rationally,
politically, or intuitively. The coding of those medical decisions was be accomplished by the
physicians who handled the trauma case and immediately after the event took place. However, to
get physicians at the moment the trauma case was over or as the case developed from arrival to
discharge from the trauma center, while being the best approach, was not feasible. The
alternative was to get a physician to review the medical files for the cases. This physician then
assigned to each moment of the trauma event a number that related to the type of decisionmaking that, in his opinion, took place during the trauma situation, as follows: 1 (one) for
rational, 2 (two) for political, 3 (three) for judgment, 4 (four) for intuition. These medical files
were reviewed and judgments were used to make informed decision about what decision-making
process was taking place at every moment of the trauma case.
4.3.3 Study design.

The data consisted of eight attributes as shown in Table 4.2. The

data for the fourteen trauma cases were entered into an Excel spread sheet, where two of the
cases were determined to have insufficient information and subsequently eliminated from the
analysis. Out of the twelve remaining trauma cases, eleven cases were chosen at random to be
used for training of the data for the Bayes‘ classifier. One trauma case was used for testing.
Referring to Table 4.2, one can easily notice that for each patient the time for the event was
recorded as it evolved. After the training, the data was run in the program where de-convolution
of the noisy data took place and it was performed according to the following procedure.
1. First, each line of data as those of Table 4.2 was considered one set of observation, which
was tested individually against the trained data. Each line represents the data mentally
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collected by the physician at a moment in time in which the patient is under the care of
the trauma team.
2. Second, the first line of data with the second line of data was tested together, then the
first, second, and third lines were tested together, and so on until the end of the trauma
case. Each line is representing the collected information; hence, each of the next line
builds upon the previous gathered information. Therefore, the last line represents both the
final thinking process and final action of the decision maker.
4.4 Summary
In this chapter, it has been described the research design and its procedures. The site of
the research for collection of data was a trauma center of one of the hospitals of the Wake Forest
University Health Sciences organization. It was discussed the decision-making model and the
approach that uses Bayesian classifier, Convolution, and Deconvolution operators to explain
physicians‘ decision-making processes. Convolution is one of the most important operations
describing a dynamical system. And Deconvolution is a mathematical operation widely used in
large number of disciplines when researchers need an algorithm that performs well in severe
noisy environments. The data were collected grouping and comparing several sources of
information while shadowing physicians in a trauma center. Afterwards these data were
reviewed by a physician before it was entered into the model, which validates the process
utilized by the investigator to acquire the data. The review of the data was done from the moment
of the initial contact with the patient to the moment of the transfer of the patient out of the
trauma center.
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CHAPTER 5
Trauma Center Physicians: The Adaptive Decision Maker
5.1 Introduction
Personal experience has proven to be a critical part of why seasoned physicians arrive at
more accurate diagnoses that reflect the best available evidence for a particular patient‘s needs.
Two questions about this decision-making process permeate the medical literature, “How do
physicians make decisions?‖ and ―How well do physicians make decisions?‖ The conceptually
separable questions of ―how‖ physicians make judgments and decisions and ―how well‖ they
make them have both become of greater interest to a wide range of people. The goal of this
chapter is to elucidate ―how‖ decisions and medical judgments are made under the stress of
handling a trauma case , leaving aside the political, economic, ethical, legal, and sociological
structural variations within which physicians and patients think and behave during complex
events. The chapter was designed through a series of conversations with those emergency
medicine attending physicians (EMAP) the author shadowed in the trauma center.
It has been said that it is difficult for one to understand another culture without
understanding the language of the people in that culture. The medical profession has a very
unique language and how successful one is in comprehending the intricate terms and metaphors
of medical language might navigate well this challenging and demanding domain. The study
interest is in how decisions and medical judgments are made in TCs. Through discussions with
several EMAPs, an understanding of the subtle ways in which physicians practice medicine as
well as what influences them to change course in any given medical situation is discussed in the
following sections.
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The research was conducted by observing (―shadowing‖) several EMAPs in the domain
of a trauma center (TC) during several eight-hour shifts for 15 days during a period of two
months. During the period of observation, the emergency team was constantly busy: Lower-level
physicians and staff were continually getting instructions from senior physicians, and
procedures, the operation of complex equipment and incoming radio and telephone calls—and
treating patients—were all occurring, often simultaneously. It was not possible to observe
everything. This is due to the fact that the human observer cannot record everything that is going
on in any given scenario. Humans are not movie cameras, and even a movie camera, with its
limited field of vision, needs to be pointed in the right direction (Patton, 1987). To overcome
some of the limitations of collecting data through observation, open-ended questions were asked
of the participating EMAPs that not only helped in explaining some of the activities and actions
that occurred within the TC, they also helped to provide a sense of the respondents‘ frame of
mind, experiences, thoughts, and backgrounds regarding emergency medicine. The questions
focused on understanding the work of the physicians being observed, thus attempting to bring the
physicians closer to the research being conducted while simultaneously allowing for the
researcher to see and experience the physician‘s perspective. The net result was a more holistic
understanding of trauma care, with the caveat, nevertheless that interviewees are always
reporting perceptions, and, for that matter, they are often highly selective perceptions (Patton,
1987).
There are in the United States 64 medical specialties; the physicians in this study chose
Emergency Medicine (EM). For many, working in emergency medicine (EM) was valued as an
opportunity to work with cutting-edge healthcare technology, make difficult decisions at a
moment‘s notice, and accept the challenges of a dynamic, complex, and fast-moving adaptive
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system. In addition, according to one of the physicians shadowed, emergency medicine is about
having the knowledge base and the skill base to do things when presented with people who are
really sick, regardless of what is causing the sickness. To some of these doctors, as was the case
with EMAP-2, they found that the initial resuscitation and stabilization of a patient in distress
was more interesting than overseeing that patient‘s long term care. To these EMAPs, a TC is a
field of rich and complex medical problems, full of unpredictable outcomes that can only be
understood by experiencing it. It is an environment where analytical and numerical solutions
alone cannot solve every problem. They went into EM because of the knowledge that there
would be a lot of varied and high-acuity, maybe even high-stress situations, and that their work
might provide a template for research studies. They often had the ambition of reconfiguring
knowledge gained from textbooks, from socially interacting with other expert physicians, and
from their own experiences and using that cumulative knowledge to provide effective medical
care to dynamic and complex living organisms. EM was something that was not a regular
―office space to do the same thing every day‖ type of job. It was a place where one could work
out of the hospital with ambulance services, police, and many others, on a wide variety of case
scenarios. As EMAP-1 said, ―Working in an Emergency Department is just not the normal job.‖
5.2 Predicting Outcomes
Recently, while discussing an article entitled ―Trauma Intensive Care Unit Survival: How
Good Is an Educated Guess?‖ (Goettler, Waibel, Goodwin, Watkins, Toschlog, Sagraves,
Schenarts, Bard, Newell, & Rotondo, 2010, pp. 1279-128), Dr. Thomas Scalea, an EM
physician, raised the following significant and pertinent questions regarding trauma care:
―Why are we so bad in predicting outcome?‖
―Is it inherently that difficult?‖
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―Are the scoring systems and predictive models just that bad, or are we simply incapable
of being objective?‖ (Scalea, 2010, p. 1287)
These questions were presented to the ―shadowed‖ attending physicians in this study.
Their responses and comments were very similar to answers from Dr. Goettler given in response
to Dr. Scalea. The main reason for the difficulty in predicting outcome, he said, is that there are
so many variables that are intangible and that cannot be quantified. It is possible to see an extra
set of vital signs, and the patient‘s appearance also gives clues about their physical condition.
But often physicians do not have a very good idea of what is going on and what needs to be
done. Each patient is so different and there are so many variables that are unknowable that no
one can really predict outcome very well.
EMAP-2: It‘s not so much difficult to predict that someone may have a bad outcome.
The scoring systems I think work fairly well. It‘s just that anything can happen to
anybody at any point in time, so it‘s hard to be 100% sure because not every model, not
every person, is 100% accurate. If you were to come in from a [vehicle] crash and you
had these four injuries, we could say ―Yeah, he‘s probably going to do fairly well.‖ Well,
we can‘t predict if you‘re going to have a blood clot—throw that and die of a blood clot.
I think it‘s also not wanting to give up hope. If somebody comes in and they‘re badly
injured, you want to do everything you can for them. Obviously you know that they may
have a bad outcome, but you want to do everything as much as you can for them. To the
point where you know that it‘s futile. And that may be in the first 5 minutes, or you may
not know that until four or five days later.
EMAP-3: It is difficult to predict the outcome for trauma patients because there are so
many ways in which their bodies can get damaged and those things only manifest
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themselves in a few areas that we can easily measure. Especially when the trauma patient
first arrives to the hospital, all you really have are vital signs and usually a pretty limited
physical exam. And so a lot of these scores try to take those things and the history of the
injury and try to extrapolate that into a predicted survival. But that does not account for
effects of the injury which may not be seen for a couple of hours but will turn out to be
very significant.
EMAP-4: There are probably so many variables in each [trauma] case that it is hard to
develop a rule, or a standard measure, that fits everybody. So, it may pertain to 92%, but
that 8% are the ones that you miss or that require some gestalt.
There are many examples of health concerns that only become obvious with time
following a traumatic injury. For instance, lung injury might not show up for hours. The
downstream effects of ischemia and organ damage from hypotension will not be seen for hours.
Even though the patient is ill, their injury severity score index at presentation might not be very
bad. However, with time patients may get progressively worse because of these downstream
effects. The patient who is transferred from another hospital where they initially presented with
their trauma might arrive at the new TC much sicker simply because of these delayed
developments, not necessarily because they were mismanaged at the first center. Because of
these variables, physicians feel that diagnostic and predictive models are helpful but definitely do
not completely describe what they find with patients after trauma. Trauma cases are always more
than the sum of their parts. It is seldom that a single part of the trauma completely determines the
nature of the whole. In short, trauma physicians are so bad in predicting outcomes because there
is not enough data to make better predictions. More importantly, there are inherent physiological
differences between individuals that may influence outcome. This inherent difference ―will
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likely require genetic profiles to assess in the future‖ (Goettler et al., 2010). The number of
variables that change from patient to patient, the inability to quantify them, and the non-linearity
of the problems faced in the TC often makes each case very complex.
Sometimes, however, trauma cases are more well-defined. Unlike with less severe
trauma, in very serious cases that are likely to result in death within 24 hours, the medical team
generally has a good idea about the long-term outlook. But, from an ethical perspective, if no one
from the family is present to give permission to stop treatment, the team must keep treating the
patient.
For the most part, the question of the difficulty of diagnosis and outcome goes back to the
problem of data collection. Intrinsically, in a trauma case the problem is that it is not known how
difficult the case will be; thus, no one knows all the information that needs to be collected.
According to EMAP-1, it is very hard to collect all the data that is needed in any given trauma
case. To make matters more difficult, he also does not think that physicians know the data that
need to be collected. EMAP-1 believes that there are many things that physicians do not know
that ―we don‘t even know we don‘t know.‖ Many times medical decisions are made based on
what is thought to be the path of physiology of a disease, with the expectation that the medicine
will fit into the framework. However, the reality is that when physicians test the medicine to see
if it works, a lot of times it does not because ―we don‘t understand the disease as well as we
think we do‖ (EMAP-1). Maybe one day physicians will be able to understand the reasons for
this and find a solution.
Dr. Scalea‘s third question—―Are the scoring systems and predictive models just that
bad, or are we simply incapable of being objective?‖— has the answer within itself. If physicians
have to try to be objective to give answers about most likely outcomes, then physicians are not
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naturally given to making decisions based on data. Decisions are made based as much on
instincts and assumptions—what physicians think is going on—as upon pure data. In other
words, physicians are using their skills and experiences. Predicting outcomes in trauma cases and
trying to change them in favor of survival and health is inherently a human enterprise, however
strong the scientific overlay might be. If this is true, Dr. Scalea‘s question is almost rhetorical.
5.3 Physicians and Pattern Recognition
The literature shows that physicians do rely on intuition and judgment, but by how much
is still unknown. Dr. Atul Gawande discusses the fact that there is science in what physicians do;
however, there is also habit, intuition, and the use of plain old guessing. He claims that there is a
gap between what physicians know and what physicians aim for. As this gap persists, it
complicates everything physicians do in TCs (Gawande, 2002). Several of the attending
physicians who contributed to this study were asked to explain this ―gap.‖
According to EMAP-3, the gap is the gap between what physicians would like to have
happen and what physicians know that they can do. He explains that physicians would like to be
able to look at a patient and know exactly what‘s going on, what will happen to them, and, with
some certainty, how much care they are going to need when they go home. For the same reasons,
physicians talk about not being able to know how sick patients are when they arrive at the
hospital; physicians just don‘t know. There is not enough science currently available to
determine the prognosis of patients in detail when they present at the hospital. Perhaps in the
future such precision will be possible, but for today, it is only a dream. There is science in
abundance and the medical world knows a lot more things today than in years past. As EMAP-3
admonished, ―But, also it is very true in medicine that as we go along, we find out that things we
used to think were true and scientifically justified turn out not to be exactly the way we thought
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they were.‖ That is where the intuition and experience come in. That is where the art of medicine
is located: in knowing that the science says one thing, but the science may not apply in exactly
the way physicians think it should to this particular patient. There is always the potential that
something else is going on with the patient. That is the unpredictability of the system.
EMAP-3: I had a great case today where a patient was admitted to our observation unit
for a urinary tract infection, and we looked through their stuff and were really suspicious
of that diagnosis. It turned out that the patient had pneumonia. And that was just a matter
of having a gut intuition that this diagnosis was incorrect, and examining the patient and
deciding that it wasn‘t quite right, and then making a different diagnosis.
Physicians use a systems approach in order not to miss anything, but they do step out of that
system when something unusual is found in order to make a critical judgment. Once something
triggers this, physicians review the situation and try to put the entire picture together in an
alternative way. That may be the reason why some of the physicians‘ work is not always
systematically done. It is by putting it all together that they arrive at a critical decision.
EMAP-2: In trauma resuscitation, the team is looking for exam findings. That‘s all that
team is doing. The two people at the end of the bed are the ones making the judgment
calls based on what they‘re hearing. So, you do trust the persons that are doing these
things—that are finding what they‘re finding. For example, respiratory technicians are
not MDs but, their expertise is airways and ventilators. That‘s all they do all day. So, if
they tell me that this person has high airway pressures on the ventilator, I have to listen to
them. And then I have to go figure out why. So, we rely on everyone to make good calls
in terms of exams, and bring up findings that they‘re finding to the people who are
actually making the final decision.
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There was a physician who would say that physicians were supposed to be evidencebased and to rely on data and studies to make every decision. Formally, evidence-based medicine
is defined as ―the practice of making medical decisions through the judicious identification,
evaluation, and application of the most relevant information‖ (Friedland, 1998, p. 3). However, it
is not the reality in every case or situation. It is difficult to imagine physicians performing Bayes
classification or some other type of symbolically complex analytical calculation every time a
solution is sought to determine the best therapeutic option. Physicians react on intuition and at
the gut level; consequently, often times their decisions are based on anecdote as much as on
evidence. ―Physicians rely on intuition a significant amount but also lean on experience,‖ says
EMAP-4. Physicians approach every situation in a similar manner, thinking about similar
situations in which something bad happened while treating a patient in a new case.
Physicians tend to act on the knowledge they have gained from the worst-case scenarios
they have had that were similar to the case scenario in which they are presently involved.
Therefore, past experience and the current situation influence intuition and outcome
significantly. The best example is seeing someone who has done trauma medicine for years and
in the process he/she sees a lot of the outliers, a lot of abnormal cases. These physicians develop
a different intuition than someone who has not done it for a long time. As a result, physicians are
going to play it safe because they are going to think, ―Okay, of all the patients I‘ve had, which
one was the worst? Okay, I don‘t want to have that happen,‖ commented EMAP-1. It is possible
that physicians are cognizant of the shortcomings of their own experiences in terms of that
limited cohort of patients that they see in trauma centers. Physicians then are going to be risk
averse and order many tests . Indeed, with traumas there are systematic ways of going through
with resuscitation, finding injuries, and treating those injuries. However, even though trauma
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care has set protocols that need to be followed, it still requires lots of physician experience to
discover the underlying cause of a problem, what has to be done, and how to design the next
step. Physicians are big believers in script theory, which means to learn the way that the trauma
or illness presents—the signs and symptoms—and once these signs and symptoms are
recognized, they trigger the diagnosis. Pattern recognition plays a big part in coming up with a
diagnosis and a diagnostic course of action.
In the best-case scenario, one can sit and think about all the knowledge and evidence one
has or that is available about a situation. As one physician explained:
EMAP-1: In most scenarios the physician doesn‘t have time to think that much. Most of
what I do in Emergency Medicine I feel is pattern-based recognition. Every patient I see
will fit into some pattern I already have in my head. And if they don‘t fit into a pattern,
that‘s when I take a step back and start over and do more diagnostic testing. I get worried
when they don‘t fit into my standard patterns.
Inductive thought plays an important role in the decision-making process. Inductively,
recognizable events illuminate appropriately efficient paths of action, the knowledge of which
stems from past experiences with positive and negative outcomes. This is one of the
characteristics of complex adaptive systems that emphasize learning and innovation through
adaptation. Learning is the process of recognizing these patterns, sorting through them, and
deciding which one best fits the problem and, simultaneously, developing new patterns of
recognition based on innovative judgment. Recognizing patterns brings to the physician‘s mind
at once previous patterns of treatment or diagnostic courses of action that may be relevant to the
trauma case at hand. Also, coming into play are x-rays, electrocardiograms,
electroencephalograms, CT-scans and other laboratory tests that create a pool of information
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which support physician‘s patterns and potentially lead to the correct solutions or schemas.
Trauma centers are modeled as networks of cognitive agents (physicians) seeking regularities in
the form of schemas—the equivalent of mental models (Stacey, 2007). These agents store those
schemas or representations as readily recognized patterns—in the form of rules—and then they
act on the basis of those rules. Such pattern recognition is not static, however. The process of
pattern recognition is complex but allows decision makers to unconsciously estimate required
actions and fill in gaps based on their experiences to produce an understanding (Finkelstein,
Whitehead, & Campbell, 2008). In essence, it allows decision makers to function with
incomplete or limited information. The integration of novel information into established patterns
gives rise to the emergence of novel patterns, new forms.
New patterns also emerge as a result of physicians using situational awareness, which
clearly characterizes their experience of the dynamic changes in the TC environment. Situation
awareness is defined as ―the perception of the elements in the environment within a volume of
time and space, the comprehension of their meaning, and the projection of their status in their
near future‖ (Endsley, 1995, pp. 143). As EMAP-1 said, he gets worried when the pattern he
sees does not fit into one of his library of patterns. He commits to an intervention when
absolutely necessary to do so, but at the same time he remains open to the possibility that it is the
wrong intervention.
There may be inherent flaws in the pattern recognition process because physicians may
think that a patient is in a set pattern to start with, when the patient is really not; this is a potential
source of errors. Additionally, in complex systems there are difficult-to-perform predictions due
to ambiguities and novelties. However, using pattern recognition still makes it much easier for
physicians to make decisions and make decisions much faster. Emergency physicians who have
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been doing this a long time have more numerous and more varied patterns in their heads to
which to fit patient scenarios. As experts in their fields, physicians have a rich repertoire of
mental representations and cognitive processes from which to draw possible solutions. Their
performance measures do not usually retain the flavor of diagnoses and treatment plans based on
the more time-invariant characteristics of cases. This is because any given trauma case does not
require a specific time—indeed, it cannot have time limitations for its completion. Additionally,
trauma cases are not dealt with so easily because there are no if-then rules for physicians in these
situations; instead, there are structured mental models (pattern recognitions) that provide the
framework for action. The complexity of these types of medical interventions may range from
linear to very non-linear or that translates into a diagnosis and a method of treatment.
Trauma cases are characterized by complexities that depend on human heuristics
permeated by habits, memorized behaviors, and cognitive strains for real-life solutions. These
features are also an inherent weakness, because if the patterns are false and bias the physician to
overestimate the prior probability of a disease or injury, then incorrect diagnoses and solutions
could be chosen. Additionally, there might be an overloading of information and cues emanating
from the trauma case that may exceed the physician‘s available mental resources for solving the
problem at hand. The first encounter with the trauma patient signified that an unnerving gulf lay
in front of the trauma team. The physician then assumed the dominant roles in solving problems
during these trauma cases in which environments (i.e., humans, technologies) and constraints
(i.e., patients‘ physical conditions) were dynamic. Through the trauma case, the physician has to
deal with the effects of information overload due to the increasing complexity of the trauma.
Therefore, this balance allows the EMAP team leader to ascertain the degree of uncertainty
existing in the mind of team members at the time they have to make decisions in treating the
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patient.
Pattern recognition has become increasingly recognized as a pivotal factor in the process
of using analytical techniques for decision making because it is a basic attribute of human beings
(Tou & Gonzalez, 1974). It has been the subject of inquiry in many disciplines, including
engineering and of course, medicine. As a facet of decision-making in these disciplines, this
unique ability of humans to recognize recurrent themes and processes helps to set human beings
apart as an exceptional instrument for analysis and action. When patterns are recognized, they
not only allow physicians to update their initial model of the nature and severity of the patient‘s
primary predicament but they also improve elicitation and communication of quantitative
probabilities (Fischhoff, 2000).
5.4 Physician Decision Making
The latter part of the last century was marked by intense globalization in response to farreaching political, economic, technological, environmental, and social changes, all of which had
a strong impact on health care. In the United Kingdom, a report was written on the effect of
globalization on health. The authors of this report (Murray & Dopson, 2000) stated that
physicians have traditionally held medical judgment and decision-making in high regard and
have been suspicious of attempts to explore them systematically with a view to making explicit
their precise character. There has been in recent years a noticeable increase of attention on
decision-making and medical judgment, not just from inside the discipline but also from outside
of the medical profession. Why do physicians shy away from exploring medical judgment and
decision-making systematically?
EMAP-1: There‘s so much that we don‘t know that we don‘t know. And I think many
people come in and try to study the [clinical] decision making; but it‘s so complex and
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there‘s so many intangibles that it is a very difficult thing to quantify and look at from a
quality-type basis. It‘s hard to methodize so many things that we do, or how we do it, or
how we make our decisions [emphasis added].
EMAP-3: I think that they do. I think it‘s not true that they don‘t. I would say that
everyone is rather protective of their own decision-making. No one likes to be told that
the way that they make decisions is suspect, but we know that a lot of the ways we make
decisions is suspect. There are a lot of cognitive errors in medical decision-making. That
is a sub-area of interest for me, and so I am perhaps more familiar with them than other
physicians. And so, we know that there are a lot of shortcuts we take with medical
decision-making which lead to errors. But traditionally, the individual physician‘s
judgment is held kind of sacrosanct. There was mystery in it and kind of you defer to that
expert‘s opinion about the conclusion they came to. And short of some egregious
violation of custom or something like that, typically physicians are allowed to decide
whatever they want to decide.
Hamm and his associates did extensive work in this area of ―how‖ and ―how well‖ physicians
make decisions and concluded that the question of what physicians actually do is obviously a
matter for research yet to be determined because of the need to take account of the complex
scripts which guide physicians‘ decision-making. These researchers have also concluded that
more research is needed in the area of ―accurate description of physicians’ decision-making
processes‖ [emphasis added] (Hamm et al., 2000). However, it is difficult to over-state the need
for ways of evaluating alternative strategies for improving medical judgments and not just focus
on the study of vignettes.
Emergency medicine is not the same as running a business that is highly structured
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around computer models. Such models allow for the evaluation of possible alternatives, where
lists of the possible values of the various parameters are collected, the dimensions of the
objective functions are created, and a series of analytical runs are performed using these
collected values. For many of these business situations, interactions would not be needed
because the majority of the problems encountered in daily transactions can be easily identified
through previously specified reports. In the domain of emergency health care the problems are
more often unstructured, ill-defined, unique to each patient, and complex in that the agents (i.e.,
physicians, nurses, technicians, and technologies) are dealing with living organisms whose
pathophysiologies differ immensely one from the other. There is so much to know and so much
to learn about a living organism. For so many decades, computers have been used to simulate
and analyze physical processes rather accurately. However, there are so many systems of crucial
interest to medicine that have so far defied any type of simulation because of the ―many
intangibles‖ and unknowns faced by the medical profession.
According to EMAP-1, researchers try to study decision-making in health care and are
faced with a multitude of variables, many uncorrelated, and a level of complexity that is beyond
full understanding by today‘s mathematics. Because the problems encountered in a TC are illdefined and increasingly complex, they cannot be handled effectively through a computerinteractive problem-solving process. Unquestionably, computers have been used very
successfully to simulate physical processes. However, physicians manipulating equations at
computers, adaptively exploring space and time in an attempt to find the best possible solution or
best diagnostic course of action for their patients is not the best approach to solving a problem
when faced with a seriously sick or multiply injured human being. Instead, these medical
professionals rely ―on a very sophisticated information system‖ available to humanity, the brain,
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―partly because it possesses a superior pattern recognition capability‖ (Tou, & Gonzalez, 1974,
pp. 6) for discovering and acting on the stressful demands of the situation. Another reason to
avoid computer models is because physicians feel that such a systematic approach removes the
cognitive and individual element of the decision-making process. Researchers in health care have
surmised that the fundamental architecture of medical decision-making related to clinical
diagnosis is a crucial element that has yet to be fully understood. Faced with time constraints and
a lack of objective data, physicians default to previous experience or the most conservative path,
even in the more serious emergency cases:
EMAP-4: [In a trauma case,] a decision has to be made in the next two minutes, what do
we do? Just do everything. I don‘t have the time to come back in an hour and reassess
and gather more data because we are time-constrained and resource-constrained. Just do
it now. It‘s all or nothing. It‘s a very binary decision. You either do it all right now, or
you don‘t do anything right now. And that‘s somewhat how the decision is made.
Emergency physicians are constantly making judgments that require both technical skill
and expertise and artful, nuanced intuition. The ultimate process cannot be entirely systematic. If
a system could do it, then a robot could do it. Anybody could do it. Nevertheless, there are many
ways in trauma care that the system is set up to remove a lot of the lower-level decision-making,
in order that the physician does not have to deal with those things. Often trauma cases go wrong
when those low-level decisions become high-level decisions that the physician is not used to
making. They may get flustered because they are presented with things that they do not usually
have to worry about, and then things go off the rails. When that happens, healthcare providers
participate in mortality and morbidity conferences to review cases after the fact and see where
things went wrong. Yet even in those cases, the medical profession typically does not criticize
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the judgment of the physicians who were embroiled in the case at that time unless it is felt that
there was some obvious error that occurred. The mortality and morbidity conference becomes a
tool for evaluating processes and outcomes at both the level of the individual physician and at the
level of the trauma team, ideally leading to improvement in decision-making and processes.
Given time constraints and the lack of comprehensive data, physicians usually try to
place their patients into a group of patients who were similar—a group that the physician has
dealt with before. Once this placement has occurred, physicians will then pick treatments that
seemed to have worked for those other patients and that they suspect will also work for the
presented patient. If physicians are aware of any science that applies to the presented case, they
will also typically try to apply that science, moving the selected treatment in one direction or
another. A good example, provided by EMAP-3, would be a hypothetical case of a patient with
massive hemorrhage. That patient would be very sick and there would not be a whole lot of time
to get history or other data. The physician would be presented with a patient who is bleeding out
and has weak vital signs, and he/she would be treating those things on the patient. But how each
one might go about treating this patient could differ. The case might present a brand new set of
data, suggesting that the patient might need whole blood transfusions, which in the United States
means getting different blood components from the blood bank and then giving them back to
approximate whole blood. ―Historically, physicians would have just transfused a whole lot of
red blood cells‖ says EMAP-3, because the patient needs a lot of blood. However, today the
physician might order a whole blood mix and treat the patient as he/she would all patients who
are massively hemorrhaging. However, as more data are gathered, the physician might need to
adjust that treatment plan. During the ongoing process of data-gathering, new information might
emerge that the patient is on anticoagulants. This would cause the physician to change the
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therapy to reverse the effects of the patient‘s anticoagulants. If other co-morbid things were
discovered, the treatment would need to address those things as well.
According to EMAP-3, ―Pattern recognition is a lot of what medicine is.‖ That is one
way physicians remove a lot of the low-level decision-making, by reasoning that ―this patient has
this which is like a lot of those other patients who had this.‖ Hence, the treatment will be to do
those things that are usually done for that known group of patients. Such an approach, however,
leaves open the possibility that the patient is not like the known group, thus introducing a chance
for error in the treatment. This brings us back to the patient initially diagnosed with kidney
infection, which turned out to be pneumonia. This patient had symptoms that appeared to
indicate pyelonephritis kidney infection and, as EMAP-3 pointed out, ―quite frankly did not
seem a lot like pneumonia, which it turned out to be.‖ However, pneumonia can be like that
sometimes, and there were a couple of pieces of data in the case that really should have made the
physicians more curious about whether it was indeed a kidney infection (namely that the urine
did not seem to be very infected). Despite this lack of fit between the expected pattern and the
patient, the physicians categorized the patient into ―fever, maybe urinary symptoms, seems kind
of like urinary infection, didn‘t really seem like a lot else.‖ As result, the book was more or less
closed on that kidney infection diagnosis and the patient was started on the treatment that would
correct that problem. On the following day the physician, upon seen the patient again, realized
that the kidney infection diagnosis was perhaps not quite right, and pneumonia emerged as the
correct diagnosis.
5.5 Unfamiliarity of Task Content: Analysis versus Intuition
Hammonds‘ Cognitive Continuum Theory considers the nature of, and the implications
of, intuitive and analytical processes in decision-making. It states that the unfamiliarity of task

86
content may lead to forms of reasoning that induce intuition in an attempt to place perception and
deductive thinking in higher levels of decision-making. Intuition and analysis have been depicted
in the literature of psychology as dichotomous rivals, where some eulogized one and criticized
the other, diminishing the scientific value of these two concepts (Connolly et al., 2000;
Goldstein, & Hogarth, 1997; Hammond, 2000). Highly analytical processes were posited at one
extreme; at the other were highly intuitive processes. At the middle point of the continuum, there
was an approximation of rational decision-making. Given this schema, the question is whether
medical doctors are more likely to use analysis or intuition when they are unfamiliar with a task
and whether the quality of a physician‘s reasoning depends on his/her use of analysis or of
intuition (medical judgment).
Generally, said EMAP-1, all physicians trust their gut to a certain degree. The first
decision physicians have to make is whether the patient is sick or not. It was observed during the
―shadowing‖ of the physicians that unspoken decisions and diagnosis were made at every
encounter with a patient. In a simple ―Hello, how do you feel?‖ two or three decisions and a
diagnosis were made. If the patient presented as overtly sick, then physicians divided their
assessments into ―We know what‘s making them sick‖ or ―We don‘t know what‘s making them
sick.‖ Either way, if the patient was in the sick category, physicians were very careful and did a
lot of analysis in order to figure out what was going on, according to EMAP-1.
If physicians look at a patient and do not think they are that sick, then the patient is
mentally put into one of two categories. If the category is, ―They‘re not sick, and I know what‘s
going on,‖ then physicians just get them out the door. If the category is, ―They‘re not sick and
I‘m not sure what‘s going on,‖ physicians will work them up and use a little more analysis.
However, they will not devote as much attention to fact-gathering and analysis in these cases as
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they would if they thought there was a true pathological situation. As was explained during the
shadowing:
EMAP-3: Because of time pressure, they‘re [physicians] probably going to be more
likely to use intuition. As for me personally, if I walk into a situation I am unfamiliar
with, I am probably going to start by intuiting my way through it. And if I have time, I
will probably start to look for science that applies to it. I may try to buy myself a little
time with intuition and then go back to my desk and start to look up stuff to give me more
direction on whatever we‘re going to do. But, I think most physicians rely on intuition
initially because of the time pressure.
EMAP-4: When there is objective data [like] vital signs, laboratory data, objective data
becomes an analytical process. In the absence of those, it‘s an intuitive process. I think
you would default first to analytical. Meaning looking for objective data, the EMS‘s
story, the vital signs upon arrival—your objective data you can gather. If those are
lacking, then it becomes intuitive.
Intuition and judgment are the first types of decision-making used when a patient is initially
seen, leading to a decision about whether there is sickness or not. Once the patient‘s health status
has been determined, then analytical and rational decision-making processes are used to figure
out what is going on with the patient. In any situations encountered by emergency physicians,
analytical processes (using quantitative data) are the first choice if data are available. As
expressed by EMAP-1, ―To ignore data in order to use intuition is not a good idea.‖
However, there are certain ―gray area‖ cases where intuitive reasoning will trump
whatever analytical reasoning says. That would be in the case about necrotizing facilities, in
which every analytical tool said that everything was normal and there was no need to do
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anything extraordinary. Fortunately, there was some intuitive part of the physician‘s reasoning
power that trumped the analytical part. All cases that confront emergency physicians probably
fall on a continuum. On one end, the situation is obvious and the decision is easy. It is below the
critical threshold for whatever decision-making is necessary. As emphasized by EMAP-4, ―The
blood pressure (BP) is low; patients need to go to the operating room. Heart rate (HR) or pulse is
going down, the patients are dying.‖ In this sense, decision-making is straightforward. Then
there are situations that fall on the opposite end of the spectrum, where physicians look at the
data and it does not take any intuition to know that the patient is fine, there is no injury, and there
is nothing wrong. It is the middle portion of the spectrum, where the data has not yet approached
any thresholds that trigger the need for a decision, forcing the physician to interpret trends in BP,
trends in HR, trends in mental status, and seek out those extraneous other bits of information,
such as mechanism of injury and EMS reports.
It is in this middle area of the decision spectrum where the need for intuitive judgment
comes in—when the data are seriously incomplete or fail to match what the medical team is
seeing. Often when physicians order a test, they expect to know the result. The test is a
confirmation of their analytical reasoning about the case. If there is some discordance between
what was expected and what the test shows, intuitive reasoning must be brought to bear. Either
the physician‘s assumption was wrong or the data is wrong. It is at this point that a physician
must say, ―I‘m looking in the wrong place, or my differential diagnosis needs to be broader
because I am missing something.‖ Failure to do so creates situations in which major signs get
missed and cases are in danger of winding up being the subject of that week‘s M&M conference.
The question of whether the quality of physicians‘ reasoning depends upon their use of
analysis or intuition depends on their experience. Physicians with significantly more experience
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have been demonstrated to possess greater intuitive reasoning skills. Intuition depends mostly on
experience; inexperienced physicians, lacking the base for well-honed intuitive reasoning,
typically misapply science-based reasoning. These novice physicians may not realize that they
are applying certain kinds of scientific knowledge to patients for whom that information was not
intended. Or, they simply do not understand the nuances involved in applying the analytical
information they know and have been trained to use. As far as whether the analytical or the
intuitive approach is inherently better, it is hard for a non-medical observer to know because it
seems to never happen in a dichotomous way. Physicians never really apply intuition without
also having used their analytical skills. By the time he/she becomes a physician, there is a
significant amount of analytical information that novice physicians know and have acquired from
both school and practice; this information is always informing their nascent intuitive approach.
EMAP-3: It‘s kind of hard to establish that. I think it has more to do with experience
than it has to do with the one approach over the other. Because I don‘t think it ever
happens that way. There‘s never really a mostly intuitive moment, or a significantly
mostly analytical moment. It‘s rare to encounter a patient to whom the scientific literature
applies perfectly such that you feel comfortable that your decision is made really
rationally in the absence of your own personal biases or intuition.
Physicians believe that decisions that turn out to be primarily intuitive are much better the
more experienced a physician is. As expected, senior medical doctors make better decisions than
junior medical doctors. Trauma surgeons compared to emergency physicians generally may
make better decisions just because these highly specialized physicians have to deal with trauma
cases in a more longitudinal fashion. Experience definitely plays a role in medical judgment, and
it can be said that, generally speaking, intuitive decisions are much better with more experience

90
(Klein, 2004). However, the reverse is probably also true: Analytical decisions are probably
better with experience because an experienced physician can recognize when an intuition does
not really apply to the patient or the ways in which the science may or may not apply to a
particular patient.
Compared to senior physicians, medical student trainees often get confused about science
as it applies to patients, and they usually need some guidance from expert doctors in applying it
appropriately. Sometimes these novices score major successes; sometimes they do recognize
when the science applies. But many times they start to head down a path of doing things based
on what the scientific literature says that really is not appropriate for patients because they fail
intuitively to recognize that the patient does not really belong in the same category of patients to
which the science applies. In commenting on an article published in the Society for Academic
Medicine by an intern who wrote about his struggle with a patient‘s diagnosis, Dr. Karen Cosby
from Cook County Hospital stated, ―Unlike the clean, straightforward descriptions in textbooks,
real patients come packaged with all sorts of challenges‖ (Cosby, 2011). Dr. Cosby further
commented on the resident‘s excellent example of reflective writing with thorough details of his
decisions and thoughts during the difficult trauma case. However, according to Dr. Cosby, the
resident‘s analysis revealed how precarious the diagnostic process can be and how
uncomfortable the process can become for physicians (Cosby, 2011). In the resident‘s article, he
revealed all the decision complexity so familiar to trauma physicians, how he grappled with
indecision, uncertainty, temporary loss of a sense of control, cognitive strain, his adaptation in
and evolvement with a changing environment, and interactions with experts (Cosby, 2011;
Caraballo, 2011). It was the struggles of dealing with political, rational, medical judgment, and
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chaotic decision-making processes all in one trauma case that produced the confusion and
uncertainty in the event.
Looking at those four parameters (political, rational, judgment, or chaos) according to
what the physicians are processing in their minds, there are certain situations where the
physicians know there is very little or nothing that can be done to save a patient, but they are still
going to work as hard as humanly possible because physicians focusing on Level 1 trauma
patients know that is their responsibility. When patients show up in Level 1 trauma in the care of
the EMS, they come in already defined by a limited set of information such as, this is a head
trauma or a gunshot wound. The entire decision-making apparatus does not exist at that point.
All that is observable are resource allocations given to the case (treatment bays, personnel,
equipment, etc.) and what physicians are doing to focus on one outcome: to save the patient‘s
life.
In an environment where there are new interns that have little or no experience and only
rote familiarity with the kind of pattern recognition that can support his or her decision-making
processes. Hence, the decision to hand a case over to an intern is a political decision by the
EMAP supervising the shift, because any decision made by the intern might be fundamentally
questionable due to lack of clinical experience. Another layer of the politics of decision-making
arises when the EMAP must decide whether the intern‘s decisions stand or whether to step in
with superior experience to change the decision. All of it falls in together in that triple helix that
explains the physician‘s mental processes. The maturing of an intern is another entire study in
itself and not the subject of this study.
Immediately the physician goes from intuitive decision-making to rational decision
making. For instance, the patient seen by the physician presents with an obvious illness. The
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question, ―Is it or is it not an illness that I have seen before,‖ is intuitive. The patient who
presents bleeding from the nose and from the ears is obviously sick. The physician did not have
to make any decision to determine that. Rationally, the patient is sick. At this point, pattern
recognition becomes important. For example, if the patient presented having a swelling of the
abdomen and low blood pressure, the patient most likely has internal bleeding. This kind of
presentation is obvious even to a novice who has little clinical experience. Once the pattern
―internal bleeding‖ is recognized, it becomes rational decision-making process (RDMP), because
then the physician proceeds to discuss which tests to order, which action is more appropriate, or
which decision needs to be made. It is a rational process because there is a protocol—a list of
tests that are appropriate and available for each situation.
The decision-making processes that are happening are completely independent of the
source of trauma. The physician goes through the process with one of the first questions, when
he asks whether this person is sick or not. This is intuitive decision-making, but political
decision-making is also folded into that. Every way a physician turns, somebody is watching
over his/her shoulder, and everything that is done is recorded. Everything is recorded, somebody
is watching, the supervisors are there, and these days everybody is reviewing security
surveillance cameras, too. All this recorded information is getting reviewed. So, no matter the
direction of any case, that physician is responsible for and will be held accountable for whatever
happens. The political decision becomes a part of the overall decision-making process. The
political gets folded into every decision.
Resource allocation does rarely come into play, at which point physicians can make the
more finite idea of chaos come into play. But as the physician walks into a situation, he/she can
immediately commence the intuitive or rational decision-making processes. If the physician is
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not asking these questions, then he/she has gone straight into RDMP because the evidence from
what he walks in and sees is so straightforward. However, at the moment he/she asks the patient,
―What is going on, today?‖ this is the hallmark of intuitive thinking, and it is clear that
intuitively certain things have been decided. Based on these decisions, the pattern emerges in the
mind of the physician.
5.6 Information Overload
In emergency medicine, especially where trauma is concerned, information overload can
quickly become a crucial part of the physician‘s daily management of work. The dynamic
environment of a TC requires the handling of many issues simultaneously. For example, during
one of the observed shifts, EMAP#2 had one EMS case on the phone, another EMS case on the
radio, an intern seeking help with a patient, and another attending physician handing over a case
as his shift was over. All these situations were handled, almost simultaneously, in a space of less
than two minutes. There was little time to combine information from many sources to estimate
the value of a procedure in any given case. Many times if physicians are trying to do a procedure,
it makes a simple procedure very complicated if they have to start over every time someone
interrupts their train of thought. It requires rethinking of the problem, reformulation of their
plans, as the train of thought vanishes, even if momentarily. Sometimes they forget to restart the
process and what would have been a simple procedure becomes more complicated because it
gets delayed and something else has happened to make the situation now more complex.
EMAP-1: I think sometimes you just have to start over and re-verify what you were
doing. I‘ve been in situations in the past where you start a procedure and you start over
because you‘re delayed, and then things evolve and the patient changes. And, now that
things have changed, the procedure is no longer necessary. That has happened before.
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It is not usually that difficult for physicians to combine information from many sources to
estimate the value of a procedure, mostly because of experience. Having done it many times,
physicians learn what is important and what is not important to the case. However, one physician
felt that it is not always that easy.
EMAP-4: I would say very difficult. I think that‘s why there is sort of an algorithmic
approach to it, a checklist approach. We are not capable of keeping all these things in our
minds; we have to have a checklist. I think that is sort of what the decision-making is: If
you cross a certain threshold for a trauma patient, (i.e., they had a rollover MVA), they
are going to get all the CT-scans. So, I would say difficult.
Physicians are looking for those thresholds of decision-making. As one of those decisionmaking thresholds is crossed, everything else ceases to matter, whether it is airway, breathing,
circulation, or any other threshold. In the physician‘s mind, many questions are asked and
answered: Can this patient go home? Can this patient stay? How sick are they? These data, cues,
and information are all distilled down into a threshold. The decision-making process then turns
into a binary decision-making mode, yes or no. CT scan: yes or no, OR: yes or no, ICU: yes or
no. In reality, there are many other variables that physicians are looking for while treating the
patient that may trump this seemingly simple process. But in the search for a diagnosis, when
any of those thresholds are crossed, a decision is made. In a trauma case, if the BP is low, if they
have significant abdominal pain, if they are not breathing, if their mental status is altered—each
of those is a branch point binary decision.
For example, consider a trauma patient who was one of the observed real-time cases
during the shadowing: a motorcycle accident. The patient‘s BP was low; he had a critical
mechanism of injury and had severe abdominal pain. Based on these three variables (BP,

95
mechanism of injury, and abdominal pain) the patient was immediately sent to OR. It did not
matter what else the physicians would find afterwards, the decision had already been made and
even if the patient‘s BP had come back up, the decision to send him to OR would have remained.
There were no other data that were going to sway the trauma team from that final decision.
Hence, there was no reason to look, no reason to even spend any mental energy processing other
data, because the critical decision had already been made.
The nature of a physician‘s job is that they are always interrupted with large numbers of
things all the time. They are often dealing with many different kinds of patients; all in a single
work shift, and in the case of a teaching hospital, such as the site of this study, there are medical
trainees to manage as well. Therefore, it becomes part of a physician‘s work load to just get
habituated to frequent short interruptions to whatever they are working on at that moment; but
they also learn to mentally return to their task as quickly as possible. In the setting of trauma, it is
set up to usually batch those things. Hence, physicians can expect information to come at certain
times, and they know what kind of information they are going to get at certain times.
When things go off the rails it is usually because the information does not arrive when it
is needed, or it is not coming at the time it is supposed to come, or it comes once and then it
comes again and it is really different information compared to the first time. Consequently, no
information was obtained, because now physicians have two really different pieces of
information. When information (i.e., x-rays, CT scans, laboratory reports and so on) comes when
it is supposed to, things go really well, and it is not hard to integrate all of it into the trauma
event. But when the timing of that information is incorrect, it can throw the entire team out of
balance, forcing physicians to do more mental work to put things back together into the trauma
picture.
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EMAP-3: In one way in trauma centers this [information overload, incorrect information,
untimely information] is almost a failing or a weakness. It‘s a significant weakness of the
trauma center model that things are so structured that when the structure fails, medical
decision-making can fail because the MDs have significantly increased stress, and they
start to misapply or misinterpret or fail to recognize that they don‘t have appropriate
information. Then they start to make bad decisions.
There are almost an infinite number of things that can go perfectly right or can go just as
perfectly wrong. For instance, a physician has a patient that needs to get a CT scan; however, the
patient has to be held back because the scanner is already being used. Perhaps there are two
trauma patients, and they both need a CT scan. Typically, physicians do not have to make the
decision of which patient goes first, because there are not always two trauma events at the same
time. But when there are, it adds another decision that must be made, because resources (the CT
scanner) are scarce, which creates higher margins for errors. The physician might pick the wrong
patient to go first to the CT-scan laboratory.
Another area where things can go very right or very wrong would be things that should
be and are routinely easy, that almost always get done, but that sometimes do not get done.
During this physician-shadowing process, a trauma patient was observed that did not have
intravenous (IV) access established. Usually EMS paramedics can get at least one IV access into
the patient, but sometimes paramedics cannot establish access. In this case, not even the trauma
team could get an IV access once the patient arrived at the trauma center. This can be construed
as a significant breakdown of the normal trauma process; to not be able to have IV access within
a couple of minutes really throws medical decision-making, because at that point the Level 1
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resuscitation unit is moving on to the primary survey. The team knows at that point that it needs
to stop and get IV access. However, as physician commented,
EMAP-3: The trauma resident physician is often thrown by that and they‘re trying to still
go, but they‘re not sure if they should go along with the rest of the exam because we‘re
still waiting for IV access.
That is why there are senior emergency attending physicians there, to keep the team together
until the much-needed IV medication access is in place.
Physicians feel that trauma events per se are not very complex, but humans are complex;
therefore, what happen in a trauma case is unpredictable because of the human factor. It takes
very little to cause consternation, as in the IV case. These are cases that do not follow the normal
model that physicians try to make them fit into. Physicians then find themselves dropping back
into the intuitive decision-making mode, trying to categorize the patient according to other,
similar patients and then applying therapies that seemed to work for those patients.
Simultaneously, they are trying to resolve everything that is keeping the patient from fitting into
the normal trauma role and to get the patient back on track to do the normal trauma-center things
while taking care of whatever critical issue he or she has presented with.
The pattern recognition models that medicine in general and certainly emergency
medicine follows help greatly with reducing the stress that is introduced by those complexities.
As EMAP-3 explained, that is why novice trauma physicians often find these situations to be
really stressful, because they just have not seen enough patients yet to have a mental library of
people batched into these mental models. As a result, they get very uncomfortable when things
do not go the way they are ideally supposed to go. They simply do not have anything to fall
back upon for decision-making. It can be concluded that it is really something that can only be
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appreciated and understood by physicians who have been in practice for several years to realize
how much one relies on this pattern recognition approach to medical decision-making.
5.7 Cognitive Demands
There has been increased recognition that real-world problems place extraordinary
demands on decision-makers. More specifically, a Level 1 trauma resuscitation case places
heavy cognitive demands on physicians. Classic models of decision-making processes generally
assume static problem domains, rational analysis, and suboptimal human decision-making
(Cannon-Bowers, 1998). These qualities are not characteristic of a trauma center, where problem
domains are in constant flux, rational analysis is just one cognitive mode of operation, and
human decision-making is expected to be optimal. Leading attending physicians are constantly
making efforts to improve the decision-making effectiveness of medical teams and to discover
the patterns of cognition at work— how the strategies and behaviors of physicians and other
team members are adapted to the constraints and demands of the trauma case at hand—while
under the stress of a Level 1 trauma case.
This research was conducted at a Level 1 trauma center in a teaching hospital of a
medical school that maintains a faculty body of high-level trauma and emergency medicine
physicians. These high-caliber professionals make up the Level 1 Trauma Resuscitation Unit
(LITRU) of the hospital, and they all work side by side with the interns. Therefore, this LITRU
may differ somewhat in its actions from other hospitals where a trauma patient is presented for
care. The unit is activated at the time the EMAP makes the decision to consider the incoming
patient as a Level 1 or Level 2 trauma (also referred to as Code 1 or Code 2), according to the set
of criteria outlined by the hospital (refer to Appendix A). Before the patient arrives at the trauma
center, the activated LITRU is positioned in place inside the Level 1 trauma bay, with each
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member of the team having his/her designated place according to their specialties and
responsibilities. A hospital must have at least 16 kinds of medical specialists readily available
for trauma care in order to be considered a Level 1 trauma hospital (See Table 1.1 of Chapter 1).
There are two attending physicians who are generally the supervisors for the day‘s shift, one of
which made the decision to classify the injured patient as a Level 1 trauma case.
The role of the two attending physicians is, in many ways, to not be a part of the trauma
case. It is to stand back and look at the whole trauma event, look at all of the team members and
what they are supposed to do versus what is actually happening. The attending physician
concentrates on the patient not so much as a person but as a discrete variable in this system, and
he/she attentively scans the system, searching for the spots where the system is breaking down
and directing others to fix them before they become a problem. This distancing is useful, because
the biggest chance for errors by those leading the code occurs when the physician becomes
personally involved in managing the patient, putting their hands on the patient. There are other
people to do that. Because there is so much information emanating from the event, the attending
physician who is ultimately in charge of the trauma has to be outside of the event. This ―hands
off‖ procedure is true even for severe medical situations like those requiring CPR, intubation,
cricothyroidotomy and similar procedures. The living organism is a system with parts that
interact and interrelate with each other, resulting in one injured organ affecting a non-injured
organ. Systems have functional requirements (FR) that help capture the behavior of the system.
The attending physician is always aware of those requirements and is attentive to the behavior of
the system as expressed by the ABCDEs functions, which the system is required to perform.
Distancing enables the attending physician to take in the necessary information about the system
piece by piece and feed it out again as the team needs it to make decisions instead of all members
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of the team having all of the information thrown at them all at once. This type of engagement
with the trauma case enables the attending physician to distinguish between the baseline
functionality requirement necessary for the system to survive the trauma and the features that
differentiate the conditions of the presented system with those past experiences.
This trauma team approach recognizes that there are other, junior physicians to do the
actual work of touching the patient to perform procedures or tests, and they relay information to
the EMAP who is integrating it all and directing the trauma case. The process lets that EMAP be
less distracted by each individual finding, whether normal or abnormal, and permits him/her to
integrate all the pieces of information into a more complete picture of the patient. It has been
documented that when the EMAP or the team leader becomes involved in the hands-on care of
the patient, they easily get distracted or sidetracked into one aspect of the system. For instance,
an EMAP who gets drawn into putting an IV into a patient is not functioning optimally as the
case manager. If something else develops that is important to know, they may not realize it
because their attention is directed elsewhere. Hence, to direct trauma cases, EMAPs have to be
outside of the action, just like the director of an orchestra: in front of the events, looking at
everything, and telling people what to do, including the nursing staff, so that things get done.
This cognitive orchestration of putting all the pieces of the puzzle together underlies their
decision-making process under stress.
An example of the kind of breakdown that can occur was given by this physician:
EMAP-3: There was a trauma [case] not too long after you were there [shadowing the
physicians] where all the trauma MDs, including the attending [physician] and myself,
got dragged into the room because the patient was very sick and actually there were a lot
of breakdowns in the system for that patient that probably contributed to a bad outcome
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for them because there was not anyone out there looking at what was happening and
seeing the breakdowns as they were occurring. Everyone was in the room with their own
little problems, and there were other, bigger system problems that no one really
recognized because they weren‘t outside of the room.
These types of breakdowns in communications are resolved by assigning each team member a
responsibility and then each team member strictly adhering to their assignment.
EMAP-4: So I think that one important thing is communication of each team member‘s
responsibilities. The person at the head of the bed is doing the airway, the surgery
resident is doing the primary and secondary assessment. This nurse knows she‘s doing
the IV, the other nurse knows she‘s getting a BP. Designated communication of
responsibilities. If my job is airway, I know all I have to focus on is breathing. I don‘t
have to take in all the other data, all that confusing stuff. I have a finite realm that I‘m
thinking in. Just the data that affects my decision to intubate [airway] or not is all I‘m
concerned about at that point.
For each trauma code, there is a person assigned to each of these critical areas prior to patient
arrival. There‘s a person handling BP and a person getting IV access. If CPR is required, there is
a person already designated to perform it. They all are pre-assigned prior to arrival of the patient.
The main thing the lead physician can do is to make sure each member of the team has
the same goal and is working toward the same goal. However, during most trauma situations,
things are very convoluted and very dynamic, and each member of the team cannot just keep
doing their one task and not have to change that task.
EMAP-1: If we‘re doing resuscitation and I suddenly decide that I‘m not sure if this
patient still has a pulse anymore. Now, I have to raise my voice, not yell, but raise my
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voice and reorient everyone and say ―Listen, I want a pulse check before we do anything
else.‖ And then, based on that pulse check, everyone will either continue what they‘re
doing or completely reorient.
These are decisions in real-world settings. The framework for studying decision-making
in TC is based on the theories of complex adaptive systems, where interaction, evolution, and
novelty are ever-present within a constantly changing environment. Expert physicians
periodically reorganize their knowledge base in order to accommodate much more information.
This new, expanded knowledge base is the foundation for conceptualizing new recognizable
patterns, as previously discussed. Expert physicians will store and retrieve information
differently than novices do and use the information for fast decision-making as required by
evolving situations. Simultaneously, they go through a conscious analytical process of exploring
their existing mental models to match or determine which pattern is most appropriate to the
situation at hand and determine a diagnostic course of action. After doing so, physicians as
decision-makers can then see how it plays out in action.
The environment that physicians and their team members face consists not only of the
patient placed in front of them, but rather what they all do as a team. Their interrelations and
interactions are not static aggregations, but dynamic systems. Therefore, there cannot be just a
single reaction to a single, given environment; rather, an expert team both reacts to and enacts
the environment. Once enacted, the team can then break down that environment into separate
events that can be easily explored and matched to each of the team members‘ pattern
recognitions available in their mental models. As the team goes through the initial patient
assessment, the available enacted environment may be a score of undifferentiated variables.
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Sometimes, what is observed does not match any of the team members‘ patterns, and this can
bring everything to a standstill:
EMAP-1: There is a teacher from whom I‘ve listened to many lectures and the famous
quote he has is ―Don‘t just do something, stand there!‖ Sometimes you have to let things
develop and let things take their own course instead of intervening, because any
intervention you may do might just make things worse.
That is a level of uncertainty physicians need to learn how to deal with throughout most of their
professional careers. Indeed, in virtually all phases of their professional careers, physicians have
lived with irreducible uncertainty in diagnosis, prognosis and therapy. But once a physician
observes and collects all the information or cues and organizes them into a coherent set of
variables, he is then more able to make the inference that some of these variables co-vary with
other variables in ways that may be predictive. The physician then infers a connection among
the variables during those seconds ―standing there,‖ simply observing. Physicians then become
part of this complex environment, moving through this complex path, and actively learning
complex tasks that take total focused attention and an extraordinary amount of cognitive effort.
This information gathering about one‘s surround and about oneself and one‘s own behavior is
what makes the trauma center and its cases a complex adaptive system (Gell-Mann, 1999).
5.8 Trauma Complexity
Many things were observed in the ED while shadowing attending physicians during their
shifts. Three of those observations were: (1) Physicians adapt to constraints, pressures, and the
complexities of the trauma case at hand; (2) Rational analysis cannot yield optimal solutions
when the problem is ill-defined, information is ambiguous, and the situation is dynamic. (3) In
complex situations, such as a Level 1 or Level 2 trauma event, the size of the input does not
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correlate with its output in a predictable manner. A very small action or observation by a
physician may entirely transform the assessment and management of a patient‘s problem.
Similarly, a large input may have very little effect. A question then emerges regarding the
physician‘s response or mental schemas in these situations when faced with problems that are
very complex. One physician recalled:
EMAP-1: We‘re taught to step back to three main priorities in very complex situations,
for instance a patient resuscitation, [and] to keep it very simple. It‘s Airway: make sure
the patient can breathe. Heart Beat: make sure they have a good pulse. Blood Pressure:
make sure they have a good blood pressure. You do your best to make a complex
situation into three simple priorities. It doesn‘t always work; but often times when
something is very dynamic and very fluid and things are changing rapidly, you have to
step back to very simple priorities to be able to deal with a very complex situation.
Sometimes the complexity and the incongruity of certain situations may change the way
physicians perceive the situation or act in solving a problem, making it possible for cutting-edge
solutions to emerge. Trauma centers provide unique environments to interns as well as more
experienced physicians for learning processes in complex skill acquisition. TCs provide a
complex, shifting and emergent task environment. The emergent task environment is the
consequence of a high level of local interaction between agents. For most physicians and
especially for trauma physicians, one of their roles is to try to make sense out of the chaos of
such environments. During a complex resuscitation procedure, all factors collected during the
primary assessment are of a very critical nature and are to be dealt with swiftly, requiring
immediate attention to correct major deviations from the norm and to avoid slipping into chaos.
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Making sense out of chaos goes back to the simple and the complex: physicians have to
try to fit very complex situations into very simple priorities. However, physicians‘ notions of the
meaning of complexity and its opposite, simplicity, are not easily defined. As Gell-Mann
postulated, it would take a number of quantities, differently defined, to cover all our intuitive
notions of the meaning of these two concepts, as each quantity would be somewhat contextdependent (Gell-Mann, 1996). Simple priorities in the context of trauma include getting patients‘
airways, their breathing and their circulation stabilized, and if chest tubes are needed, providing
them, giving patients fluids if needed, and trying to get a CT scan if patients become stable
enough for the procedure. The essence of complexity is the way these priority patterns change
with each patient and become vastly more complex, which takes physicians back to the pattern
recognition concept. What are being prioritized are the A, B, and Cs, which stand for airway,
breathing, and circulation; and trying to fit very complex situations into patterns that have been
seen before, which, when it can be done, can really help simplify very chaotic situations.
EMAP-1: It really calls for a lot of subjective thought, unfortunately, because it‘s not an
objective method. Your personal biases could easily obscure your abilities to fit it into the
appropriate pattern. That‘s one thing we have to be careful about.
What physicians, then, are trying to accomplish is to take these complex boundaries
between orderly and chaotic behavior of the human body (system) and understand the factors
that control its behavior during those short minutes of the golden hour from the point of the
initial trauma. This tests physicians‘ empirical knowledge to its limits.
Typically, physicians in complex situations rely upon pattern recognition discussed in the
previous sections, looking at the patient and interpreting all the available information in light of
the kind of patient that they think they have in front of them. At the onset of the trauma code,
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physicians do a quick run-through of the data as the patient arrives. In looking at the patient, the
physician mentally places him/her in a bin of the kind of patient that he/she is, then mentally
steps back a little from the action to see the results. The problem is when things start to go
wrong, problems emerge, and physicians fail to repeat that pattern recognition process and
question whether the patient was put into the correct bin. Often when this happens, the data of
the situation have changed but the physicians are involved in something else and have not
recognized that changes occurred. In this regard one physician said,
EMAP-3: That can be really stressful, if you don‘t realize that‘s happening and you
recognize that the situation is going bad and you aren‘t really sure why. Because the
patient seemed like this kind of person who should be better now because of the things
that you did because they were [categorized as] this kind of patient. And so really, I think
you just try to again pattern-recognition batch them so that you hope your intuitive
decisions will be more appropriate and what kind of bin you put them into is kind of
more of the scientific evidence based and experience based. That‘s where that applies
initially. As you get more data you may apply more of an analytic approach to that
patient, but mostly it‘s just intuitive.
One important observation made while shadowing the attending physicians was that it is
unusual for leading trauma physicians to be far from agreement because one person is generally
firmly in charge of the team. Unless the lead physician recommends a medical procedure that the
team members think is really crazy, the team will usually go along. Typically, if the attending
physician in charge does run into something that has the potential for disagreement, their training
and experience allow them to take a minute to lay out the situation and get team members‘ input.
Therefore, the leading trauma physician can usually move forward in a direction in which people
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have at least relatively significant agreement. Trauma physicians typically in chaotic situations
move again into an intuitive model in which they are going to make decisions based on what is
going to be good for that patient based on the kind of patients they are categorized as being.
The thing that helps trauma physicians the most is the experience of having dealt with a
lot of really sick patients and complex situations where the diagnosis is not certain and the data is
not certain. The attending physician provided the following comment:
EMAP-3: Really the only way to do that is [1] experience in one way or another through
[2] simulation or actually [3] seeing patients. In our model of medical education, we
usually deal with actually seeing patients in a supervised setting. Where things get really
difficult is when a patient never falls into a pattern and all you have is data that you can‘t
model into some pattern and those are really stressful just because you have to deal with
each piece of data without any structure and that is hard.
In this complex adaptive process of dealing with ill-structured problems that quickly
move to the edge of chaos before the problem is solved, everything can also go back to the
thresholds of decision-making already discussed. If the physician looks up and sees the patient‘s
BP at 60 mmHg, regardless of the resources available the decision to send the patient to OR is
immediate. There are certain critical thresholds that, when crossed, rise to the top so forcefully
that nothing else matters. Trauma physicians then default to a habit/algorithm/stepwise approach
to remove some of the thinking from the situation (i.e., ABCDEs, checklist). Having a checklist
in place prior to encountering a patient removes any ad hoc decision-making. Physicians practice
these decision checklists during their training in order to be able to default to them in stressful
situations. Thus, what helps physicians in this complex environment in order to avoid chaotic
situations are the checklists and some degree of experience in applying them. However,
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physicians are not certain what the mix of those two are or should be. The closer one gets to
chaos, the more experience comes into play, because at that point things are moving outside the
realm of what the checklist covers. Obviously, it would not be chaos if the decision-making
checklist covered it. If there were a checklist available to cover the situation, it would still be
falling under rational or analytical decision-making.
5.9 Determining Patients’ Priorities
Emergency physicians are constantly involved in making decisions: whether to order a
lab report, an x-ray, an EKG, or ordering one procedure versus others as a strong possible
solution to the problem at hand. The European Journal of Trauma reported a case of a car
accident where the occupant of the car broke the right clavicle and the tenth and eleventh ribs on
the same side. The patient was admitted to the hospital, kept for 24 hours for observation, and
sent home shortly after that. Two days later the patient was back in the ED with generalized
abdominal pain associated with nausea and vomiting, which kept the patient in the hospital for
five days. Initial ultrasound and CT scan did not result in discovering the problems, but
subsequent CT scans and other tests revealed the problems: duodenal hematoma and blunt
abdominal trauma. A more appropriate diagnostic course of action was then planned for the
patient (Barry, 2006).
The prioritization of tests to determine the extent of injuries and detect them all is a
constant in a trauma physician‘s life. Basically, any time a patient is a Level 1 or 2 trauma codes,
based on trauma ―rules‖ these patients are always going to get a CT of the chest, abdomen, and
pelvis. The chest/abdomen CT administered in the above case would probably have detected the
duodenal hematoma and blunt abdominal trauma the first time around. Perhaps not with 100%
certainty, but with high probability. Physicians at the site of this study take virtually any patient
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who has received any type of severe injury (this case probably would have classified with a
clavicle and two rib fractures) and practically without thinking get a CT of the chest, abdomen
and pelvis. These types of injuries require following the protocols for getting all the tests. It is an
effort to take complex situations and subject them to the same routine every time in order not to
miss things like this.
There are situations wherein certain preliminary information directs a physician down
one path of suspicion versus another diagnostically. It is a matter of medical judgment where
physicians mentally categorize and count on prior decision-making schemas. In the presence of
further data from the trauma event, the schema can supply descriptions of certain aspects of the
real world, predictions of events that are likely to happen in the real world, and prescriptions for
behavior of the complex adaptive system. By looking at two broken ribs and a broken right
clavicle, deductively or intuitively it will be assumed that this patient could potentially be sick;
therefore, this patient will get a lot of tests because this patient is significantly injured. Trauma
physicians do not think about it, especially when dealing with a car crash as the mechanism of
injury; they just do it. The human body in car crashes tends to sustain injuries not only directly
from the impact but also from the combination of acceleration and deceleration forces on his or
her body. Despite very little external evidence of injury, internally there might be serious
damage and stress to tissues that will complicate the entire scenario.
These are the kinds of things trauma physicians must deal with when trauma cases first
arrive. Sometimes it does not sound like a particular patient would need to be considered a
trauma code. These patients are some of the many people who are in auto accidents yet who are
nevertheless not trauma codes. In such cases, it is the mechanism of injury that becomes the main
variable. It answers the question of how bad the catastrophe was that caused the injury.
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Mechanism of injury is always regarded as one of the main variables to consider in trauma
codes. Biomechanics plays an important role in injury mechanisms, especially in motor vehicle
crashes. Physician understanding of the biomechanics of injury is considered of utmost
importance in evaluating and treating trauma codes. According to the ATLS manual, the details
of the injury event can provide clues to identifying 90% of a patient‘s injuries (Fildes, 2008).
Any patient that had no abdominal tenderness and no external abdominal signs of trauma would
not have had a CT-scan, which would be the test that would diagnose such injuries. According to
EMAP-3, patients with broken clavicles and ribs are particularly known to be difficult to
diagnose, but they are also relatively rare, so the case reported by the European Journal of
Trauma is not really an unusual outcome.
This goes to the question of how much testing is appropriate for trauma patients, which
was the initial question. Trauma physicians have to go with pattern recognition and previous
experience to be able to recognize the exceptions to the rule. Patients that do not look very
injured do not get a lot of tests. Yet many times there are conditions that the physician intuitively
knows are exceptions to the rule, and more tests are requested for those patients. In all these
decisions, physicians also need to weigh the potential harms of over-testing people by making
diagnoses of conditions which are not important but for which they are going to receive a lot of
extra tests. Consider for instance the following case:
EMAP-3: I had a patient that other day, who a specialist had ordered a CT scan of the
neck, which I thought was relatively unnecessary. And there was an incidental finding
which was unimportant but probably led to a lot of extra testing to diagnose [something]
that in fact is not important. That was a case in which the test probably was not necessary
and the outcome of the test was not good for the patient. And, then there is the actual
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expense of extra testing, which is not insignificant. We, as custodians of the health care
system, have to realize that. And then the harms, potential physical harms of the tests—
which most of these are radiation-based studies, and many of them involve contrast dye,
which is potentially bad for your kidneys. So it‘s not a small thing to decide to do them.
In a trauma center, especially for Level 1 and 2 trauma codes, a lot of those decisions
have been decided before-hand for the trauma physician. A Level 1 trauma code is always going
to get these kinds of laboratory studies and then extra ones if, in the physicians‘ judgment, the
extra tests are needed. For the trauma center environment, the usefulness of these tests has
already been decided by the medical profession, as represented by government agencies, the
American College of Surgeons, the Medical Association, and the physicians as a group.
Physicians may decide to make exceptions, but generally speaking those tests are going to
happen. It is decision-making involving discordance between what physicians are seeing, what
physicians expect to find, and what is actually found that triggers the physicians to go down a
different diagnostic path.
5.10 Trauma Gestalt
An Emergency Department (ED) in a healthcare system also houses trauma centers (TC),
with all of their ramifications for staffing and care. It has to have physicians and nurses who are
trained to work in an emergency department and to take care of sick patients with any type of
illness and any age group. Therefore, EM physicians cannot be an expert on only one kind of
medicine, such as pediatrics, orthopedics, or any of the other 63 specialties. These physicians
have to be able to deal with all types of problems, at least enough to get patients stabilized, do an
initial or secondary assessment and get the initial diagnostic process going. The ED also has to
maintain that infrastructure in readiness 24 hours a day; it cannot just be part of the day. It must
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also have enough ancillary resources to allow the physician to do the appropriate diagnostic
testing, and physicians (not just emergency physicians) who are willing to come in on call and
see a trauma patient 24 hours a day. The healthcare organization must maintain on the premises
or on call a surgeon and a fully equipped operating room to take care of those patients.
The main factors that make an ED program with its trauma centers very successful are
money and other resources. It is of utmost importance to have the CT scanners, x-ray equipment
(both portable and non-portable), well trained RNs and an educational infrastructure to teach the
nurses and the physicians. It is necessary to have the ability to reimburse physicians well enough
that they want to stay up in the middle of the night seeing very sick patients. And there has to be
the whole hospital infrastructure to support all of that. Trauma centers, then, require a lot of
training and resources—and serious commitment from their leadership.
At the site of this research, the organization and support was visible in every aspect of the
ED. The major strength was that the hospital puts a lot of resources into the trauma system.
There are a lot of committed people, and there is a lot of really good training for all the medical
personnel. The weakness is that the whole health care system is changing so quickly that it is
uncertain whether the present amount of resources is still going to be available to put into the
system and continue to make it function well enough to respond to future demands. The ability to
keep up with the present volume of sick patients that are seeking services is in balance at the
moment; but, hard times are anticipated if the present level of services will be required into the
future. The whole process of health care reform, changes in the healthcare economy, and the
stability of the global economy are going to dictate the direction trauma care will take.
To compound the problem of caring for the injured, there are the malingering patients
consuming ED resources. It is hard to tell who that patient is who is malingering. He might be
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malingering; he might be someone who is really sick. There have been mistakes made before
where the medical team determined someone was malingering but they turned out to be sick and
the outcome was not good. The alternative is to take everyone seriously, regardless of
appearances, no matter what the problems or complaints, which is one of the hard parts of
medicine. The ED personnel have to assume they are sick.
Generally, the program affects everybody in a positive way. It gives physicians, nurses,
technicians and staff immediate feedback on their failings as well as encouragement for jobs
done well. It provides constant training and a system to fit into. The members of the program are
respected because the results achieved are not coming out solely from the physicians or trauma
surgeons or the nurses or the x-ray technicians. The results are achieved by everyone working
together in the trauma system. Going back to the initial paragraph as to why these professionals
chose EM as career, the biggest reason they work in a trauma ED is that they get to work with a
team of very highly educated people—highly educated nurses and doctors. In contrast, in a clinic
they would be working by themselves in a lot of ways, instead of working as they are now with a
large team of very smart, assertive people.
One of the most significant problems in trauma medicine is that a lot of trauma
management has become non-operative. In other words, for many trauma patients an operation is
not needed. ―For a lot of abdominal injuries and chest injuries that currently we manage through
other methods, you used to have surgery,‖ says EMAP-3. Yet the current trauma center model
relies on the immediate availability of surgeons. One of the problems created by this expectation
of surgical management is that there are significant rural areas that do not have immediate
availability of trauma surgeons, so those patients need to be transported to a trauma center in a
timely manner. This involves either helicopter transport or ground ambulance transport. In any
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case, the movement to a treatment center from outlying areas is prolonged. EMAP-3 pointed out
that, ―There is a need to kind of decide better how to decide when surgeons are needed and also
if there is a better way to move patients to trauma centers, or to move trauma centers to the
patient.‖ Three questions of crucial interest emerged:
1. Is it more appropriate to really make an effort to have trauma surgeons in outlying
areas that may not have every other resource available but could do initial surgical
trauma management?
2. Do surgeons have to be in tertiary centers with every subspecialty available?
3. Is that really what a trauma center has to be?
These are questions of crucial interest for future research in trauma medicine.
The trauma center and the ED where the shadowing and discussions with all physicians
took place have a commitment to high-quality clinical medicine and teaching. The hospital
school works hard to make sure the physician residents are the best all around, teaching
professionalism and clinical competence as ED residents as well as hospital residents. The
volume of patients, which exceeds 3,600 trauma cases and more than 100,000 emergency cases
yearly, makes these physicians truly excellent professionals. The ED takes lots of referrals from
neighboring states, ―so we see lots of weird things,‖ says EMAP-3. It is just natural in the
development of cognitive processes that when one sees ―lots of weird things,‖ the pattern
recognition repertoire gets bigger. Another important strength of this ED is that it has highquality ancillary staff (i.e., nurses and technicians). For instance, the ED maintains true, fully
trained charge nurse positions. The charge nurse is in charge of trauma codes, working side by
side with the attending physician who is heading the ED for the shift. The triage nurses group is
made up of the more experienced nurses who are specifically trained to triage. EMAP-3
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explained the importance of the triage, ―You want those nurses to be experienced because, again,
they are also going to make intuitive decisions about patients that may not necessarily be
supported by the data about how sick that patient is.‖ It is crucial for these triage nurses to have
an informed patterned recognition buffer to make those at-the-edge decisions.
The study site is a fairly typical, traditional ED in that there is a significant amount of
ambulance-based traffic and a significant amount of walk-in traffic. This is also an academic ED
in that there are resident trainees who see the vast majority of these patients under the
supervision of the attending physicians. The emergency medicine attending physician (EMAP)
almost always does a more limited evaluation then they would do if they were in private practice.
This is acceptable and necessary for the training of the residents. While from the patient‘s
perspective, it would be ideal to see just one physician at the level of an attending physician,
every EMAP sees to it that patients get that level of care, even when they see the resident first.
5.11 Chapter Summary
This chapter covered a very large number of topics that are crucial to decision-making in
an environment where decision makers are under stress. It covered a wide range of topics,
ranging from pattern recognition, clinical judgment, and exploring decision-making
systematically to information overload, cognitive demands, and the complexity of trauma events
from the standpoint of complex adaptive systems. Observations, shadowing, and open-ended
questions were the tools used to understand how physicians make decisions in the stressful
environment of trauma centers. These tools provided a unique way to understand medical
decision-making processes and how physicians approach the very difficult task of saving
someone‘s life when only little or partial knowledge is available at the onset of the trauma event.
These EMAPs demonstrated the ability to make broad but fundamental decisions regarding a
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sick or multiply injured human being. Trauma physicians know what they want to achieve and
how to focus their knowledge and experience on the event at hand.
Physicians, as expert decision-makers in their fields, are predisposed to make clinical
judgments implicitly as well as being inclined to make decisions and clinical judgments on a
more intuitive basis. Of paramount importance is pattern recognition, which helps physicians in
solving difficult problems when all that is available are data that cannot be easily modeled,
making the situation truly stressful. Physicians store those patterns in the form of precepts and
they act on the basis of those precepts by somehow forming inner mental representations of outer
reality, then acting on the basis of those representations. Thus, experience helps physicians in
this complex environment to avoid chaotic situations. The closer physicians get to chaos, the
more experience plays a role in problem-solving. In making sense out of chaos, a trauma team
goes back to the simple and the complex by fitting very complex situations into very simple
priorities, such as the ABCDEs. A Level 1 trauma resuscitation case places heavy cognitive
demands on physicians because TCs are complex, shifting and emergent task environments. An
increasing emphasis is placed on physicians‘ performance in complex situations, requiring
improved communications, teamwork and coordination. The unpredictability of trauma systems
and the difficulty of collecting needed data were stressed because there are so many tangible and
intangible, known and unknown variables. Physicians in trauma centers exercise great leadership
because they care about emergency medicine very deeply. In the process of caring for the very
sick or seriously injured, these physicians exploit many types of information processing for
effective strategies to come up with plausible decision-making solutions for the patient‘s
problems, contingent on task demands and often adapting to new directions.
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CHAPTER 6
Results and Discussion
6.1 Introduction
In this study, data was collected for a total of 17 trauma cases; five of these cases were
excluded due to insufficient performance data. Of the twelve cases chosen, data from ten of these
cases were used to be used in the model for ―Decision-Making Process Under Stress‖ for a
training process. Two of the cases were used for the actual classification for the likelihood that
an observation belongs to one decision-making class or another. The resulting output was the
generation of a confusion matrix (CM) by means of the Bayesian classifier and a process graph
using a deconvolution operator. Both were derived with parameters that modeled the cognitive
performance of the physicians‘ decision-making processes.
The two trauma cases were selected and used in the model ―Decision-Making Process
Under Stress‖ (DMPUS) for achieving the greatest understanding of how physicians make
decisions under stress. The cases were discussed for verification of the results with a physician at
the trauma center site. The results align very close to how physicians think during trauma events,
giving a better insight into how physicians make decisions.
1.

Case 1: The patient arrived at the trauma center transported by EMS, with multiple
gunshot wounds to the lower extremity. The trauma team was around the patient at
the bedside, simultaneously evaluating to determine the type and extent of injury
and subsequent management of the region of the body that was injured, the organs
in the path of the penetrating bullet, and the velocity of the bullet. Technicians with
portable X-ray machines were called in for x-rays.
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2.

Case 2: The patient arrived at the trauma center with chest stab wounds with an
unknown size of knife. It was not possible to immediately assess how deep the
wounds were and whether vital organs had been punctured. Although the patient‘s
condition initially showed marginal improvement, when reassessed by the
emergency physician the impression was that the patient was not improving.
Further history was taken and after more trauma center care, the patient was
transferred to the operating room to be cared for by trauma surgeons.

During the study period, physicians were observed while attending to critically injured or
extremely sick patients in the trauma center. As patients arrived, physicians were formulating
decisions and plans of action. Throughout Case 1 events, gunshot wounds, many decisions were
made in split seconds. Some decisions inherent to traumas like Case 1 must be made rapidly and
executed promptly. These decisions, which must be made in the midst of immediate stressors,
may be outlined as follows:
1.

Mechanism of injury – bullet entrance and exit sites

2.

Bullet caliber and velocity of the projectile
a. High-velocity wounds may cause increased damage lateral to the track of the
projectile due to temporary cavitation
b. Care must be taken not to underestimate the amount of energy delivered in highvelocity wounds.
c. Appropriate actions must be taken to prevent missed injuries.

3.

Internal bleeding
a.

Must take blood pressure very often

b.

Attention to patient‘s abdomen as to whether it becomes taut
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c.
4.

5.

Attentive to temporary cavitation

Additional injuries based upon
a.

The length of the projectile‘s path

b.

The greater kinetic energy

c.

Linear or nonlinear trajectory of the bullet between entrance and exit

d.

The possibility of ricochet off of bony structures

e.

Possible fragmentation of bones creating secondary projectiles

f.

Vascular problems

Patient‘s medical history
a.

Importantly, is patient on some type of blood thinner?

6.

Visually identify sites of major external bleeding.

7.

Continuously visually assess the extremities for color and perfusion, other wounds,
deformity, swelling and discoloration or bruising.

8.

Assess four important body organs/systems
a.

Skin

b.

Neuromuscular function

c.

Circulatory status

d.

Skeletal and ligaments integrity

9.

Review for other musculoskeletal injuries

10.

Examine for limb-threatening injuries

11.

a.

Possible major arterial vascular injury

b.

Need for immediate consultation with a surgeon

Securing blood from blood bank if needed
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12.

Is the shooter in custody?
a.

Should ED be locked up?

b.

Is the medical team safe?

c.

Should hospital security or the police be called?

These are many of the decisions made during a trauma event of this type, because the type of
surgical procedure that may follow is definitely influenced by these decisions. There are many
types of medical and other decisions taking place at these times, and, depending on the patient‘s
physical condition, stage of illness or age, there might be a set of different decisions. This
differential decision-making process is the substance of developing trauma codes.
In Case 2, a series of decisions were formulated by physicians that included many of the
same decisions as those necessary for gunshot wounds, as well as some decisions inherent to
penetrating knife wounds to the chest. Physicians were making decisions on how to stop the
bleeding, as in Case 1. However, they were also engaged in how to ascertain that internal organs
were not affected and, if they were affected, what line of action might be taken to correct or
minimize the problem. Among these decisions are:
1.

To seek the account of EMS or witnesses who can provide details of the incident,
because this information helps in predicting injury patterns

2.

Developing an unusual index of suspicion about what affects the patient

3.

Determining whether the patient has any hemodynamic abnormalities

4.

Early and immediate surgical exploration (laparotomy)

5.

To see whether there was puncture of the pleura

6.

Lung puncture

7.

Whether to bring in respiratory technicians
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8.

Determine whether a CT-scan or X-ray is needed. Will they be revealing in this
particular trauma case?

9.

Whether to do more evaluations or transfer the patient to a more appropriate level
of care for severe injuries that have already been identified

There are also many other decisions which are common to both cases that can or seem to
be procedural and almost automatic, but they are not. These are decisions regarding when to
record vital signs, such as blood pressure, level of oxygenation, heartbeat, respiratory rates, body
temperature and environmental temperature, as well as who will collect this data, and the
assignment of a CPR expert to be present throughout the assessment period, among several
others. At the least, these seemingly merely procedural decisions will increase the noise of the
environment, causing physicians to have to deal with a lot more distraction and information. In
addition to the procedural domain, physicians in trauma centers also have to deal with the
affective domain, that is, all of the emotions emanating from medical staff, patients and relatives
of the patients. These are environmental noises that convolute decision-making processes; they
can easily blur the physicians‘ minds.
In terms of simulation output, the two cases were different in the manner in which the
physicians handled each case. The physician‘s course of action initially can be easily followed
because it is very procedural: x-rays are ordered, wounds are cleaned, first and second
assessment as required in trauma codes are performed—and all with clockwork precision. These
procedural actions are automatic, ―tangible, well defined, and teachable‖ (Croskerry, 2000) and
seem to be achievable without much thought, relying chiefly on training, experience, and prior
authentic rehearsal of textbook techniques.
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This study, however, was trying to make sense of the decisions as being rational,
political, judgmental or intuitive – as defined in Chapter 3. While technicians was taking and
developing x-rays and bringing the resulting reports to the physician for analysis, the physicians
were making many decisions for the patient in the meantime, which might fall into any of these
four decision categories. The process never stops because it cannot stop until the patient either is
stabilized or has expired. Dr. Patrick Croskerry, a scientist and an emergency medicine medical
doctor, wrote about three domains of expertise in emergency medicine that are required for
effective performance in trauma situations, referring to these domains as procedural, affective
and cognitive. His writings about decision-making in emergency medicine draw a sharp
distinction between the three and attention to the fact that it may appear to outside observers, ―as
well as to many within the medical profession,‖ that the procedural is the most important of the
three domains. However, his assertion is that most of the emergency physician‘s time is engaged
in ―cognitive behavior‖ through actions and interactions with other medical personnel
(Croskerry, 2000). The assertion in this study is that these cognitive behaviors define physicians‘
decision-making processes as being intuitive, judgmental or political.
6.2 Results
The model ―Decision-Making Process Under Stress‖ generated a confusion matrix and a
deconvolution graph for each of two different study conditions applied to each of the two trauma
codes. There were a total number of 101 of four decision-making types in Case 1, of which 61
were classified as rational, eight political, five judgment, and four intuitive decisions made. It
resulted in 75.09% accuracy for all decisions made during the trauma case. In Case 2, the results
were similar in that there were 68 rational, 7 political, 1 judgment, and 4 intuitive decisions
made. The resultant numbers from the CM that used data from the eight variables have been
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summarized according to Case 1 and Case 2. Table 6.1 gives an outline of the time sequence of
events for ―Case 1‖ and ―Case 2‖ regarding each ―decision-time-interval‖ (DTI).
Table 6.1
Sequence of Events of Trauma Cases 1 and 2
Decision-Time-Intervals
Case 1

Case 2

Gunshot Wound

Knife Stab

Time

DTI

Time

DTI

04:39

DTI-1

03:10

DTI-1

04:44

DTI-2

03:14

DTI-2

05:01

DTI-3

03:18

DTI-3

05:06

DTI-4

03:20

DTI-4

05:37

DTI-5

03:24

DTI-5

03:28

DTI-6

6.2.1 Trauma Case 1 – Study Condition 1. The first study condition used sample data
collected for the eight variables on a ―moment-per-moment‖ basis in trauma Case 1, referred to
as ―decision-time-interval‖ (DTI). For each DTI, the data was run through the Matlab program
model. During Case 1, there were five moment-per-moment decision time intervals, each
referred to as DTI-1 through DTI-5 (see Table 6.1.) For the first study condition of Case 1,
Figure 6.1 provides the results of all five confusion matrices (CMs) that include the percentage
of accuracy of all decisions made by the physician during the golden hour of the trauma code.
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Figure 6.1. Confusion matrices, Trauma Case 1, Study Condition 1.
These CMs are based on the Bayesian classifier which gives fairly accurate probabilities
of likelihood that a decision was correctly made, assuming relevant variable inputs are known. In
other words, it allows researchers (physicians) to combine new information, or data, from the
noisy environment with their existing knowledge or expertise, which in turn provides a better
approach to problem solving and better decision-making.
Figure 6.2 gives the deconvolution graphing output for each DTI for the first study
condition of Case 1, describing physicians‘ cognitive behavior during a trauma from a cognitive
engineering approach. These graphs represent the evolution of the physician‘s thinking process
for each moment of the trauma code, which is an approach to developing and evaluating a
physician performance measurement system that leads to effective decision-making outcomes.
Variations in the physician‘s decisions are conspicuous on the deconvolution graphs and are
determined by experiences, preferences, choices, influences and a number of other human and
non-human factors dictated by certain mechanisms such as emotions, environmental noises,
physical condition of patients, and so on. The graphs of Figures 6.2d and 6.2e show that the
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medical team experienced a period of relative stability in which the next actions could be
reasonably predicted, with perhaps little from the environment influencing the medical team‘s
actions. It was only when environmental noise and increased information changed at a pace
greater than the physician‘s decision-making threshold that the team encountered critical points
that forced decision-making accuracy to be reduced.
These graphs represent the variation in the physician‘s thought processes via the upward
and downward movements of the graph lines, which establish its erratic nature as decisions
proved to be stable or unstable. This was caused by the fact that trauma physicians do not have
time to look for all relevant information and weigh every bit of information to decide on a course
of action when every split second counts toward saving patients‘ lives. Moreover, these
variations in essence illustrate the stressful moments of the trauma code; as the graph lines show,
stress is never completely eliminated. The complexity of the system brought about by the team
members‘ interactions and relationships were compounded by the team members‘ individual and
collective behaviors that changed as a result of their involvement with the environment, created
critical moments during which decision processes slowed down, even if just for fractions of
seconds. Trauma physicians do not face a problem domain that is clearly bounded because
human patients are individual systems that react differently one from another; therefore, each
trauma case is unique and even ill-structured presenting a series of novel problems.
Figure 6.2a illustrates that the incidence of the percentage of correct decisions at the
onset of the trauma was 69%, which with some variations reached a peak of 77%, finally
stabilizing at between 75% and 76% when the physicians de-blurred and made different
decisions. Throughout Case 1, in the remaining graphs of Figure 6.2 (b, c, d, and e) decisions run
from 66% to a peak of 81% moment-per-moment as the trauma code progressed.
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Figure 6.2. Deconvolution graphs, Trauma Case 1, Study Condition 2.
In the first CM of Figure 6.1, the actual physician‘s decisions show 64 rational decisions
that were correctly classified as rational decisions, two rational decisions that were incorrectly
classified as political, one rational decision incorrectly labeled as judgment, and four rational
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decisions incorrectly marked as intuitive decisions. The next row of the same CM shows three
actual political decisions correctly classified as political, six political decisions incorrectly
marked as rational, two political decisions incorrectly marked as judgment, and one political
decision incorrectly labeled as intuitive. The third row of this CM shows four judgment decisions
that were correctly classified as judgment, one judgment decision incorrectly labeled as rational,
zero judgment decisions incorrectly labeled as political, and zero judgment decisions incorrectly
labeled as intuitive. In the last row there were six intuitive decisions correctly classified as
intuitive, six intuitive decisions marked as rational, one intuitive decision marked as political,
and zero intuitive decisions that were marked as judgment. Consequently, in Figure 6.1, the CM
system correctly predicted 64 rational decisions, three political, four judgment, and six intuitive
decisions, for 74.0% accuracy. Following the same reasoning outlined above, the remaining four
CMs of Figure 6.1 show 76.0%, 71.2%, 76.0%, and 77.9% accuracy. The rise in accuracy is due
to physicians de-blurring their thought processes and making different decisions, bringing the
percentage up to 77.9% from the previous lower level. These results have been graphically
summarized in Figure 6.3.
In this summary of the five confusion matrices for Case 1 reflected in Figure 6.3, each
bar of the graph depicts the percentage of accurate decisions made by the physician during the
trauma case and correctly classified by the Bayesian classifier. In decision-time interval one
(DTI 1), the percentage of accuracy was 74%, and this accuracy increased to 76% during DTI 2,
just to hit a critical decision-making point in DTI 3, as shown by the decrease in the accuracy
rate of almost five percentage points, down to 71.2%. As physicians de-noised their thought
processes in DTI 4, it bounced up to76% and then leaped up again in DTI 5 to 77.9% accuracy.
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Figure 6.3. Summary of confusion matrices, Trauma Case 1, Study Condition 1.
Accompanying the summary of confusion matrices in Figure 6.3 are the deconvolution
graphs presented in Figure 6.2, in which each of the five line graphs represents the physician‘s
thought process for a moment during the trauma to arrive at a decision. Figure 6.2a shows a
process that is unstable. This graph shows variations throughout the 15 iterations; but, it also
shows that the deconvolution process reached an optimum at 77% of de-noising development
during the first five iterations. However, the process stabilized at iteration ten, where it reached
an optimum of 75% of de-noising. In Figure 6.2b, the results are perceptible as physicians
approached the next moments of the trauma code with the first four iterations showing denoising results of 79%. Again, the process reached a critical decision-making point and
environmental noise brought the process to a lower level of understanding that reached 75% at
11 iterations and 74% at 15 iterations. The results of Study 1 helped in developing a more
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comprehensive understanding of the complexities underlying decision-making by trauma
physicians.
6.2.2 Trauma Case 1 – Study Condition 2. The same procedure was followed for
Study 2 of Case 1, but, the data used were ―moment-upon-moment,‖ meaning that the data for
DTI-1 and DTI-2 were entered together in Matlab to create both the confusion matrix and the
deconvolution graph for those two decision time intervals. Next, it was the DTI-1 with DTI-2
and DTI-3 sample data which were entered together in Matlab. It was continued in this manner
to the end of the golden hour of the trauma case, always adding one more moment-per-moment
(DTI) of the sample data to the end of Case 1. The resulting confusion matrices are shown in
Figure 6.4, and the deconvolution graph outputs are shown in Figures 6.5a thru d.

Figure 6.4. Confusion matrices, Trauma Case 1, Study Condition 2.
Figure 6.5d is a graphical representation of the entire trauma event (DTI-1 through DTI5), at which point the physician had full knowledge of the entire case. It can be compared to
Figure 6.5a, at which time the physician had only partial knowledge of the trauma code.
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Figure 6.5. Deconvolution graphs, Trauma Case 1, Study Condition 2.
In this study, two of Case 1‘s participants, the CMs reported in Figure 6.4, have been
summarized in Figure 6.6, where the accuracy rates were graphically compared to achieve a
greater understanding of the decision maker‘s cognitive processes.
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Figure 6.6. Summary of confusion matrices, Trauma Case 1, Study Condition 2.
As shown in Figure 6.6, the accuracy of decisions made changed from 75% at the
beginning of the trauma code to 73.1% mid-way stabilizing in the end at 75% accuracy. This
75% accuracy can be compared to the deconvolution graph of Figure 6.5a in which the
percentage of correct decisions reached a peak of 78%. It is evident that the decision makers
encountered critical points, forcing their thinking processes to slow down in order to manage deblurring and an opportunity to make different decisions. The physician reached a slow moment
in the decision-making process creating convolution at what seems to have been a critical point,
while entering the next moments of the trauma, as shown in DTI 1-3 of Figure 6.5b. Critical
points are serious indications of a time of struggle and differences of opinion, and they may
indicate periods of cognitive disagreements among the medical team members (Goldstein, 2010).
However, critical points offer the medical team unique opportunities for successful
transformation of the event through complex interactions, relationships and innovations that help
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to define strategies for dealing with novel situations. This critical point caused a reduction in the
percentage of correct decisions to 73.1%. The convolution could have been the result of higher
environmental noise that required the physician to heavily focus attention under stress, perhaps
because of novel knowledge characterized by the development of new patterns. Critical moments
such as these often happen in trauma situations as the pace of events and the nature of the trauma
require physicians to interrupt any on-going cognitive activity in order to address a more critical
developing situation. Performance was markedly impaired for a few iterations, showing a steady
decline to continue into the DTI 1-4 of Figure 6.5c before deconvolution took place. In
addressing this new state, the deconvolution or de-noising during DTI 1-5 reached an optimum
of 75% to allow physicians to make decisions with clear minds as observed in the last CM of
Figure 6.4. The last two deconvolution graphs, (c) and (d) of Figure 6.5, provide clear evidence
of thinking process improvements and the physicians‘ ability to achieve higher performances
while under stress. This higher performance is shown in the significant results of Figure 6.5d, in
which the entire trauma event (DTI-1 through DTI-5) is depicted to represent the physician‘s full
knowledge of the entire case as the medical team reached its optimum. In this period of time,
there was steady de-blurring and variations on the decision process occurring throughout the 15
iterations, always, however, improving decisions and experiencing steadily upward stabilizing
adjustments.
The accuracy of a decision is compared to the physician‘s thresholds for that procedure,
decision-making action, a particular disease, or an injury of the patient. An accuracy percentage
that is a good approximation of the physician‘s threshold for the situation takes the process to the
DMUS final result (refer to Figure 4.1 of Chapter 4). This is the physician‘s initial guess as to the
diagnostic course of action. Assuming the resulting percentage of accuracy is reasonably within
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the physician‘s threshold, the decision process is completed and the physician has reached the
decision under stress.
The important points observed for Condition 1 of Case 1were in the results of the
deconvolution graphs. As shown in Figure 6.5a, the percentage of correct decisions went from
65% to 78% in five iterations and reduced to around 71% in four more iterations, stabilizing
itself at 76% after four more iterations. In other words, there was a critical moment in which the
medical team came in contact with some critical information that blurred the physician‘s thought
process, causing the decision-making process to slow down or be too noisy to decide the course
of action, and this lasted for six iterations.
Additionally, the graphs of Figures 6.5a, c, and d show similar reactions where decisions
went up from 67% to 76% with some variations that brought correct decisions down to 73%
before springing up and stabilizing again at 78% after the physician‘s de-blurring. Something
happened that raised the physician‘s decision process to a different level. When little or no
variation is observed in the graph lines, it means that the decision of the physician has reached its
optimum because there is little variation between the physician‘s decision and the Bayesian
classifier. Physician decision-makers have been trained in specific construct systems that enable
them to view in many dimensions the problem or situation which their medical team is facing. It
is important is that these constructs are adaptive and not static, since trauma physicians are part
of a complex adaptive system that must be able to adapt in and evolve with a changing
environment. As discussed in the previous sections, these constructs are, for the most part,
confirmed by a pattern recognition process that matches the situation at hand with those in the
physician‘s mental library of pattern recognition.
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The confusion matrices of Figure 6.4 were summarized in Figure 6.6 for an easier
interpretation of the decision-making process for Study 2 of Case 1. Evidence regarding the
decision-making activities of these physicians is indicated by the percentage of accuracy
achieved throughout the trauma.
6.2.3 Trauma Case 2 – Study Condition 1. The second trauma case was several
minutes longer in duration. The same procedure outlined for Case 1 was applied for Study 1 and
Study 2 of Case 2. The results for Case 2 were six CMs for Study 1 and five CMs for Study 2.
This is illustrated in Figure 6.7 and Figure 6.10, respectively. Further, the resulting
deconvolution graphs for Study 1 and Study 2 of Case 2 are shown in Figures 6.8 and 6.11,
respectively. This combination of CMs and deconvolution graphs is important for making sense
of the physician‘s thinking processes, because it is a strong way to visually depict the decisionmaking process. It allows for rapid comparison of the physician‘s mental models with the reality
of the trauma situation. In Figure 6.7 of Study 1, note the robust results of all six CMs. At the
start of the trauma code, the physician‘s accuracy was 75% in the first ―decision-time-interval‖
(DTI-1). The accuracy improved as the trauma code gained momentum, reaching 77.9% during
the next DTI-2, and improving once more to 82.7% in DTI-3. Physicians encountered some
critical moments during the next two intervals as accuracy dropped 7.7% to 75%. However,
accuracy went up to 78.8% in the last CM. These CMs for Study 1 of Case 2 have been
graphically summarized in Figure 6.8. The deconvolution graphs of Figure 6.9 demonstrates the
ability of the trauma medical team to approach complex situations, raise new questions, use
proximity, time, and perceive the consequences of actions taken.
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Figure 6.7. Confusion matrices, Trauma Case 2, Study Condition 1.

Figure 6.8. Summary of Confusion matrices, Trauma Case 2, Study Condition 1.
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The deconvolution graphs of Figure 6.9 show a much more stable process. However,
these graphs still show that stress permeated the physician‘s mental schemas at each moment of
the trauma code, as demonstrated by the variations in the graph lines, corresponding to the most
critical moments. The improvements are clear at each of the iterations. The graphs show erratic
behavior due to stress and environmental noises, but, results always improved as time progressed
from DTI-1 to DTI-6. All six graphs of Figure 6.9 show that the physician had a strong sense of
his/her ability to position cognitive resources optimally and to remain task oriented in spite of the
critical moments that were present in all iterations. These difficulties were the source of the
stress encountered during the performance of the trauma procedures. The percentage of correct
decisions oscillated from a low of 64% to a high of 86%, finally settling at 80% at the end of the
golden hour. The last deconvolution graph, Figure 6.9d, shows the de-blurring that brought
decisions from 77% down to 73% at what seemed a critical moment in the trauma. It should be
noted that once again physicians de-blurred their decision-making processes and made new
decisions and judgments to determine a new course of action, causing the percentage of correct
decisions to go up and stabilize at 82%. Intriguingly, understanding the critical moments in
trauma cases is probably one of the major considerations for the physician, making his or her
mental process at those times the most valuable asset in forming their diagnostic impressions and
impelling the actions of the entire trauma team.
6.2.4 Trauma Case 2 – Study Condition 2. The results of the CMs in Figure 6.10
show that at the start of trauma Case 2 decisions had slowed down, having an accuracy at both
DTI 1-2 and DTI 1-3 of 76.9%. Results were improved in DTI 1-5, reaching 79.8% accuracy and
regressed in DTI 1-6 to 76.9% just as at the beginning of the trauma case. These CMs have been
summarized in Figure 6.11, which gives a better visualization of the entire accuracy level of this
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case. In the CM for DTI-5, in which the percentage dropped to 76.9%, the decrease can be
attributed to a critical moment. At this very instant, as observed, the medical team must have
received some critical information that blurred the physician‘s thought processes, causing his
decision-making process to slow down or be too noisy. These are the moments where intuition
and pattern recognition approaches take first seat in decision-making. However, physicians are
careful about the over-use of pattern recognition because, despite the fact that often it provides
the correct answer, ―it occasionally fails, sometimes catastrophically‖ (Croskerry, 2009). The
characteristics and capacities of the medical team members influence the strategies that should
be examined or decisions made by the medical team while at the edge of a critical event.

Figure 6.10. Confusion matrices, Trauma Case 2, Study Condition 2.
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Figure 6.11. Summary confusion matrices, Trauma Case 2, Study Condition 2.
Referring to the deconvolution graphs (a through e) of Figure 6.12, each offers the
possibility of a clinically plausible series of stressful moments which caused many variations.
The third deconvolution graph, labeled ―(d) Case 2 Study 2 DTI 1-4,‖ shows significant
variations with constant de-blurring, but always trending upward improvement, achieving 81%
before settling at the level of 79%. The knowledge required to derive an appropriate decision is
not quite straightforward in trauma events because sometimes the fast pace and graphical nature
of the occurrence affects information retrieval. However, there is an intuitive appeal in thinking
that the physician‘s cognitive processes can significantly affect performance and lead to
strategies that result in correct decisions. The final decision for this case was to transfer the
patient to trauma surgeons in the operating room.
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6.3 Discussion
In presenting the philosophy of science while considering the methodological questions
that arise in the context of observation, Wartofsky (1968) argued that:
“Any descriptive utterance, any observation statement, is already a hypothesis; and
further, that every such hypothesis already carries with it a matrix of relevance which guides us
to engage in those tests of experience which we take to support or to fail to support this
hypothesis.”
The overarching objective of this research was to understand the manner in which
physicians make decisions under the stress of trauma situations and to help explain their thought
processes. Physicians must rely on more than technical skill or textbook knowledge to get
through the golden hour of a trauma event. Most of the situations faced by physicians in trauma
cases cannot be decided on an empirical basis alone. Ultimately, they require having an
understanding of the complexities of the case, an appreciation of the fact that individual humans
react to injuries and sickness in different ways, and an awareness that affective emotions can
sometimes run high.
Emotional reactions often have the potential to interfere in the trauma team‘s abilities to
function at full capacity. As was observed and perceived during the observation period, there
were children, young adults, older adults and elderly patients with serious injuries and sickness
that included a broken cranium, heart failure and even gunshot wounds, all of which caused the
emergency department to be locked up. All these events not only affected the trauma team‘s
ability to function, because these medical professionals are feeling human beings, themselves,
but also threatened the trauma team‘s safety. The various systems physicians use to go about
caring for the severely injured or sick are generally not the basis upon which they make
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decisions. Instead, good decisions are made when a good balance has been achieved between the
information acquired during the trauma case and an appropriate methodology used to assess it.
Looking at the statistics arising from the deconvolution graphs gives some insight as to
why, in trauma codes, no one can expect decision-making to follow any given known parameter.
This combination of CM and deconvolution graph is a clear way to visually represent the
decision-making process. It allows for rapid comparison of the physician‘s cognitive process, the
reality of the case and the utilization of a number of information processing strategies in order to
decide on a course of action. This type of decision-making in such environments is by its very
nature complex, in spite of physicians‘ knowledge of the human organism‘s life-growth-self
reproduction-self regulation-death cycle. The knowledge of this cycle tends to somewhat reduce
the complexity. However, each member of the trauma team‘s physical experiences of the case,
such as sight, touch, hearing and smell, generate a phenomenal range of decision-making
assumptions that might be radically different from those of the other members. Therefore,
evolvement and adaptation are truly fundamental processes within some theoretical framework
in a decision-making process. As the deconvolution graph line variations illustrate, physicians
are acting spontaneously and trusting each other‘s intuition, knowledge and judgment in making
decisions under stress.
Rational decision-making in environments such as trauma centers is far from being
perfectly deductively rational, and physicians admit that there is some level of uncertainty.
Pattern recognition, among many other important tools, was discussed in Chapter 5 as one of the
models that emergency physicians have relied upon to deal with uncertainty and make decisions
about situations encountered in trauma. These emergency physicians throughout their careers
increase their capacity to recognize unfamiliar situations as familiar ones, as well as increase
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their abilities to decide on courses of actions for present situations by recognizing patterns that fit
the present emergency. It is that ability of expert physicians to see things using their vast library
of knowledge that inexperienced decision-makers cannot see which makes these decision makers
exceptional. But, in trauma codes, these physicians are working in teams, and as the case
unfolds, the pattern recognition may change for each member of the team. Each member sees the
picture from a different angle, and one ―must distinguish between the continuous seeing and the
dawning of an aspect‖ (Wittgenstein, 1953 p. 193-194). Ultimately, each team member reports
their perception of what they believe to be the actual problem at hand, and this sharing
contributes to changing their perceptions and de-blurring their mental models. Wittgenstein
points out that different concepts touch at a single point and coincide over a stretch and ―seeingas‖ is altogether a process of seeing and thinking, in which ambiguity escapes the agent
altogether (Wittgenstein, 1953 p. 194-195).
Croskerry (2000) recognized that an emergency physician‘s thinking while making
clinical decisions is of the inductive type, and its nature and limitations need to be understood. It
is possible for a patient to arrive at an ED with certain symptoms and be diagnosed with an
ailment, and the next arriving patient with the same symptoms may be similarly diagnosed while
a more serious condition may be missed. The results of the model suggest that physicians in EDs
were more likely, in the face of novelty during trauma events, to incrementally revise and modify
their thinking strategies in order to optimize performance and avoid the kind of situation just
described. Therefore, it shows the natural adaptability and evolution of the system in creating
opportunities for physicians to de-blur their thinking processes and produce a more seamless
transition in structuring their decisions.
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On the other hand, physicians often have only fragmentary data or information cues about
trauma patients upon their arrival at a trauma center. Still they try, for the most part successfully,
to arrive at an internal schema, a mental model of the problem and its solutions. It was referred to
above and in the previous section as ―optimizing performance‖ and as decisions that have
―reached an optimum.‖ Most trauma cases are blurred with fragmented data. In this real
environment of trauma medicine blurred with fragmented data, the options are almost unlimited
in a given instance in which all events occur and small errors can be proved catastrophic. There
is no way a physician can find an optimum or even recognize it in the face of incomplete data
and such a chaotic and fast-changing environment. In such environments, measurement can
never be as perfect as in textbooks. However, it can be seen from the deconvolution graphs that
physicians‘ mental models reach an optimum equilibrium after arising, sometimes overshooting
variations on a straight line, upward or downward in a zigzag manner before either stabilizing at
a certain percentage of accurate decisions or reaching the border of chaos. The paradox here is
that just because one physician knows, understands or is quite well-versed in some procedure, no
one can expect that it will go well when a similar situation presents itself.
Emergency physicians get into these situations often, insofar as they see a lot of patients
in a given period of time, but during the following period of time, in spite of the fact that the new
patient arrivals have similar conditions, they may have very different reactions to those
conditions as compared to the previous patients. The deconvolution graph line variations show
decision makers during trauma events incrementally and persistently revising and modifying
their strategies to optimize results. This constant revision causes physicians to select and use the
cognitive strategy of asking questions of knowledgeable other people, and their answers trigger
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metacognitive experiences about how the endeavor is faring, activating as result a deliberate,
conscious memory search for an effective decision-making strategy (Flavel, 1979).
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CHAPTER 7
Contributions and Future Work
7.1 Research Summary
It has been argued that “From the standpoint of clinical reasoning, it is disconcerting
that clinicians often are unaware of, or have little insight into, their thinking processes”
(Croskerry & Norman, 2008, p. s24-s29).
Emergency physicians are trained to integrate medical knowledge acquired through years
of experience with everyday novel situations. The novel situations that present in a trauma center
(TC) are especially likely to occur in situations that require and stimulate a lot of careful, highly
conscious thinking and cognitive input together with a strong medical knowledge base for
clinical decision-making. These situations help us to develop a richer understanding of trauma
medical teams during the actual performance of their functions in a trauma center. The medical
team itself might end up having to be characterized not only by a narrow time frame (the golden
hour period) but also by the manner in which these teams respond to each event, because from
one night to the next, the team might look very different in terms of who is working, how they all
work together and what leadership styles exist.
The trauma medical team is in a real struggle to save someone‘s life, and there are
medical procedure skills acquired through years of training, in addition to algorithms provided
by the healthcare system, that teams have learned to apply to each trauma situation. With high
levels of experience, these skills become almost automatic. But the fact remains that in this
struggle for life or death, formal procedures are in most cases not sufficient or adequate to
solving ambiguous and uncertain problems. It is the difference between formal structure and
informal structure. Trauma centers may be considered informal as they are composed of
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specialists (i.e., physicians) who, for the most part, are autonomous agents of the hospital who
are trying to make sense of what is going on around them. There are continuously decisions
being made that feed into this trauma system. The key is to understand that these decisions are
driven by intrinsic rational, intuitive, clinical judgment and sometimes political decision-making
processes, and then there is the unknown and the complex that factor into the event—the
uncertainty piece. Additionally, there is that crucial need to understand that in every way, in
every case, real-world problems, such as living systems in trauma codes, place heavy cognitive
demands on decision-makers for rapid and reflexive orienting, allowing his or her adaptive
processes to take over to deal with the situation effectively.
Emergency physicians assertively demonstrate the ability to make wide-ranging and farreaching decisions regarding sick or multiply injured human beings in short periods of time. This
ability is only possible because emergency physicians know what they want to achieve and have
been trained in how to focus their knowledge and experience on the event at hand to reduce the
uncontrolled environment that exists at the beginning of trauma codes. Furthermore, emergency
physicians have clear goals about the roles they play in acute injury care, in spite of the fact that
the events to be faced will typically be unpredictable. It was observed in the TC that there is no
lack of clarity about the role of an emergency physician.
These decision-makers apply the knowledge of pattern recognition frameworks that must
be adapted in solving difficult problems wherein all that is available are data that cannot be
easily modeled to fit the reality of the trauma. By virtue of the great number of trauma codes that
show up at their door steps, emergency physicians tend to build large mental libraries of these
patterns that become important to planning their actions. Thus, experience helps physicians to
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sharpen their thinking processes in this complex environment to avoid chaotic situations and to
focus their energies on increasing the quality of patient care.
This dissertation showed that for the most part trauma physicians are dealing with
voluminous and difficult-to-handle information. Thus, it is in part experience that plays an
important role in trauma decision-making by facilitating the gathering of information and the
development of alternative paths to problem-solving action during trauma events. Because the
study was conducted at an academic environment, the role of each of these emergency
physicians also included building up the cognitive style of resident physicians and ascertaining
that they did not get so little information that they became bored nor so much information that it
risked leading to overload and burn-out as repeated situations reached the edges of chaos. It is a
complex environment in which performance criteria change with each case at hand. Therefore,
this study also discussed the fact that trauma centers provide unique environments not only for
interns but for more experienced physicians, as well, for learning processes in complex skill
acquisition. Physicians talk about not being able to know how sick patients are when they arrive
at the hospital. Because of the inherent complexity of the human body, which is compounded by
serious injuries or sickness, there is not enough science currently available for physicians to
determine the prognosis of patients in detail when they present at the hospital. Initially,
physicians‘ ways of speaking do not describe the facts as they really are. However, physicians
tend to see the situation as comparable to making an experiment in which only time will tell
whether the decisions they have made were correct and will result in optimal outcomes for their
patients.
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7.2 Contributions
The model DMPUS presented here to explain the physicians‘ decision-making thought
processes offers a way of understanding how decision-makers approach stressful problems. The
most immediate result of the model was to be able to capture physicians‘ cognitive tasks as they
play an important role in trauma events. The model was aimed at providing physicians trauma
events with the capability to learn more about their own behaviors and those of the environment.
The combination of Bayesian classifier and deconvolution operators in a model was
designed to mimic the information processing of decision-makers under stress. Deconvolution is
widely used in many branches of science. Communication engineers, for example, use (in real
time) convolution and deconvolution models extensively in communication systems such as the
telephone to un-do distorted messages that have become garbled by the telephone system. This
kind of study is important for high-pressure environments in which human decision-makers and
high technologies coexist. This study attempted to understand the process of metacognition
experiences, the understanding of physicians‘ cognitive processes through which strategies are
developed to decide under pressure the course of action for a trauma code situation.
The resulting benefits of this study are important information about how physicians think
during decision-making processes in emergency situations, which carries potential benefit to
society. Aspects of complexity concepts were emphasized to provide a better understanding of
critical situations often encountered by decision-makers in difficult task environments. A key
contribution is that it traces the major determinants and pervasive effects of decision-making
occurrences for a deeper understanding as to why expert decision-makers tend to make
judgments without assigning numerical values. Physicians as decision-makers play an important
role in adapting to flows of knowledge based upon fragmentary data about the system presented
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in trauma centers. Humans generally have the predisposition to selectively perceive information
that is consistent with their existing views. A better understanding of how physicians think will
most likely generate an increase in new sets of tools to assist in strategic decision-making.
One significant fact observed during this study was the explosion of information that
accompanies all the technologies that trauma centers utilize in the care of trauma patients. A
good portion of a physician‘s training has to be allocated to learning each technology apparatus,
and this learning must be updated with each new apparatus that is acquired. But emergency
physicians also rely heavily upon their own experience, attitudes and efficacy in trying to affect
trauma outcomes. All of these factors play important roles in complex relationship with one
another, leading emergency physicians to be able to predict events and trigger actions. It seems
reasonable to suggest that much is known about the performance of the different medical
specialties which compose a trauma center medical team. Invariably, the factors that limit the
performance of each of the members of the team is not the abundance of new technologies; it is
the scarcity of research that explores how physicians think in ways that will give them an edge
while caring for a complex system such as a human being in trauma.
By exploiting the Bayesian classifier and the deconvolution model, and understanding the
existing convolution at the onset of each trauma code, it is possible to extract the much-needed
knowledge that helps physicians to focus on a potential diagnosis. The study suggests that all the
medical specialties composing a trauma team are more than capable of contributing strong
observations and interpretations as to how they see the situation and how to proceed to find a
solution or solutions. Whether those observations are right or wrong matters not, because they
are hypothesizing about the diagnosis, which, when followed by actions, returns feedback. Here
physicians are engaging in cognitive strategies at work that are harder to describe or measure.
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7.3 Research Limitations
As with most research, this study had some natural limitations. One of the limitations of
this research is mostly related to the collection of data and the difficulties of translating
physicians‘ thoughts into a mathematical exercise to be solved by analytical reasoning. The data
collected was from a very limited number of trauma case scenarios; though the scenarios were
observed in real-time, suggesting a small body of evidence. While this difficulty is common in
the healthcare sciences due to the sensitive nature of patients‘ information and the complexity of
securing IRB approval for these kinds of real-time research, its potential limitations warrant
reflection. The researcher, as non-medical personnel, was limited in his knowledge of the areas
of medical terminology, physiology, human anatomy and medical procedures during the
observation of an ongoing-under-stress trauma code. The observation of a physician in action is
always limited by the difficulty of understanding what physicians are actually doing, thinking
and saying.
Physicians in trauma centers‘ domains have the pressures of dealing with a wide range of
emotions originating from the environment, patients, patients‘ families and medical personnel
surrounding the trauma case, which causes a highly charged emotional situation. The leading
physician of a Level 1 trauma resuscitation unit knows the team he/she is working with, and, as
such, communication among the team members was observed to be at times silent, with only
exchanged eyes contact and suggestive glances. Because the researcher‘s observations could
raise concerns, given that they were intended to measure and explain physicians‘ thinking
processes in their decision-making actions, EMAP-1 was asked to review the collected data to
mitigate this concern by verifying that information acquired was correct. This limitation, the
difficulty of obtaining sufficient patients‘ medical records, precluded the ability to give more
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validity to the decision-making model. It only considered a few trauma cases. The narrow range
of trauma cases limits the generalization and scalability of the research findings to complex
adaptive systems in general. It will be useful to replicate the findings in other trauma center
domains and in larger scale, to include the medical records of trauma cases that have occurred
during the full period of a year. At the site of this research, more than 3,200 trauma cases are
seen yearly, which provides good opportunity to further validate the model. Admittedly, this
study suggests that more research needs to be carried out pertaining to decision-making
processes in trauma centers using a sufficient number of cases. The healthcare industry has
distinguished itself by the importance and support it gives to research in the areas of patient care
and training of its medical personnel.
The second limitation pertains to the fact that the study was conducted at an academic
setting. It is known that the medical profession is based upon an apprentice-like model of
medical training, which is more closely observed in the academic setting. Attending physicians,
while still watching over their apprentices like a hawk for the entire procedure, take a step back
to allow for medical residents to take over the event in order to learn, placing an onus on the
attending physician. Physicians‘ residents, because of their highly inquisitive minds, suffer
significant pressure as well to acquire competence in many areas within a short time. Because of
this academic setting, the decision-making process was sometimes distributed amongst team
members in order to maximize the acquisition of clinical acumen, wisdom and good medical
judgment.
7.4 Conclusions
This study begins to clarify whether a specific understanding of physicians‘ decisionmaking processes can be gained in a trauma center setting, where they are confronted with
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complex, stressful and rapidly changing situations. The main goal of this study was to explain
physicians‘ decision-making processes while under the stress of treating a traumatized (injured
or very sick) human being. It has explored the processes by which physicians make decisions
during a trauma occurrence. Emergency and trauma physicians are performing rapid
resuscitation and damage control while in the golden hour of a trauma event. The survival of a
Level 1 trauma patient is given the highest priority in trauma physicians‘ mental processes. The
study shows that the setting of trauma medicine and emergency medicine requires a different
way of approaching problem solving.
More than three decades ago researchers expressed concerns that no attention had been
given to the principles that underlie clinical decision making, researches in the cognitive aspects
of medical decision-making had diminished, and a comprehensive theory of diagnostic thinking
and problem solving was not yet available (Croskerry, 2000; Kassirer, 1976; Kassirer, 1995).
Trauma and emergency medicine are not the usual models of organizations with which scholars
tend to be familiar. Trauma centers‘ models of decision making are a mixture of formal and
informal actions and the spontaneity of its participant agents who are facing novel problems and
developing new ideas. Many times this study mentioned the complexity involved in each and
every trauma case presented due to the human body being a complex system. Besides dealing
with decisions pertaining to the immediate problem of caring for the patient injuries or sickness,
physicians are also overloaded with the problem of resource allocation management. Resource
allocation management is a complex problem in and of itself (Ntuen, & Park, 1995). The
attending emergency physician is always aware of the case requirements and is attentive to the
behavior of the system. While planning in time and space, physicians‘ capacities for decision-
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making and judgment become the dominant traits that allow them to take in the necessary
information about the system and decide upon problem-solving actions.
7.5 Implications for Future Research Studies
Since 2009, the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) in the United States have been
pushing strongly towards assessment, evaluation and dissolution of barriers and obstacles to
conducting acute injury care research. The opportunities for research in emergency medicine
abound, as the numbers of research studies conducted to date in this area have been modest. The
CDC is aware that human performance measurement in complex environments such as those in
trauma centers is a multifaceted problem that will require interdisciplinary research efforts.
Future studies in this marginally explored field of how physicians think during decision-making
processes are needed in trauma medicine.
The following suggestions are proposed for further research that will have meaningful
implications and direct consequences towards understanding the decision-making processes in
trauma centers. These include (a) voice recognition for gathering physicians‘ performance data,
(b) developing a greater understanding of the role metacognition plays in physicians‘
communication, comprehension and problem-solving skills that helps physicians monitor their
decision-making processes, (c) developing principles to help understand physicians‘ thinking
processes to make them more visible processes, (d) the development of a conceptual framework
for the minimization of cognitive errors in trauma centers and (e) replication of the study by
looking at all or most trauma cases recorded for a particular trauma center for an entire year, with
the collaboration of emergency physicians who have an interest in decision-making processes
and in how physicians think during actual trauma codes.
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It seems that by large, there is far too little rather than more-than-enough information
available about physicians‘ thinking processes while making decisions in trauma-related events.
It is difficult to discern what physicians are thinking, because it is part of their culture.
Researchers studying medical doctors have brought to light the critical importance of decisionmaking in all disciplines of medicine and the need for collaborative efforts of multidisciplinary
research teams involving physicians, engineers, medical decision-making researchers and many
others (Croskerry, 2005).
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Appendix A
Level 1 and Level 2 Trauma Code Criteria
Level 1
Traumatic cardiac arrest


Hypotension or Shock (includes systolic blood pressure < 90 mmHg)
(It includes field intubation, inability to incubate, or assisted ventilations)


Glasgow Coma Scale < 8



Gun Shot Wound of neck or torso (chest, back, abdomen, or groin)



Receiving blood transfusion to maintain vital signs

Level 2


Heart rate < 50 or > 125



Respiratory rate < 10 or > 29



History of hypotension but normal blood pressure at present



Glasgow Coma Scale 8 – 10



Stab to torso



Gun Shot Wound to the head



Gun Shot Wound proximal to knee or elbow



Paralysis/suspect spinal cord injury



Amputation proximal to wrist or ankle



Neurovascular compromise in an extremity



Intubation at an outside hospital



Multisystem trauma on outside imaging



Significant neurologic injury (Glasgow Coma Scale < 10)
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Flail chest



Crush injury to pelvis



Auto versus pedestrian



Ejection from vehicle



Two or more long bone fractures

Burn Criteria Level 1


Any burn with Hypotension or Shock (systolic Blood Pressure < 90mmHG)



Any burn with threatened airway patency

Burn Criteria Level 2


15% total body surface area



10% total body surface area, age < 10 or >60



Burn patient incubated prior to arrival



Burn patient with obvious non-thermal injuries
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Appendix B
Physicians Specialties
1. Allergy
2. Anesthesiology
3. Cardiology
4. Critical care
5. Dermatology
6. Emergency Pediatrics
7. Emergency Toxicology
8. Emergency Medicine
9. Endocrinology
10. Family Medicine
11. Gastroenterology
12. Geriatrics
13. Hematology
14. Hospice Palliative Care
15. Hospitalist
16. Infectious Diseases
17. Internal Medicine
18. Neurology
19. Neurosurgery
20. OBGYN
21. OBGYN Gynecologic Oncology
22. OBGYN Maternal and Fetus Medicine
23. OBGYN Reproductive Medicine
24. Oncology Hematology
25. Oncology Radiation
26. Ophthalmology
27. Orthopedics
28. Orthopedics Hand Medicine
29. Orthopedics Sports Medicine
30. Otolaryngology
31. Otolaryngology Pediatrics
32. Pain Medicine
33. Pathology
34. Pediatrics Adolescent
35. Pediatric Cardiology
36. Pediatrics Critical Care
37. Pediatrics endocrinology

38. Pediatrics Gastroenterology
39. Pediatric Hematology
40. Pediatric Oncology
41. Pediatric Infectious Disease
42. Pediatrics Nephrology
43. Pediatrics Pulmonologist
44. Physical Medicine and Rehab
45. Psychiatry
46. Pulmonologist
47. Radiology
48. Radiology Interventional
49. Radiology Nuclear Medicine
50. Radiology Pediatric
51. Rheumatology
52. Surgery colon Recta;
53. Surgery General
54. Surgery Plastic
55. Surgery Oncological
56. Surgery Thoracic
57. Surgery Transplant
58. Surgery Vascular
59. Urology
60. Urology Pediatric
61. Women's Health

Appendix C
Details of Trauma Cases
Table C.1

15:06
15:10
15:12
18:30

Patient arrives at ED transported by EMS - CPR in
progress
CPR still in progress
Patient dies - Patient sent to morgue
Family and Police arrived

Mechanism of injury was a Mopped Bike Wreck

Physician
Decision

Glasgow
Coma Scale

Heart
Rate
Respiratory
Rate
Mechanism
of Injury
Oxygen
Level
Sa O2%
Pupils L/R

Blood
Pressure

Time

Trauma Case 1 – Motorcycle Crash

3

1

3
0

1
1

Observations
Patient arrived at ED
transported by EMS CPR in progress.
Trauma team places
collection of vital signs
on hold in order to
revive patient without
success. CPR continued
until patient expired.
Patient sent to morgue.
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Table C.2
Trauma Case 2 – Gunshot Wound to Lower Extremity
Time

4:39
4:44
5:01
5:06
5:37

Blood
Heart
Pressure Rate
110/80
135/72
131/70
125/70
126/89

84
78
89
83
90

Respiratory
Rate

Mechanism
of Injury

18
18
15
18
20

2
2
2
2
2

Oxygen
Level
Sa O2%
96
98
93
96
93

Pupils
L/R
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3

Glasgow
Coma
Scale
15
15
15
15
15

Physician
Decision
1
4
4
3
2

Observations
Gunshot wound to the
lower extremity.

Table C.3
Trauma Case 3 – Multiple Gunshot Wounds
Time

15:09
15:11
15:25
15:30
15:40
15:45
16:00
16:20

Blood
Pressure

Heart
Rate

Respiratory
Rate

Mechanism
of Injury

122/82
111/72
130/64
111/83
111/94
132/88
142/69
138/74

68
71
72
65
67
70
82
88

16
16
16
16
14
14
20
18

2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2

Oxygen
Level
Sa O2%
100
100
100
100
100
99
99
100

Pupils
L/R
2/2
2/2
2/2
2/2
2/2
2/2
2/2
2/2

Glasgow
Coma
Scale
15
15
15
15
15
15
15
15

Physician
Decision
4
4
1
1
1
3
2
1

Observations
Multiple gunshot
wounds.
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Table C.4
Trauma Case 4 – Vehicle Crash
Time

21:28
21:33
21:48
21:55
22:10
22:20
22:33
22:45
23:18
23:01
0:06
0:50
1:15

Blood
Pressure

Heart
Rate

Respiratory
Rate

Mechanism
of Injury

132/100
151/89
154/89
144/86
155/106
147/110
152/83
149/70
146/84
133/60
164/77
135/73
142/73

106
113
109
104
123
112
103
111
106
101
106
91
92

14
24
21
20
21
21
16
24
26
20
23
22
20

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

Oxygen
Level
Sa O2%
97
98
98
98
95
98
99
100
98
98
99
97
99

Pupils
L/R
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3

Glasgow
Coma
Scale
15
15
15
15
15
15
15
15
15
15
15
15
15

Physician
Decision
3
3
1
1
1
4
4
1
1
2
2
2
1

Observations
Vehicle crash. Patient
badly hurt. Patient was
very alert but very
uncooperative and
screaming at medical
staff.
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Table C.5
Trauma Case 5 – Severe Knife Stab
Time

Heart
Rate

Respiratory
Rate

Mechanism
of Injury

190/78
160/78
132/78
110/81
100/67

106
110
118
120
110

20
20
19
16
16

3
3
3
3
3

18:49
18:55
19:10
19:14
19:18

Blood
Pressure

Oxygen
Level
Sa O2%
99
99
99
99
100

Pupils
L/R
4/4
4/4
4/4
4/4
4/4

Glasgow
Coma
Scale
15
15
15
15
15

Physician
Decision
1
4
3
3
1

Observations
Patient transferred to WFU
from another hospital for a
higher level trauma center
facility. Severe knife stab
to the chest. Primary and
secondary assessments
conducted. Bleeding was
controlled. Patient sent to
the operating room for
surgery after being
stabilized.

Table C.6
Trauma Case 6 – Blunt Knife Stabs to Chest
Time

3:10
3:14
3:18
3:20
3:24
3:28

Blood
Pressure

Heart
Rate

Respiratory
Rate

Mechanism
of Injury

160/98
161/99
171/109
144/109
139/102
140/100

108
106
90
92
107
98

15
15
16
18
18
20

3
3
3
3
3
3

Oxygen
Level
Sa O2%
98
94
98
98
98
94

Pupils
L/R
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3

Glasgow
Coma
Scale
15
15
15
15
15
15

Physician
Decision
3
4
4
1
1
3

Observations
Chest wounds due to
multiple knife stabs.
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Table C.7
Trauma Case 7 – Vehicle Crash
Time

3:09
3:15
3:20
3:25
3:40
3:50
3:58
4:01
4:03
4:07
4:12
4:17

Blood
Pressure

Heart
Rate

Respiratory
Rate

Mechanism
of Injury

103/85
103/85
123/87
126/65
126/62
135/63
145/70
98/93
98/93
107/42
101/43
95/46

91
94
91
94
94
98
101
82
69
74
64
80

20
16
20
16
16
16
20
20
17
15
16
15

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

Oxygen
Level
Sa O2%
99
98
98
94
99
108
100
100
100
95
95
85

Pupils
L/R
4/4
4/4
4/4
4/4
4/4
4/4
4/4
4/4
4/4
4/4
4/4
4/4

Glasgow
Coma
Scale
8
8
8
9
9
10
10
10
9
15
15
15

Physician
Decision
3
3
4
4
4
1
1
1
2
2
1
1

Observations
Patient involved in a
vehicle crash. After
arrival at ED, patient
was stabilized, X-rays,
and sent to CT-scan
laboratory on the
stretcher in which the
patient arrived. Patient
mildly agitated.
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Table C.8
Trauma Case 8 – Vehicle Crash
Time

16:00
16:12
16:20
16:27
16:29
16:33
16:36
16:40
16:44
16:49
17:00
17:23
17:31

Blood
Pressure

Heart
Rate

Respiratory
Rate

Mechanism
of Injury

142/68
130/76
133/102
133/74
145/70
121/72
139/88
111/72
115/70
114/71
100/61
111/62
108/71

124
101
112
101
101
105
100
93
79
80
78
80
91

24
19
13
13
15
13
13
16
16
18
18
20
20

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

Oxygen
Level
Sa O2%
96
100
98
100
98
99
99
100
99
100
100
98
99

Pupils
L/R
2/2
2/2
2/2
2/2
2/2
2/2
2/2
2/2
2/2
2/2
2/2
2/2
2/2

Glasgow
Coma
Scale
9
9
9
9
9
9
8
8
15
15
15
15
15

Physician
Decision

Observations

1
1
1
3
3
4
4
3
3
2
3
3
4

Patient brought in by
EMS due to vehicle
crash. Possible spine
problems. Primary and
secondary assessments
at bedside conducted.
X-ray and CT-scan
were ordered by the
trauma team. Patient
arrived intubated.
Patient was extubated
and tolerated
procedure well.
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Table C.9
Trauma Case 9- Gunshot Wound
Time

2:05
2:09
2:12
2:18
2:20
2:50
3:00
3:05
3:09
3:15
3:28

Blood
Pressure

Heart
Rate

Respiratory
Rate

Mechanism
of Injury

148/98
160/56
139/62
132/87
140/73
124/82
154/78
152/98
124/71
142/91
135/77

88
85
86
88
87
70
70
89
88
86
88

20
20
16
16
20
18
17
18
18
17
18

2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2

Oxygen
Level
Sa O2%
93
95
90
95
96
94
95
95
94
94
95

Pupils
L/R

Glasgow
Coma
Scale
11
11
12
11
11
12
13
15
15
15
15

Physician
Decision
3
1
1
1
3
4
4
3
3
4
2

Observations
Gun Shot Wound
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Table C.10
Trauma Case 10 –Severely Burned
Time

19:10
19:15
19:20
19:23
19:28
19:38

Blood
Pressure

Heart
Rate

Respiratory
Rate

Mechanism
of Injury

130/70
123/75
125/73
116/73
120/79
126/79

97
101
101
99
98
98

18
13
15
18
18
17

4
4
4
4
4
4

Oxygen
Level
Sa O2%
96
96
96
96
97
97

Pupils
L/R
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3

Glasgow
Coma
Scale
15
15
15
15
15
15

Physician
Decision
3
4
4
3
1
3

Observations
Burned Patient.
Patient was working
on equipment that
caught fire, severely
burned patient. Patient
was first seen by
another hospital and
then transferred to a
higher level trauma
center at WFU.
Primary and secondary
assessments
performed again on
patient.
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Table C.11
Trauma Case 11 – Blunt Chest Wounds
Time

Blood
Pressure

Heart
Rate

Respiratory
Rate

Mechanism
of Injury

150/95
126/100
156/80
147/82
129/66
130/87

102
93
96
93
82
85

20
16
16
16
16
16

4
4
4
4
4
4

3:35
3:45
4:00
4:06
4:10
4:16

Oxygen
Level
Sa O2%
96
96
100
98
98
99

Pupils
L/R

Oxygen
Level
Sa O2%
96
96
96
97
97
100
98

Pupils
L/R

3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3

Glasgow
Coma
Scale
15
15
15
15
15
15

Physician
Decision

Observations

3
1
1
1
4
3

Patient transferred
from a lower level
trauma center for
higher care. Trauma
team suturing wounds.
Chest wounds.

Glasgow
Coma
Scale
15
15
15
15
15
15
15

Physician
Decision

Observations

Table C.12
Trauma Case 12 – Vehicle Crash
Time

21:51
21:52
21:58
22:05
22:09
22:10
22:19

Blood
Pressure

Heart
Rate

Respiratory
Rate

Mechanism
of Injury

122/48
109/90
121/70
124/54
124/79
130/74
133/73

106
104
101
107
106
98
105

16
17
18
19
20
16
20

1
1
1
1
1
1
1

3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3

1
1
3
3
3
4
3

Trauma team at
bedside conducted
primary and secondary
assessments. The
mechanism of injury
was a vehicle crash.
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Table C.13
Trauma Case 13 – Vehicle Crash
Time

22:32
22:37
22:43
22:48
22:53
22:56
22:59
23:01
23:10
23:20
23:25
23:30
23:40
23:46

Blood
Pressure

Heart
Rate

Respiratory
Rate

Mechanism
of Injury

134/102
140/83
140/90
138/87
140/83
132/84
142/92
130/100
124/79
133/76
135/89
111/89
122/81
130/77

102
103
102
92
98
95
106
98
94
89
93
93
93
80

19
16
14
13
19
20
16
18
15
13
20
22
18
22

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

Oxygen
Level
Sa O2%
94
96
96
98
97
98
98
95
95
96
95
94
95
97

Pupils
L/R
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3

Glasgow
Coma
Scale
8
8
9
9
10
12
12
12
12
12
13
15
15
15

Physician
Decision
1
4
3
3
3
4
3
2
2
1
1
1
3
3

Observations
Patient arrived by
EMS. Trauma team in
place at bedside.
Primary and secondary
assessments
conducted. Patient was
stabilized.
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Table C.14
Trauma Case 14 – Vehicle Crash
Time

7:44
7:45
7:46
7:47
7:48
7:49
7:50
7:51
7:52
7:53
7:54

Blood
Pressure

0

Heart
Rate

0

Respiratory
Rate

0

Mechanism
of Injury

1

Oxygen
Level
Sa O2%

0

Pupils
L/R

5

Glasgow
Coma
Scale

0

Physician
Decision
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

Observations
Patient arrived at ED
via EMS with CPR in
progress. All Vital
Signs collection was
placed on hold in
order to revive patient.
Trauma team had no
success in reviving
patient. Patient
expired at 07:54 AM,
ten minutes after
arrival in trauma
center.
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